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Abstract
In this dissertation I examine the impact of education on a range of civic outcomes in
Italy and the UK which embody two of the main dimensions of social capital: civic
engagement and social trust. The central aim of this thesis is to attain a credible re-
lationship between education and civic outcomes, accounting for diverse issues which
may obscure it. Namely, unobservables driving education choices (i.e., endogeneity),
and the tendency to under-report sensitive topics and over-report civic opinions (i.e.,
misclassification). This approach allows me to ascertain the extent to which the
causal effect of schooling on the civic indicators is either genuine or is driven mainly
by endogeneity and a systematic misreporting by educational levels. I also investigate
how these elements vary by contextual factors of the two countries. The contribution
in this area is given by utilizing data from these two countries, considering a distinct
group of civic outcomes (i.e., civic opinions and civic behaviours) and by dealing
with misreporting. Previous research does not explicitly control for misclassification
and focuses on civic engagement, one aspect of social capital. Furthermore, I con-
tribute by introducing a hurdle ordered probit with misclassification to account for
two issues regarding the distribution of a self-reported ordered outcome, its skewness
and its misclassification. The main findings are: (i) for Italy, qualitative overall con-
clusions regarding the causality of education on civic outcomes are indeed affected
when accounting for misclassification: education turns out to be insignificant across
civic behaviours, (ii) for the UK, on the contrary, education has significant positive
effects on all civic outcomes due to upward biases induced by endogeneity, (iii) both
Italy and the UK, however, do not differ substantially overall with regards to misre-
porting: most civic outcomes are misclassified for either country, and misreporting is
more severe for civic behaviours due to a larger influence of social desirability.
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Education provides varied benefits to society, for instance, increasing productiv-
ity, impacting upon individual health and well-being, crime reduction and higher
economic growth. The wide range of positive externalities deriving from education
can be explained by the relationship between human and social capital, broadly de-
fined as informal rules and norms that, along with the formal rules, establish an
institutional framework (Chhibbert (2000)). Indeed, there is evidence which sug-
gests that countries and communities with a higher stock of social capital are more
likely to present superior human development (e.g., Poortinga (2006a), Groot et al.
(2007), and Snelgrove et al. (2009)) and a higher economic performance (e.g., Maskell
(2000), Zak and Knack (2001), Francois (2002), and Halpern (2005)).
In turn, the level of social capital, formally, “networks, together with shared
norms, values and understandings which facilitate cooperation within or among
groups” (Healy and Cote (2001), p. 41), can be enhanced by increasing school-
ing levels. For instance, van Oorschot and Finsveen (2009) argue that education is
often one of the most important determinants of social capital found in the different
empirical studies. Regardless of their income level, higher educated individuals are
more likely to participate in social networks, be engaged in politics and volunteering
activities, and have a stronger trust in other people (Delhey and Newton (2003), van
Oorschot and Arts (2005), Bekkers (2007)).
In this dissertation I examine, for Italy and the UK, the impact of education
on a range of civic outcomes that embody some of the main dimensions of social
capital. Hence, the chosen working hypothesis is with causality going from human to
social capital. Intuitively, higher educated individuals are better informed and more
capable when interpreting and processing information, more conscious about the
consequences of their actions and others, as well as more likely to be civically engaged,
all of these being crucial components of social capital. More specifically, my main
interest throughout the dissertation is to attain a “credible” relationship between
education and civic outcomes. Unobserved factors driving education choices (i.e.,
endogeneity) and the tendency of individuals to under-report socially undesirable
1
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behaviours (i.e., misclassification), are both elements which contribute to obscure
the true relationship between education and civic outcomes. I tackle these issues and
also investigate how these elements vary by contextual factors of the two countries.
Finally, I propose an extension to discrete choice models to deal with highly skewed
responses of a misclassified outcome.
The human to social capital framework has been adopted in several studies which
argue that educational attainment increases social capital (see, for instance, La Porta
et al. (1997), Glaeser et al. (2000), Curtis et al. (2001), van Oorschot and Arts
(2005), Helliwell and Putnam (2007)). There are also cross country investigations
that provide evidence on the direct relationship between schooling and social capital.
For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that trust and civic norms are stronger
in nations with more educated populations. Recently, in a study that includes 28
European nations, Gesthuizen et al. (2008) conclude that educational attainment
increases nearly all indicators of both formal (participation in formally constituted
civic organizations) and informal (social ties between individuals and their friends,
families, colleagues, etc.) social capital. The same evidence is contained in the meta
analysis study of Huang et al. (2009) who assess the effect of schooling on two of the
main dimensions of social capital (i.e., social trust and social participation) in a large
number of evaluations, and find that education is a strong and robust correlate of
individual social capital. Similarly, Allum et al. (2010), when fitting a measurement
model for three elements of social capital (social trust, institutional trust and civic
association) using European data, they also find that education is a strong predictor.
There are diverse interpretations on the positive influence of education on the
dimensions of social capital.1 There is consensus in the literature that social capital is
an umbrella concept, a multidimensional construct, and therefore multiple indicators
are needed if these dimensions are to be measured properly (e.g., Johnston and Percy-
Smith (2003), van Oorschot et al. (2006)). Then, due to its multidimensional nature,
it is unsurprising that there is no a single cause for shifting social capital. Certainly,
many determinants have been identified on each level of analysis. At the micro-level,
social capital is affected by personality type, age, family, class, education, work,
religion, and consumption habits. At the meso-level, social capital is affected by civil
society, school, community, ethnic and social heterogeneity, mobility, transportation
habits/infrastructure, and urban design. Finally, at the macro-level, social capital is
directly affected by history and culture, social structure and hierarchy, labour-market
trends as well as the size and nature of the welfare state.
1For an interesting review, see Halpern (2005), Chapter 5. He identifies three levels of social capital:
micro (individual), meso (community) and macro (region, national), and argues that education
affects social capital primarily at the micro level.
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With regards to the geographical distribution of social capital over European
regions, research suggests a range of driving forces which are present at different
levels of the analysis. At the macro level, for example, an extended welfare state
creates a national norm of social solidarity and fellow feeling which is conducive
to higher trust levels amongst individuals (Curtis et al. (2001), van Oorschot and
Finsveen (2010)). Furthermore, explanations at the meso-level are based on social
skills learnt at school and the relatively higher levels of utility that individuals with
increasing level of social capital obtain from social interaction (Glaeser et al. (2002)).
Alongside schooling, religion is often cited as another important determinant at
the micro-level (Wuthnow (1999), Putnam (2000), Smidt (2003)). There are two
general explanations of why religion should foster social capital formation. The first
perspective views religiosity primarily as a cultural phenomenon, thereby stressing
the effects of religious beliefs, norms, identities, and world views. The second per-
spective focuses on structural aspects of religiosity and thus on the effects that result
from social integration and active participation in religious communities (Traunmu¨ller
(2010)). Moreover, because social trust has an important foundation in moral beliefs,
different religious identities may explain variations in individuals’ propensity to place
trust in others. In particular, a country with a dominant protestant culture tends
to show a higher level of trustworthiness, while a catholic country tends to display
lower levels of trust in others and in institutions (Delhey and Newton (2005), van
Oorschot et al. (2006), Bjørnskov (2008)). This is principally explained in the liter-
ature (see, e.g., Putnam et al. (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Verba et al. (1995), Lam
(2006)) with two arguments. Firstly, by the fact that protestant norms and values
extend social trust from close kin to people in general, whereas there is a distrustful
familism inherent in catholicism. Secondly, by their respective organisational struc-
ture: an egalitarian and horizontal network structure of protestantism which is more
conducive to the formation of mutual trust than the hierarchical structure of catholi-
cism. Note that Italy and the UK are distinct as far as religious composition and
welfare policies are concerned.
From a theoretical point of view, the sociological literature proposes two theories:
the socialisation and resource perspectives (Gesthuizen et al. (2008)) which account
for the relationship between education and formal and informal social capital. Firstly,
the crucial assumption of the socialisation perspective is that the origins of social cap-
ital are rooted in a process by which individuals are subject to devoting their efforts
to a collective good, internalising norms. Parents and teachers alike, play an impor-
tant role in this process as they are socialising agents who teach individuals moral
values and stress the importance of being good citizens. Because higher educated
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individuals are most likely to originated from privileged backgrounds whose parents
are more educated too, there is also an intergenerational transmission of social capi-
tal (Bekkers (2007)). In short, schooling fosters social capital through a socialisation
process at school, at home as well as through social networks. There is, however, a
growing body of research which suggests that social attitudes such as trust have a
genetic basis (see, e.g., Hatemi et al. (2009)). For example, in a recent paper using
samples of twins, Sturgis et al. (2010b) find that interpersonal trust is an important
component of personality, with environmental influences having a discernable effect.
This questions the hypothesis of the development of trust through the socialization
process at an early stage of the life-course. Secondly, the resource perspective pre-
dicts a differential impact of education instead, being concentrated in the formal (or
visible) aspects of social capital. More educated individuals contribute to the formal
sphere of social capital (e.g., donations to and membership of volunteering for orga-
nizations) as this allows them to preserve their status position. This is not the case
with less publicly or informal activities such as contact with colleagues, neighbours,
and offering informal help (Pichler and Wallace (2007)).
It should be noted, however, that it is also probable that economic and social
well-being lead to enhanced social capital, with causal effects running in both direc-
tions. This is in line with a range of hypotheses. For instance, in the seminal work of
Coleman (1988), the connection of human and social capital is through family social
capital. In particular, he suggests that communities rich in trust and social connec-
tions achieve low rates of high school drop outs, with individuals in families with
stronger bonds, more likely to succeed in education since they have easier access to
adults’ human capital. Moreover, mutual trust is considered by some authors endoge-
nous to certain elements of the social structure (Torsvik (2004)) and social capital
itself regarded as context-dependent (Fine (2001)) and, consequently, may provide
an environment where schooling thrives.2 Similarly, this bidirectional connection is
further supported by studies (Glaeser et al. (2002), Groot et al. (2007)) that, upon
empirical evidence, deem human and social capital as complements. Putnam (2000)
assumes that child development is strongly shaped by social capital and states that
where there is high social capital there is also high education performance. This
simultaneity is clearly highlighted by Durlauf (2002) who critically examines various
identification problems of leading studies in the field. In fact, according to Dekker
and Uslaner (2001), due to the complexity and contesting nature of social capital,
there is growing awareness that social capital can be both cause and effect.
2Bjørnskov (2009), on the contrary, proposes a reverse causality where social trust affects schooling’s
growth by means of lowering transaction costs.
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In the thesis, I address the previous criticisms of the human to social capital
framework. For example, in Chapters 4 and 5 which contain the empirical analysis
of Italy and the UK, I deal with simultaneity (or endogeneity) of education when
modeling civic outcomes in line with research in the economic literature (e.g., Dee
(2004), Milligan et al. (2004)). Here, the main hypothesis regarding the linkage of
schooling and civic engagement stems from the political science field as models of
civic participation. I discuss an alternative theoretical model for the association
between education and civic opinions (i.e., civic voluntarism) in Section 1.3. I am
able to offer a robust relationship between these two elements throughout the thesis,
by using alternative models regarding the causality of education and civic outcomes
as well as methodologically accounting for empirical concerns raised in the literature
(such as misreporting).
1.2. SOCIAL CAPITAL, ITS IMPACT ON WELL BEING AND CIVIC OUTCOMES
TAXONOMY
Social capital is a contested concept. The extent to which elements should be
included as part of social capital to accomplish an operationalised definition in em-
pirical research, has been subjected to important debate.3 I begin this section by
discussing in more detail, definitions of social capital and how they are related to the
array of civic outcomes studied in this dissertation. As mentioned earlier, I consider
the concept of social capital a heuristic notion which provides a conceptual framework
to analyze the relationship between education and civic outcomes.
Early seminal studies within the field include the works from Bourdieu (1986),
Coleman (1988), and Putnam et al. (1993), Putnam (1995). Albeit with different in-
terpretations (for instance, Bourdieu’s concept of social capital emphasises conflicts
and the power function), all of these authors stress the crucial role that social net-
works, trust and norms play to achieve common goals in society.4 The three features
of social capital, networks, norms (to a lesser extent) and trust, are the elements
which tend to dominate the conceptual discussion around social capital (Schuller
et al. (2000)). I discuss the concepts of trust and networks below.
Within the social capital literature, Fukuyama’s work on trust is well acknowl-
edged. He defines trust as: “the expectation that arises within a community of regu-
lar, honest and cooperative behaviour based on commonly shared norms on the part
3For some interesting reviews of the concept from sociological, political science and economics
perspectives, see Schuller et al. (2000), and Prakash and Selle (2004).
4A popular definition due to Putnam is: “features of social life –networks, norms, and trust– that
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam (1995),
p. 66).
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of other members of that society” (Fukuyama (1995), p. 26). A nation’s well-being,
the ability to compete, etc., are mainly explained by this cultural characteristic.
Social norms influence people’s behaviours by constraining them, lower transaction
costs (as it is not needed to write contracts that capture all contingencies), and aid
the exchange of information. Shared norms are generalised attitudes towards be-
haviours that are accepted by most individuals/groups as ‘correct’ (e.g., giving up
a seat in bus to somebody who needs it). Trustworthiness is based on ‘commonly
shared norms’, the norm of reciprocal behaviour. A society that is characterised by
generalised reciprocity, defined by Putnam (2000) as widespread and transitive trust
and trustworthiness among the members of a large group, is more efficient than a
distrustful society as it facilitates collective action for mutual benefit (van Oorschot
et al. (2006)).
Social trust is then crucial and, by dividing nations into low and high trust soci-
eties, one is able to explain a dissimilar economic progress for each group according
to Fukuyama. Because trust and reputation for trustworthiness are instrumental
in: increasing the willingness to trade (Uslaner (2002)), lowering transactions’ costs
(Dasgupta (2000)) and achieving higher institutional quality and lower corruption
(Uslaner (2008)), one observes in high-trust societies the development of large scale
(and efficient) corporations out of family firms through the medium of the ‘rich and
complex civic society’. Conversely, in low-trust societies, the limitation on trust leads
to enterprise being restricted to the ‘family’ and the ‘rich and complex civic society’
to be replaced by a centralised state. Note that Italy is classified as a low-trust so-
ciety, with small and inefficient organisations and trade carried out under influence
and corruption (Fukuyama (1995)).
Furthermore, trust creates networks’ externalities. The reciprocal component of
trustworthiness allows norms and information to flow across networks and so are
an essential part of them. Networks are either based on trust amongst: strangers
or distant people (bridging social capital), familiar (bonding social capital), and
with people in positions of power (linking social capital) (Woolcock (1998)). The
prevalence of particular types of bonding social capital has collateral downside effects.
A common example is that of criminal gangs creating bonding social capital. This
links naturally to Fukuyama’s idea on low-trust societies where limitation of trust
leads to enterprise and networks to be restricted to closed-knit groups.
Alternatively, one can look at the problem of trust via the overall institutional
environment (Rothstein (2005), Chapter 5). It is very unlikely that individuals would
trust the majority of people if institutions do not ensure justice and fairness.5 There
5This is reflected by regional disparities in the level of bonding capital and institutional quality in
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is a similar positive correlation between trustworthiness and trust in institutions,
in other words, in countries where people trust institutions more, there is also a
higher level of civic morality. van Oorschot et al. (2006) state that this result is
parallel to the hypothesis of Putnam et al. (1993) by which sheer participation in
civic organizations forms habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness.
On the contrary, bridging social capital is mainly deemed a key factor for a civic
society, economic development and good institutions. I now introduce the array of
civic outcomes studied in the thesis and also present a taxonomy of these indicators.
The set of questions on civic outcomes (or dependent variables) for Italy are as
follows. Firstly, ‘interest in politics’ and the ‘problem of tax evasion’, are clearly
related to opinions about the political field and are classified as “civic opinions”.
Secondly, whether the following behaviours are acceptable: ‘not paying for your
ticket on public transport’6, ‘keeping money obtained by accident when it could
be returned’ and ‘not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally
scraped’, are denoted as “civic behaviours”. This array of civic outcomes fits into the
social capital framework proposed by Uphoff (2000), who divides social capital into
“structural social capital” (civic engagement) and “cognitive social capital” (social
trust). The former type is associated with various forms of social organisation while
the latter indicates mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and
ideology and, more specifically by norms, values and beliefs.
These two categories of social capital are highly interdependent, as each form
contributes to the other and both affect behaviour through the mechanism of expec-
tations. Norms, values, attitudes and beliefs, by creating expectations about how
people should act, by implication, create expectations about how people will act
(Uphoff (2000), p. 218). For example, values and attitudes create an expectation as
to whether an individual will keep money or not when it could easily be returned.
Moreover, there is evidence (Woolcock and Narayan (2000)) that political interest,
political action and measures of trust are associated. Sundquist and Yang (2007)
interpret this correlation by arguing that political involvement is an important com-
ponent of trust and a good indicator of bridging social capital.
Structural forms of social capital are observable and externalised in contrast to
cognitive forms. Civic opinions belong to judgments on the political field and hence
are externalised through social organisations, but not people’s behaviours (at least
the ones studied in this thesis) as they are largely influenced by values and beliefs.
Another taxonomy of social capital that provides support to my categorisation of civic
Italy which is often cited as a typical empirical example. See Section 2.2 for details.
6This variable is also used in Knack and Keefer (1997).
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indicators is Krishna (2000). The first dimension is ‘institutional capital’: structural
elements (roles, rules, procedures and organizations) that facilitate mutually benefi-
cial collective action. The second is ‘relational capital’: values, attitudes, norms, and
beliefs that predispose individuals toward cooperation with others. Civic opinions
belong to the first and civic behaviours to the second.
Although I use social capital as a framework, it should be noted that there are
certain elements omitted from the civic indicators for the Italian case which are
measured by statistical offices. For example, social interaction, social networks and
social support (usually measured by contact with friends, family, neighbours, etc.)
are not captured by the current indicators.7
The UK analysis employs more indicators than Italy. But it should be pointed
out that, because one of the aims in the analysis of the UK is to provide a validation
of the results for Italy, the core group of civic outcomes are equivalent across the
two countries. The UK’s civic opinions are: ‘interest in politics’, ‘pay attention to
politics’, ‘discuss politics’ and being ‘active in a voluntary organisation’. Moreover,
the three civic behaviours measure the extent to which the following statements are
justified: ‘failing to report accidental damage done to a parked vehicle’, ‘keeping
money that you have found’, and ‘avoiding a fare on public transport’. Note that
the group of civic behaviours is identical to the ones for Italy. In addition, I include
outcomes related to politics, voting and social trust. Namely, whether respondents
believe that ‘political activity takes too much time and effort’, ‘family and friends
think that voting is a waste of time’, ‘feel very guilty if not vote’, ‘neglect my duty
as a citizen if not vote’, as well as outcomes concerning interpersonal trust and trust
in institutions, that is, whether ‘most people can be trusted’ and whether they ‘trust
the local government’. These indicators represent another dimension of social capital
which is not captured for the previous Italian indicators, such as social participation
and interpersonal trust.
Although the array of indicators for the UK fits into the earlier social capital
framework of Uphoff (2000), a slightly different framework by van Oorschot et al.
(2006) is more suitable, which contains three dimensions for social capital: i) net-
works, ii) trust, and iii) civism. Each dimension has two aspects. First, in the
network dimension, they distinguish participation in voluntary organisations and so-
cialising with family and friends. Second, the trust dimension embodies generalized
7The Office of National Statistics (UK) identified five dimensions of social capital (Green and
Fletcher (2003)). Namely, views about the local area (e.g., satisfaction with living in the area,
problems in area), civic participation (e.g., propensity to vote, action on local and national issues),
social networks and support (e.g., contact with friends and relatives), social participation (e.g., in-
volvement in groups and voluntary activities), reciprocity and trust (e.g., trusting other people).
The chosen indicators for Italy mainly capture two of those: trust and civic participation.
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trust (interpersonal trust, trust in people) and trust in institutions (state institutions
such as the health care system, the justice system, parliament, the police, etc.). Indi-
viduals’ attitudinal and behavioural characteristics are given by the last dimension,
civism, that contains as a first aspect, trustworthiness (people’s civic commitment
and morality) and as a second aspect, people’s political engagement (similar to link-
ing social capital). Therefore, most of the thesis’ UK indicators belong to the third
dimension, civism, with civic behaviours measuring the degree of trustworthiness and
civic opinions, the aspect of political engagement. The analysis, however, includes
further outcomes for the remaining dimensions of trust and networks. Hence, all
three dimensions of social capital are represented. I now turn to a brief discussion of
the impact of social capital impact on well being.
There are various mechanisms by which social capital fosters economic growth and
individuals’ human development. The impact of social capital on these two aspects
is the key reason as to why obtaining a credible causal link between education and
social capital (the main objective throughout this dissertation) is vital. The overall
argument is that social capital influences economic performance through trust as its
pivotal element. Trust incentives markets to function efficiently by reducing inter-firm
transaction costs (due to reputation and informal sanctions supplementing formal
contracts and sanctions), by increasing exchange of knowledge between firms and by
enhancing the division of labour by lowering costs of coordination (Maskell (2000)).
Yet, a deeper insight into the relationship of “social capital-well being” is achieved
by looking at specific effects by levels of social capital. Halpern (2005) divides these
effects by the three levels of social capital: individual or micro level; community or
meso level; regional, national or macro level.
Firstly, at the individual level, certain types of bonding social capital (e.g., hav-
ing a supportive family) can have a substantial effect on educational attainment and
future earnings. Bridging network social capital is also very helpful in the labour mar-
ket. For instance, the probability of unemployment decreases if individuals belong to
networks of interconnected agents as they have a higher access to and exchange of in-
formation. In addition, participation in intercommunity networks reduces incentives
for rent seeking and cheating, promoting economic growth (Beugelsdijk and Smulders
(2009)). Secondly, the stock of social capital within a community has an impact on
house prices as well as the characteristics of a neighbourhood, such as school quality
and low crime. Thirdly, social capital at the macro level boosts economic growth
partly through its positive effects upon the formal structures of government, as it is
strongly associated with lower government corruption8, higher bureaucratic quality
8 Several studies (e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006))) show the negative effects of corruption on economic
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and compliance with paying taxes (Halpern (2005)). There are numerous studies
that show that social capital affects the level of democracy and economic growth.
Dincer and Uslaner (2010) find a positive relationship between trust and growth
across U.S. states. Using data from a mixed group of countries (i.e., low, middle,
and high-income) Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001) and Beugelsdijk
et al. (2004) find a positive effect of trust on economic growth as well. (See also the
previous review of Fukuyama (1995)).
The second motivation in obtaining a credible relationship between education and
civic outcomes is founded on the direct effect of social capital on human development.
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that distinct levels (or types) of social
capital are significant determinants of crucial health outcomes, such as self-rated
health and suicides rates (e.g., Subramanian et al. (2002), Helliwell (2006), Poortinga
(2006a), Sundquist and Yang (2007)). Recently, Groot et al. (2007) provide evidence
that a higher stock of social capital increases people’s life satisfaction as well. Social
capital affects well being via different channels.9
At the individual level, social capital provides social and material support in
adverse times. Strong bonding ties, for instance, tend to offer emotional support,
which in turn has a positive impact on health, especially mental health, mainly via
psychological mechanisms, such as personal control and stress reduction (Ferlander
(2007)).10 At the meso level, socially cohesive communities have better access to
local health services because they are more likely to be successful at fighting potential
cuts in services and more effective at exercising social control over different health
behaviours such as drug abuse. Finally, at the macro level, a deeper trust in a society
leads to a higher efficiency of health institutions.
Equivalent mechanisms are proposed by Szreter and Woolcock (2004) but in terms
of types of social capital. They argue that bonding social capital is important for the
necessary social support; bridging social capital, for solidarity and respect across the
social spectrum; and linking social capital for the effective mobilization of political
institutions and will. In short, there is a growing body of evidence on how social
capital plays an important role in shaping people’s health.
A spurious relationship may be obtained if one does not account for measurement
error in the causal link of schooling on civic outcomes. Controlling for measurement
error in the two components of this association is vital. One could not argue of
growth. Corruption simply acts as an additional tax which slows economic growth (Dincer and
Uslaner (2010)).
9For more details, see Poortinga (2006b) and references therein.
10Although she argues that for the provider it can be stressful and hence have negative health effects.
In consequence, she stresses the need to incorporate the mutuality of social relations when looking
at the impact of social capital on health.
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the benefits of education in terms of economic growth and health via its impact on
key facets of social capital (i.e., civic engagement and social trust) if the observed
relationship is plagued with inaccuracies. This might be the case for certain civic
outcomes used in the thesis as they are self-reported measures which try to recover
sensitive information. Therefore, observed responses to civic outcomes and their ‘true’
responses may differ and are probably misreported. Similarly, education decisions
(the other element of the relationship) are likely to be affected by unobserved factors
which simultaneously affect answers to civic outcomes. This could also obscure the
causal link education-civic outcomes. Measurement error in the relationship may
vary at the macro level too as a consequence of the cultural and contextual factors
of the two countries.
In summary, misclassification of civic outcomes as well as endogeneity of schooling
should be accounted for, otherwise the former reasons (i.e., social capital’s impact on
economic growth and individuals’ health) from the literature may not be applicable.
This is why the key and core idea throughout this dissertation is how measurement
error affects causality.11
1.3. A MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
As previously stated, the array of civic outcomes can be separated into two groups:
civic opinions and civic behaviours. The former group represents knowledge of cur-
rent political issues whereas the latter is guided by trust and enforcing norms. Civic
opinions indirectly measure political participation, as individuals who are more inter-
ested in politics and discuss political issues are more likely to vote. Crucially, raising
a society’s interest in politics generally makes its citizens more politically active (Pat-
tie et al. (2003)). Moreover, psychological involvement or participation in politics is
highly correlated with individuals’ socioeconomic resources (Miller (1992), p. 429).
Hence, results for the civic opinions of the dissertation can be related to hypothesis
from the economic literature regarding the association of schooling and voting, as
well as theories from the political science field, where political engagement is based
on a socioeconomic model of participation. This partly allows me to depart from the
social capital literature when investigating the ‘schooling-civic opinions’ causal link,
and focusing on the political and economic literature instead.12 I begin by examin-
ing an explanatory model of political activity: civic voluntarism. I use some of its
features in the analytical Chapters 4 and 5, particularly when examining endogeneity.
11A detailed explanation of the thesis’ outline is contained in Section 1.4.
12This departure is only partial as social capital is present in most aspects of life. Political engage-
ment is clearly influenced by bonding social capital. For example, younger individuals would be
more keen on politics if their parents are politically affiliated.
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Verba et al. (1995) investigate the process of political participation proposing a
civic voluntarism model13 that rests on three factors: resources, psychological en-
gagement with politics, and access to networks through which individuals can be
recruited to political life. In other words, those who are able to take part, who want
to take part, and who are asked to take part, are more likely to do so. Of the three
factors they place more emphasis on resources, because causality and interpretability
are easier to establish. They argue that certain resources (especially time, money,
and civic skills) are necessary for political participation. Educational attainment has
a particular primacy to acquire these. In fact, not only does education have a di-
rect impact on political activity, it also affects the acquisition of each of the sets of
factors that facilitate participation: the well-educated are more likely to earn higher
incomes; to develop civic skills at work, in non-political organisations; to be in so-
cial networks through which requests for political activity are mediated; and to be
politically interested and knowledgeable (Verba et al. (2005)).
Additionally, an individual’s family socioeconomic background also influences all
these factors and consequently his future political activity. Verba et al. (2005) offer
some explanations of this process.
On the one hand, privileged families are more likely to boast a politically rich
home environment dominated by frequent political discussions, with politically ac-
tive parents acting as role models. Children growing up in such families would clearly
have distinguished political orientations, which most probably would make them more
psychologically motivated to participate in politics as adults. On the other hand, par-
ents’ economic background will ultimately determine their children’s socioeconomic
position through the education they provide them, which in turn affects their future
jobs and income. In turn, their position in society will affect their political activity
because, participatory resources such as civic skills developed in school and in adult
institutional settings (e.g., jobs) as well as location of recruitment networks, are all
more easily attainable to certain society stratum.14 In other words, the transmis-
sion of political activity from generation to generation initially operates through the
political richness of the home environment, and then during a child’s education by
affecting the participatory factors resources, recruitment, and motivation.
The civic voluntarism framework, however, shares several features with the social
capital concept that has been discussed in the thesis so far. For example, the input for
political psychological motivation is essentially stimulation provided at home, clearly
bonding social capital or social capital at the micro level.
13See also Brady et al. (1995) and Burns et al. (2001).
14Moreover, education can increase analytic ability and allows more educated individuals to have a
greater capacity for absorbing and organizing complex political information.
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There is also a consensus in the economic literature that education is positively
associated with civic outcomes. I introduce a couple of important studies. Dee (2004)
shows that schooling has a significant effect on voter participation and support for
free speech for the US, as well as in the quality of civic knowledge as measured by the
frequency of newspaper readership. He also finds that the impact of schooling holds
for different levels of education, both at the post-secondary and the secondary levels,
and has a strong and independent effect on most measures of civic engagement and at-
titudes. Similarly, Milligan et al. (2004) find a strong relationship between education
and voting in the US and also evidence that education increases citizens’ attention
to public affairs and to following politics. Both studies use explanations from the
civic voluntarism model when explaining the instrumental variable approach to con-
trol for unobservables. For instance, Milligan et al. (2004), discuss unobservables
at the home environment level which influences both schooling and civic outcomes.
That is, they argue that some parents who encourage their children to participate
in civic activities also instill in their children a taste for education. This strand of
the economic literature, however, only focuses on one dimension of social capital,
ignoring social trust, and does not explicitly account for misclassification. The thesis
goes beyond this existing research by including social behaviours and investigating
misclassification. This is the key contribution of Chapters 4 and 5.
1.4. DISSERTATION’S OUTLINE, METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The core of the thesis consists of three Chapters which take into account the earlier
mentioned issues affecting the causality of education on civic outcomes, so as to attain
a convincing association between them. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are self-contained and
can be read independently, hence, separate conclusions are included at the end of each
of them. The data and methodological Chapters (i.e., Chapters 2 and 3, respectively)
should be read alongside them but, otherwise, they are independent. Chapter 5 could
also be seen as a robustness analysis, where some of the key results of Chapter 4 are
replicated using a different dataset for the UK. Chapter 7 offers overall conclusions
linking all the dissertation’s results with the literature review in this introductory
Chapter. Below, I present the dissertation’s outline and contributions.
As discussed in detail in Section 1.2, the principal reason to concentrate on the
current set of civic outcomes is due to their dual impact on economic growth and
individuals’ health. This holds in the thesis’ conceptual framework as the indica-
tors embody key dimensions of social capital. Within this framework, my focus is
particularly on the causal effect of schooling since it is considered one of the main
factors influencing social capital. On the one hand, this is the key motivation of the
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thesis from a theoretical outlook. By focusing on Italy and on the UK, I attempt to
extend the previous research in this area from both the economic and social capital
literature, and I am also able to discern to what extent, causality and the issues
which affect the linkage between schooling and civic outcomes, vary by the contex-
tual factors (e.g., welfare policy, wealth, religion, cultural aspects, etc.) of these two
countries. From a methodological point of view, on the other hand, the main interest
throughout the dissertation is to attain a “credible” relationship between education
and civic outcomes, accounting for diverse issues which may obscure it.
Figure 1.1 provides a diagram of the different Chapters. In particular, the Chap-
ters are linked as follows. Let x and y denote observed values of education and civic
outcomes, respectively. Since education choices are driven by unobserved factors, one
does not observe the true value of schooling x∗ and the original relationship f would
be biased. One needs to recover the true relationship g by accounting for endogeneity.
But g assumes that the true civic outcomes y are observed. However, because civic
outcomes are likely to be misreported, Chapters 4 and 5 look at whether the origi-
nal association of the true variable of interest x∗ to outcomes y still holds when one
accounts for the tendency to underreport socially undesirable behaviours and over-
report socially desirable ones. Thus, I assume that the true values of civic outcomes
are not observed: ω 6= y. This response pattern is known in social psychology as so-
cial desirability. The causal effect is now denoted by h. Also note that relationship h
could be endogenous to each country’s social structure. Finally, Chapter 6, explores
this in more depth, and proposes an econometric/causality model which takes into
account the characteristics of the distribution of a sub-group of civic outcomes. That
is, the skewness and misclassification of civic behaviours are introduced in a hurdle
model. The remainder of this section discusses each Chapter and its contributions in
more detail.
Chapters 4 and 5 attempt to identify the causal effect of education on an array
of measures of civic engagement in Italy and in the UK respectively, addressing the
endogeneity and misclassification problems. Despite numerous reasons to expect a
positive association between education and civic outcomes, estimates may not pro-
vide a valid relationship unless one takes into account the potential endogeneity of
education. For example, it is likely that parents who foster an interest in further
education in their children, also instil into them the importance of being civically re-
sponsible. Intelligence is also an unobservable which would simultaneously influence
education decisions and levels of trust. Indeed, as argued by Sturgis et al. (2010a)
intelligence fosters greater interpersonal trust as more intelligent individuals are more
accurate in their assessments of the trustworthiness of others. This means that more
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Figure 1.1.— Dissertation’s outline.
intelligent people are less often betrayed over the life-course and therefore are able
to benefit from norms of reciprocity. In line with other approaches (e.g., Oreopoulos
(2007), Brunello et al. (2009)), to account for endogeneity I use educational reforms
in both countries which are sources of exogenous variation in individuals’ level of
schooling but are otherwise unrelated to civic outcomes.
These two Chapters also deal with misclassification. Chapter 4, in particular, is
an extension of the article Di Pietro and Delprato (2009) because it simultaneously
considers misreporting and the potential endogeneity of education. In the former
study the focus is on the causal effect of education on an array of measures of civic
engagement in Italy, but only addressing the endogeneity problem and associated
bias’ sources on this relationship. In particular, the aim of Di Pietro and Delprato
(2009) is whether the direction of the biases vary across civic indicators.
Misreporting represents deviation between the recorded answer to a survey ques-
tion and the underlying attribute being measured. This frequently occurs when
respondents are asked questions about socially and personally sensitive issues. Typ-
ically, individuals would tend to underreport socially undesirable behaviours and
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over-report socially desirable ones. This is known as social desirability bias in social
psychology (see, King and Bruner (2000), Hattie et al. (2006)). In Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5, I examine how the causal link, given by the education coefficient in a
standard ordered probit, may be affected by misreporting of the self-reported civic
outcomes. Following the approach of Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) and Dustmann
and van Soest (2004), estimates from an ordered probit are compared with those
from an ordered probit with misclassification.15
I draw on findings from social psychology and political science when setting up
various hypothesis in terms of misclassification patterns, by group of civic outcomes
and by educational levels. For instance, numerous arguments in political science
support over-reporting of civic opinions (e.g., Bernstein et al. (2001)). The chosen
approach allows me to establish the extent to which the causal effect of schooling
on the civic indicators is genuine or whether it is mainly driven by a systematic
over-reporting of more educated individuals relative to the less educated ones.
As before, the main empirical contribution is given by using an array of civic
outcomes and, crucially, to account for misclassification. Previous research study-
ing the causal link of education and civic outcomes does not explicitly control for
misclassification and focuses on one aspect of social capital, civic engagement. By
including civic behaviours into the analysis I am able to provide evidence on how,
after accounting for misreporting, education is related to indicators of social trust.
Moreover, because of the two countries’ analysis, it is possible to investigate issues
such as the extent to which educational effects on social capital differ under varying
social structures. I now summarize the Chapters main results.
On the one hand, results for Italy indicate that most civic outcomes are misclassi-
fied, and misreporting is more severe for civic behaviours due to a stronger influence
of social desirability. Perhaps surprisingly, I accept the hypothesis that education
is exogenous, although caution is needed in the interpretation of this result. The
key finding of Chapter 4 is, however, that qualitative overall conclusions regarding
the causality of education on civic outcomes are indeed affected when accounting
for misclassification: education turns out to be insignificant across civic behaviours.
This lack of causality suggests two possibilities. It may indicate that social desir-
ability operates differently in the two dimensions of social capital and is a more
important issue on measures of civic behaviours than indicators on civic engagement.
Alternatively, it may reflect that, at least in Italy, the cultural component of social
trust plays a major role than schooling. Both are at odds with the conjecture that
15Also, I introduce an IV ordered probit with misclassification to control for the potential endo-
geneity of education.
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they hold in spite of individuals educational levels. Moreover, individuals misreport
civic behaviour questions regardless of their education levels, but not in the case of
civic opinions where misclassification only holds for more educated individuals. In
general, results tend to agree with existing theories from political science and social
psychology.
On the other hand, the analysis for the UK in Chapter 5 shows that most civic
outcomes are misclassified and, consequently, misreporting is an important empirical
issue for this country. Endogeneity is an empirical concern too, as the null hypothesis
of exogeneity is rejected for most indicators. The direction of the bias introduced
by endogeneity follows the same direction as the one introduced by misreporting,
with upward biases in both cases. Except for the Italian case where there is lack
of endogeneity, the hypothesis of the civic voluntarism model seems to hold for the
UK: unobserved factors which lead individuals to develop a taste for education, are
likely to be positively correlated with civic opinions and civic behaviours. In fact,
results appear to suggest that the extent of this correlation is such, that the impact
of education on civic behaviours becomes statistically significant when accounting
for endogeneity. This is the main difference with the Italian case: schooling, in the
UK, has significant positive effects on all civic outcomes. Educational achievement
emerges as a strong predictor within the three dimensions (network, trust and civism)
of social capital. There is a significant misreporting of civic behaviours regardless
of the educational level considered and, in the case of civic opinions, only for more
educated individuals.
On the whole, Italy and the UK do not differ substantially with regards to misre-
porting, which indicates that social desirability influences measures of social capital
beyond country effects. This might reflect the importance of personal characteristics
over regional determinants in explaining differences in people’s social capital. This is
in line with some studies in the social capital literature that argue about a consider-
able degree of unity, in terms of aggregate levels of social capital amongst European
countries. Additionally, this result is further supported by the emerging literature on
the impact of genes on measures of trust.
Chapter 6 consists of a theoretical extension to an ordered response model. I
introduce a “hurdle ordered probit with misclassification” to address two problems
regarding the distribution of a self-reported ordered outcome: its skewness and its
misclassification. The latter issue is motivated by the assumption that the dependent
variable measures a sensitive topic (i.e., a civic behaviour) which it is likely to be
misclassified. The argument is as before: the bias (social desirability bias) arises
since respondents will tend to answer, though unconsciously, according to what is
Chapter 1. Introduction and summary 18
considered to be socially acceptable in order to gain approval of others, and will result
in under-reporting undesirable behaviours and over-reporting desirable ones (see, e.g.,
Paulhus (1991), Tourangeau and Yan (2007)). To account for the high degree of
skewness, that is, a substantial proportion of values at one end of its distribution,
I propose a hurdle (or two-part) model, which is commonly used in the empirical
literature. In fact, combining a binary choice model with an ordered response model
is a standard practice in health economics (e.g., Jones (2000), Yen (2005), Madden
(2008)).
The hurdle ordered probit with misclassification consists of two parts: (i) a split
probit model which divides the distribution into two regimes by the median of the
dependent variable, and (ii) an ordered probit with misclassification to deal with
misreporting of observed answers in the top half of the scale. In Chapter 6, I carry out
an extensive simulation exercise and obtain favourable performance in finite samples.
By applying the model to a biased civic behaviour (for Italy) I find that, if the
splitting process and measurement error are ignored, inference would be erroneous.
This is the first model which accounts for both issues and could potentially be applied




In this Chapter I provide a description of the thesis’ datasets and reasons why
I focus on Italy and the UK. In particular, Section 2.2 contains a review of social
capital studies for both countries which emphasises why the Italian and UK cases
deserve to be studied and contrasted. Section 2.3 explains the Italian dataset used
in Chapter 4 and also in the application section of Chapter 6. Section 2.4 contains
the datasets and sources for the UK, which are employed in Chapter 5.
2.2. REASONS TO FOCUS ON ITALY AND THE UK
The focus on Italy is twofold. Firstly, the economic literature on civic returns
tends to be centered in works for the US and UK (e.g., Gibson (2001), Dee (2004),
Milligan et al. (2004)). Because political institutions efficiency, civic behaviours and
enforcing norms are predominantly endogenous to the social structure, it would be
rather erroneous to make generalisations exclusively based on these countries. I then
attempt to extend the previous research in this area by utilising data from Italy.
Providing new evidence is not trivial: normative aspects of culture will strongly im-
pact, for example, on the level of transaction costs and so economic performance of a
specific region or country will be directly affected as well (Halpern (2005)). Secondly,
the Italian case contains unique features, particulary significant social capital regional
differences, which makes it an interesting case worth studying. Indeed, contrary to
the economic literature where there is lack of research on Italy, the Italian case is very
popular within the social capital literature, since publication of the seminal study on
the Italian regions was carried out by Putnam et al. (1993). I aim to contribute to
these two strands of research but mainly from an economic perspective, dealing with
various issues on the causal link of schooling on civic outcomes. Next, I provide a
review of some evidence on Italy from a social capital perspective.
Putnam et al. (1993) argue that the critical factor when explaining differences
in the effectiveness of regional governments and economic performance in Italy, is to
be found in the different ways in which those regions’ societies are organised. Typi-
cally, regions are characterised with horizontal structures common in the north and
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hierarchical forms in the south, and by differences in the extent of civic community,
citizen involvement and governmental efficiency. By using four indicators of social
capital: numbers of voluntary organizations, local newspaper readers, voter turn-out
and preference votes, they find strong correlation between these indicators and gov-
ernment quality across regions in Italy. They attribute the North-South differences
mostly to the large number of voluntary associations in northern Italy which explain
the region’s economic success.1
Recently, Sabatini (2008) confirms the finding, that linking social capital of vol-
untary organisations has positive influences on diverse economic outcomes in Italy.2
He claims that in southern regions the spill-over effects from membership in organiza-
tions to the cooperative values and norms is low, and so there are fewer opportunities
to learn civic virtues and democratic attitudes through this channel. This results in
lack of trust, fewer cooperative behaviours and more shirking behaviours. In con-
trast, bonding social capital of strong family ties is more widespread exerting negative
effects.3
Some authors claim that trust is culturally inherited. Locke (1995) argues that
differences in economic performance among regions in Italy are largely accounted for
inherited patterns of social interaction among firms. Trust and reciprocity among
firms are higher in regions where polycentric networks are the norm, than in those
where inherited networks are hierarchical or fragmented. Fukuyama (1995) stresses
the need for cooperation between strangers as a medium of success in large firms, as
well as the dependence of such cooperation on trust. He contrasts large public firms
in high trust countries to smaller family firms that prevail in low-trust societies. As
noted earlier in Section 1.2, Italy is classified in his framework as a low-trust society,
with small and inefficient organisations, trading under influence and corruption.
The lack of trust in the Italian southern regions exemplifies a situation known
in the literature as ‘social trap’ (Rothstein (2005)). One can look at the problem
of trust from the overall institutional environment, where available institutional av-
enues, reflecting past or prevailing structural conditions, act as limitations on how
1According to Putnam et al. (1993), associations function as “schools of democracy” in which
cooperative values and trust are easily socialised.
2In his study, importantly, there is acknowledgement of the problem of omitted variables and that
social capital may be endogenous to institutional and economic performance, rather than a cause
of them. He attempts to provide reliable results by using structural equations models.
3Putman traces the differences between the supply of social capital in southern and northern Italy
back to several centuries, to a political culture established over a long period of time. Essentially,
to independent city-states in the north in the fifteenth-century and to the feudal and autocratic
southern region (Rothstein (2005), p. 53). Independent city-states of northern Italy encouraged the
formation of such horizontal networks, in contrast to the more authoritarian political regimes of the
south.
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far one can extend the ambit of trust. A ‘social trap’ is a situation where individuals,
groups or organisations are unable to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of
social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. Examples include pervasive
corruption and tax evasion (one of the Italian civic indicators analyzed in Chapter 4),
which are more likely to occur in the south.
Note that people will cooperate only if they can trust that others will also co-
operate. Public policies which enhance social and economic equality carried out by
impartial political institutions would create social capital and trust (Rothstein (2005),
Rothstein and Uslaner (2006)).4 Otherwise lack of trust, an outcome of the dynamic
interaction between norms and institutions, leads to bad steady states where trade
breaks down, institutions are dysfunctional and beneficial norms are violated (Fran-
cois (2008)). Obviously, lower levels of trust would also lead to a higher tolerance of
self-interest acts. For instance, tolerance of behaviours such as ‘keeping money that
you have found’ (another indicator analysed) is much lower in Scandinavian countries
than in southern European countries (Halpern (2005), p. 66).
Being aware of the reasons behind the process of a declining level of social capital
helps to outline various hypothesis. A poor institutional environment in Italy may
be the origin of a lack of interest in political issues and to judge as acceptable a lower
tax compliance. Lack of cooperation and low trust may also lead individuals to be
more tolerant of self-interest acts or bad civic behaviours.
The focus on the UK from an empirical point of view is to validate the evidence
on Italy. Although the comparison is also an important concern in the dissertation
because, by contrasting their results, diverse appealing questions arise. For example,
is causality of education on measures of social capital in these two countries endoge-
nous to their social structures? If so, which differential characteristics of these two
countries are associated to different levels of social capital, making the relationship
endogenous?
There are various explanations. Social capital levels are reported to be lower in
countries that spend less on welfare (Arts et al. (2003)), and some research (e.g.,
Wuthnow (1999), Smidt (2003), van Oorschot et al. (2006)) stresses that the gen-
eration of social capital is linked to religious beliefs. With regards to the role of
religion in the formation of social trust, it is acknowledged in the literature that,
whereas protestantism fosters generalised social trust, the development of trust in a
given population could be impeded by its catholic heritage (Putnam et al. (1993),
Fukuyama (1995), Bjørnskov (2008)). In fact, in a recent study for the formation of
4This is known in the literature as the institutional performance theory (see, e.g., Allum et al.
(2010)).
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social trust in Germany, Traunmu¨ller (2010) finds a double positive effect of protes-
tantism: not only do protestants tend to be more trusting, but a protestant context
also increases one’s trust regardless of individual religious beliefs. These results sug-
gest that both individual religiosity and regional religious contexts matter in the
formation of social trust.5 Note that the fact that the UK is mostly protestant and
Italy mainly catholic, would thereby imply higher levels of social trust for the former
country. I now explain the theory underlying the linkage between religion and trust,
especially the protestant/catholic distinction.
The fundamental idea is that the protestant identity and a regional cultural tra-
dition of protestantism foster generalized social trust by extending the scope of moral
communities beyond narrow in-groups toward people in general. Protestant tradition
extend virtues such as truth-telling, reliability, and reciprocity beyond the narrow
circle of one’s own family (Fukuyama (1995)). In regions dominated by protestants,
more people would have internalized these norms and thus behave in honest and
trustworthy ways when dealing with strangers. This leads to more positive expe-
riences in everyday interactions and encourages the extension of trust to people in
general, including strangers. Traunmu¨ller (2010) describes these two positive effects
by individual and contextual levels hypotheses.6 Catholicism, on the contrary, might
be conducive to an ‘amoral familism’, that is, a situation where moral behaviour is
only exhibited toward the own in-group but not toward people in general. In catholic
dominated populations, then, one would observe less experiences of trustworthiness
from strangers’ social interactions.
Additionally, the hierarchical and rigid organizational structure of catholicism
should be less encouraging to the formation of mutual trust (Putnam et al. (1993)).
In fact, in a family orientated country such as Italy, the subjective, cultural dimension
of social capital7 is shaped by bonding social capital and therefore have an elective
affinity with particularized trust than with generalized trust, trust in institutions and
civic morality (van Oorschot et al. (2006)). This, in turn, may also have an impact
on the level of misreporting. The UK, however, has a higher level of wealth (GDP)
and more religious diversity as compared to Italy.8 These are only some illustrative
reasons that might influence the type and degree of the linkage of education with
dimensions of social capital in either country. Recall that, throughout the thesis,
5An equivalent finding is obtained by Lam (2006).
6The religiosity of a collective serves as a cultural as well as structural context for individuals and
is therefore likely to have an impact on social trust independent from individual religiosity.
7That is, the set of values and attitudes of individuals relating to trust, reciprocity and willingness
to cooperate.
8For a recent analysis of the determinants of generalised and particularised trust for the UK, see
Sturgis and Smith (2010).
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social capital is conceived as an umbrella concept which is multidimensional, therefore
multiple indicators are required for a complete measurement of these dimensions.
Because it contains various dimensions, a wide range of results are possible.
Differences in political systems, social norms and expectations amongst European
nations would, on the whole, lead to significant countries’ effects. Yet this has been
called into question. Recent evidence for European countries of Allum et al. (2010)
suggest that effects on measures of social trust, and institutional trust happen at
the micro level. In particular, they argue that both forms of trust are more akin to
personality type variables or value orientations and, therefore, more likely related to
the social psychological conception of trust. I finish this section by describing some
UK studies on social capital.
Historically, the UK has a long tradition of civic culture with high levels of social
trust and political and civic participation. Hall (1999) argues that the UK has not
followed USA’s lower levels of social capital due to the post war transformation in
social structure and the emphasis placed upon the government’s policy towards the
delivery of social services, as well as the use of non-profit association and volunteering
work. At present, however, there has been decline in the UK similar to the USA,
France and other Anglo-Saxon countries (Halpern (2009)). The only exception to
this erosion of social capital is the group of Scandinavian countries which shows
a higher average level of trustworthiness mainly related to their countries wealth
and dominant protestant culture (Delhey and Newton (2005), van Oorschot et al.
(2006)). Rothstein attributes their higher stock of social capital to the fact that
a solidaristic rather than egoistic individualism has appeared in the Scandinavian
countries . This “solidaristic individualism” is not present in the UK where there is
a shift towards privatisation and egoistic individualism. In the case of “solidaristic
individualism” individual autonomy and social responsibility go together. People are
willing to support others with different values and causes because this happens on a
condition of mutual trust by which they would also be helped and respected in return
(Rothstein (2005), p. 78).
Although the nature of politics, government and type of engagement have changed,
there is a decreasing tendency in the level of trust of politics and politicians in Britain
(Halpern (2009), p. 177), and increasing levels of income inequality. Even though
the latter UK’s conditions may be akin to Italy, southern European countries are
markedly distinct as they tend to show low levels of both formal and informal social
capital. Studies on the distribution of social capital in Europe (e.g., Beugelsdijk and
van Schaik (2005), Pichler and Wallace (2007)) classified the UK into the western
group of countries, which is in between the northern and southern European countries
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with respect to contextual characteristics. van Oorschot et al. (2006), for instance,
consider in their analysis four European regions: north, west, south and east.9 As
mentioned earlier, in the southern region there is lower welfare spending and wealth
as well as a catholic majority. In western countries, on the contrary, there is more
religious diversity, wealth and more extensive welfare states.
These contextual characteristics of the two countries (at the macro level) normally
lead to different types of social capital and distribution amongst individuals. Take, for
example, the role of the welfare state. In a recent paper, van Oorschot and Finsveen
(2009) go beyond existing theories by stating that the reduction of inequality in social
capital is one of the central aims of the welfare state. Central to their argument is
that economic and cultural inequality directly translates into inequality in social
capital and vice-versa, that is, these two inequalities (re)produces each other. They
argue that welfare states can have two basic impacts on the (re)production of social
capital inequalities. Firstly, one impact is indirect. Welfare policies seek to reduce
large economic inequalities by means of often inter-connected policies such as labor
participation, education, healthcare, etc. Secondly, a direct but unintended impact.
Welfare policies create a basic security and empowerment which, especially for the
more deprived groups in society, may enhance their trust in others, as well as in
institutions. Also, they foster a context of national solidarity and fellow feeling,
which is conducive to higher trust levels too.10
The empirical evidence is inconclusive. Recently, van Oorschot and Finsveen
(2010) find that there is no effect of welfare stateness on social capital inequality, al-
though they stress that an analysis relying on a broader range of welfare states might
show effect. Similarly, Gesthuizen et al. (2008) do not find consistent patterns on the
distribution of social capital by educational expansions and welfare state contexts
amongst European nations. But the former authors do find that the influence of
education on the dimensions of social capital varies under conditions of educational
expansion and social security expenditure. For instance, higher levels of social secu-
rity expenditure have an effect on the impact of education in voluntary organization
membership.
9Specifically, the regions are composed as follows: north (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), west (Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom), south (Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Spain) and east (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia).
10Known as the solidarity hypothesis in the literature.
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2.3. ITALIAN DATA
In Chapters 4 and 6 (i.e., Section 6.5) of the thesis I use data from the Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Central Bank of Italy.
I rely on a specific section related to civic outcomes which is included in the 2004
wave. Respondents to this section contain household heads born in uneven years.
Five different indicators of civic outcomes are considered for Italy. The first
one relates to political engagement. Individuals were asked to report how interested
they are in politics, with answers taking values 1 to 4, which correspond to ‘very’,
‘fairly’, ‘not very’ and ‘not at all’, respectively. The second indicator concerns people’s
opinion on the problem of tax evasion. Specifically, people were asked to rate the
importance of the problem of tax evasion in relation to all the problems faced by
the government. The answer to this question is coded on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being
‘very serious’, 2 as ‘serious’, 3 as ‘the same as any other’, 4 as ‘marginal’ and 5 as
‘non-existent’. In the next three questions respondents were asked to indicate the
extent to which the following behaviours were justified: not paying for your ticket on
public transport, keeping money you obtained by accident when it would be possible
to return it to the rightful owner and not leaving your name for the owner of a car
you accidentally scraped. Answers to these questions are given on an ordered 1 to 10
scale, with ‘never justifiable’ equals to 1 and ‘always justifiable’ to 10. The order for
the responses of the five civic outcomes is reversed so that a high value indicates a
higher sense of civic duty. Summary statistics for the civic outcomes are displayed
in Table 2.1.
Because the survey only contains the highest educational achievement of the in-
dividual and not the number of years spent at the educational institution, I compute
a continuous measure of schooling by following similar approaches in the literature
(see, for instance, Brunello and Miniaci (1999)). Clearly, years of education are cal-
culated by imputing the number of years required to complete the highest level of
educational achievement reported by the individual.
More precisely, the following procedure is used. To obtain a primary school cer-
tificate and a lower secondary school diploma 5 and 8 years of education are needed,
respectively. For the next education level, that is, upper secondary school, the num-
ber of years varies by the type of school attended. In particular, four extra years
are needed for teaching school, and a five-year programme for general and technical
schools. The number of statutory years required to complete university education
varies according to the subject studied as well. To obtain a humanities and social
sciences degrees 4 years are required, and for a medicine degree 6 years. Finally, most
postgraduate courses tend to last one year in Italy. The average level of education
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TABLE 2.1
Descriptive statistics for Italy: SHIW sample for civic outcomes
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Civic outcomes:
Interest in politics 1.91 0.90
Importance of the problem of tax evasion 4.08 0.81
Not paying ticket on public transport 8.73 1.98
Keeping money and not return it to the rightful owner 8.87 1.91
Not leaving your name for the owner of a car you scraped 8.96 1.86
Education (years of schooling) 9.09 4.39
Demographic variables:
Household income (in thousand) 31.74 32.19
Age (years) 55.74 15.52
Male = 1 0.63
Father’s education (years of schooling) 4.95 4.19
Mother’s education (years of schooling) 4.09 3.73
Married = 1 0.66
Employed = 1 0.46
Number of children in the household 0.81 0.97
Area of residence:
South = 1 0.31
Center = 1 0.23
North=1 0.46
Urbanization:
Small town (below 20,000) = 1 0.32
Medium town (between 20,000 and 40,000) = 1 0.20
Big town (between 40,000 and 500,000) = 1 0.40
Very big town (above 500,000) = 1 0.08
Father’s occupation:









Number of observations 3,059
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in the sample is 9.09 years. Additional explanatory variables are: age, household
income, gender, parental education and occupation, marital and employment status,
number of children in the household, area of residence and urbanisation. The sample
size is N = 3059. Summary statistics for individual characteristics are presented in
Table 2.1.11
2.4. UK DATA
I rely on two surveys for the UK analysis in Chapter 5. For civic opinions, I use the
British Election Study (BES), 2005 cross section wave12 and, for civic behaviours,
the European Values Study (EVS), waves 1981, 1990 and 1999 for the UK.13 A
description of each data source is provided below.
The BES has been conducted at every General Election since 1964. The purpose
of the BES is to study long-term trends in British voting behaviour, to explain
the election outcome, party choice and turnout, as well as examining the election
effects on British politics. The 2005 BES comprised a series of linked surveys. The
main surveys are the pre-campaign and post-election cross-sectional surveys, the
self-completion survey and internet follow up surveys.14 The core survey of the BES
uses a national face-to-face probability sample and the primary instrument is a post-
election face-to-face survey. I use this entire post-election sample (N= 4161) for
England, Scotland and Wales. This sample is composed by a pre-campaign-post
election panel with N = 2959, as well as a post-election only “topup” of N = 1202.
As can be seen in Table 2.2, I consider four civic opinions for the UK, three of
them equivalent to ‘interest in politics’ in Italy. The first one asks respondents: how
much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics?, with answers
taking values 1 (a great deal), 2 (quite a lot), 3 (some), 4 (not very much) and 5 (none
at all). The second and third civic opinions ask whether individuals pay attention to
politics and whether they discuss politics with family and friends, with answers given
in a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means ‘pay no attention to politics’, and 10 ‘pay a great
deal of attention’ and, for the latter civic opinion, 0 means ‘very unlikely that would
discuss politics’ and 10 ‘very likely that would discuss politics’.
Although not directly linked with political participation, I also consider the vari-
11Note the high proportion (70%) that the covariate “father’s occupation” falls into the category
‘others’. This category contains the following occupation’s types: blue-collar worker (≈ 53%), office
worker, teacher, junior manager and official.
12The last available dataset for the BES is from June 2010, but it is a temporary (beta) release with
some information missing.
13I do not include the latest cross section data (for 2008) since it has not been released yet for Great
Britain.
14See, Johnson et al. (2007) for details on the 2005 BES.
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TABLE 2.2
Descriptive statistics for the UK: BES sample for civic opinions
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Civic opinions:
General interest in politics 3.06 1.00
Attention to politics 5.37 2.49
Discuss politics with family and friends 5.26 3.39
Active in a voluntary organisation 1.96 1.15
Education (age finished full-time education):




19 or older (=5) 0.23
Demographic variables:
Age (years) 50.91 17.78
Employed = 1 0.53
Income 5.43 3.14
Male = 1 0.44
Married = 1 0.49
Number of children in the household 0.55 0.96
Heath-Goldthorpe five-category social class variables:
Socialclass1 (salariat) = 1 0.32
Socialclass2 (routine non-manual) = 1 0.23
Socialclass3 (petty bourgeoisie) = 1 0.05
Socialclass4 (manual foremen and supervisors) = 1 0.09
Socialclass5 (working class) = 1 0.27
Country:
Wales = 1 0.19
Scotland = 1 0.24
England = 1 0.57
Additional outcomes related to politics and voting:
Political activity takes too much time and effort 3.11 0.94
Family and friends think that voting is a waste of time 2.41 1.01
Feel very guilty if not vote 3.55 1.19
Neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote 3.76 1.07
Additional outcomes about trust:
Most people can be trusted 6.26 2.03
Trust local government 4.88 1.89
Number of observations 4,161
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able active in a voluntary organisation as a fourth indicator, with answers taking
values 1 to 4, which correspond to ‘very active’, ‘somewhat active’, ‘a little active’
and ‘not at all active/not involved’, respectively. By incorporating voluntary activi-
ties I am able to investigate the impact of schooling on another dimension of social
capital, i.e., social participation (networks).15 Citizens who choose to join organisa-
tions and voluntary associations have more opportunities to meet people, to develop
more extensive systems of social relationships, and hence to become more engaged in
civic life (Verba et al. (1995)). As noted by Putnam et al. (1993) participation in civic
organisations forms habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness. Even
different levels of participation in voluntary organisations can characterise countries
and regions (van Oorschot et al. (2006)).
Furthermore, four extra indicators related to politics and voting, as well as two
concerning social trust from the BES 2005 post-election sample, are investigated.
Individuals were asked to show how much they agree with the following statements:
it takes too much time and effort to be active in politics and public affairs, most of
my family and friends think that voting is a waste of time, I would feel very guilty
if I didn’t vote in a general election and, finally, I would be seriously neglecting my
duty as a citizen if I didn’t vote. Answers to these questions are coded on a 1-5 scale,
with 1 (strongly agree), 2 (agree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4 (disagree) and 5
(strongly disagree). Responses to the two indicators about social trust (most people
can be trusted,16 trust local government) are provided in a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 equals
to the lowest level of trust and 10 to the highest level of trust.17 As before, the
order of the responses for all civic outcomes and additional indicators (if necessary)
is reversed, so that higher values represent a higher sense of civic duty. Summary
statistics for all these outcomes are displayed in Table 2.2.
The BES survey does not provide the education covariate as the number of years
spent at a specific educational institution. Instead, the amount of education is rep-
resented by an integer defined by the age when the individual finished full-time ed-
ucation.18 That is, 15 or younger (=1), 16 (=2),..., 19 or older (=5). Additional
15In fact, for the Office of National Statistics (ONS) in the UK, involvement with voluntary organi-
sations is an aspect of the social participation dimension of social capital that should be measured
(see, e.g., Harper (2002)).
16This question measures a ‘moralistic’ type of trust whereas trust in people with whom one is
personally familiar is known in the literature as ‘strategic’ (Uslaner (2002)). See Sturgis and Smith
(2010) for a discussion of this kind of data for the UK, as well as the issue of heterogeneity in
question interpretation.
17As far as the ONS (UK) is concerned (e.g., Babb (2005)) trusting other people and institutions
(justice, government, etc.) are also key components of social capital and so they are classified as
elements of the reciprocity and trust dimension. Specific research for the UK employing these two
indicators are, for instance, Li et al. (2005), Fahmy (2006), and Sturgis et al. (2010a).
18Milligan et al. (2004) employ the same definition of schooling from the BES survey.
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covariates included in the analysis are similar to the ones for Italy. Specifically, age,
employment status, income,19 gender, marital status, number of children (under 18)
in the household, five dummies describing the economic position (social class) of the
respondents measured by the five category Goldthorpe-Heath class schema (Heath
et al. (1985)), and dummies for each country. Covariates’ summary statistics are
presented in Table 2.2.
The UK’s analysis for civic behaviours is based on the EVS (See Table 2.3). The
EVS is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on
basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes,
values and opinions of citizens all over Europe. It started in 1981 and is repeated
every 9 years. I use cross section data from the 1981, 1990 and 1999 waves, which
make an overall sample of N = 3651, comparable to the ones from the SHIW (Italy)
and BES (UK) datasets. The EVS sample for the UK contains the same three civic
behaviours as the ones chosen for Italy.
In the group of civic behaviour questions, respondents were asked to indicate the
extent to which the following statements were justified: failing to report accidental
damage done to a parked vehicle, keeping money that you have found, and avoiding
a fare on public transport. Answers were coded on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 stands
for ‘can never be justified’ and 10 for ‘can always be justified’. Again, answers to
these questions are reversed so that 1 and 10 stand for the lowest and highest civic
behaviour responsibility, respectively. These questions convey information on the
degree of people’s trustworthiness by revealing attitudinal and behavioural charac-
teristics of people themselves, but not interpersonal trust. Nonetheless, they are
linked because there is a positive correlation between trustworthiness and trust in
institutions: in countries where people trust institutions more, there is also a higher
level of civic morality (van Oorschot et al. (2006)).
The education variable for the EVS sample is presented in the same terms as in
Table 2.2, that is, as an integer for the age when the individual finished full-time
education (15 or younger (=1), 16 (=2),...,19 or older (=5)). The other explanatory
variables chosen for civic behaviours coincides with the ones used for the UK’s civic
opinions of the BES sample. Summary statistics for all EVS outcomes and covariates
are offered in Table 2.3.
The two countries’ data sources are comparable. The SHIW dataset, containing
the whole array of civic outcomes, is representative of the whole Italian population
and therefore it has been extensively used in leading IV studies of the economic re-
19Income stands for the combined annual household income, with answers coded as: 1 if income <
5,000, 2 if income ∈ (5, 001−10, 000), 3 if income ∈ (10, 001−15, 000),..., and 14 if income > 70,000.
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TABLE 2.3
Descriptive statistics for the UK: EVS sample for civic behaviours
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Civic behaviours:
Failing to report accidental damage done to a parked vehicle 9.00 1.82
Keeping money that you have found 8.56 1.88
Avoiding a fare on public transport 8.73 1.90
Education (age finished full-time education):




19 or older (=5) 0.15
Demographic variables:
Age (years) 44.14 18.70
Employed = 1 0.57
Income 6.08 2.37
Male = 1 0.46
Married = 1 0.58
Number of children in the household 1.92 1.38
Socio-economics status:
Socialclass1 (upper, upper-middle class) = 1 0.18
Socialclass2 (middle, non-manual workers) = 1 0.27
Socialclass3 (manual workers-skilled, semi-skilled) = 1 0.28
Socialclass4 (manual workers-unskilled, unemployed) = 1 0.27
Country:
Wales = 1 0.09
Scotland = 1 0.10




Number of observations 3,651
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turns of schooling (e.g., Brunello and Miniaci (1999), Flabbi (1999), Brandolini and
Cipollone (2002)). The UK’s group of civic opinions is included in the BES dataset,
which is also representative of the British population and a major survey on politi-
cal issues. Thus, final samples of both surveys share two important characteristics:
they are representative of their countries and were conducted almost at the same
time, that is, the SHIW in 2004 and the BES in 2005. In connection with civic
behaviours, I did not pursue the idea of using the EVS dataset for Italy because I
judged more important to gather all civic indicators from the same SHIW dataset





A large number of empirical studies in economics and other social disciplines rely
on self-reported data. However, there is great consensus that this type of data is
generally plagued by measurement error. Measurement error represents deviation
between the recorded answer to a survey question and the underlying attribute being
measured. There are different sources of measurement error. It may arise from
errors in data processing and/or in data collection procedures. Most importantly,
it may reflect systematic misreporting or unreliable responses by interviewees. This
frequently occurs when respondents are asked questions about socially and personally
sensitive issues. Typically, individuals would tend to underreport socially undesirable
behaviours and over-report socially desirable ones (Paulhus (1991)). This is known
in social psychology as social desirability (SD) or social desirability bias (SDB).
Many studies in empirical economics deal with subjective measures which take
ordered categorical values. Examples include research in the fields of ‘economics
of happiness’, ‘job satisfaction’, ‘health satisfaction’ and ‘subjective evaluations of
language fluency’, which are typically analysed using ordered response models. Since
it is very probable that these self-reported measures or dependent variables suffer from
misclassification, parametric procedures ignoring the issue of measurement error are
likely to lead to inconsistent estimates for the parameters of interest as they rely on
a misspecified distribution of the data (Ramalho (2002)). For instance, in the binary
choice case, Hausman et al. (1998) find that, even in the case of a small amount of
misclassification, ordinary probit not only yields inconsistent estimates, but it can
also overstate the precision of the estimates.
Hence, modifications in the likelihood functions of standard ordered response
models are required in order to incorporate measurement error or misclassification
probabilities. Namely, an ordered probit (OP) that includes as additional parame-
ters, misclassification probabilities (linking reported and true responses), defines an
ordered probit with misclassification (OPM). This parametric model is used through-
out the thesis.
Chapter 3 is organised as follows. Section 3.2 contains a methodological review.
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Section 3.3 formally introduces the OPM model and the recoded civic outcomes for
Italy and the UK, which are used in Chapters 4 and 5. In Section 3.4 I perform a
small simulation experiment to illustrate the advantages of the OPM over the OP
model. In Section 3.5 I present some misclassification assumptions by group of civic
outcomes and educational levels. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. A formal definition
of the testing procedure is included in the Appendix A.
3.2. METHODOLOGICAL MISCLASSIFICATION REVIEW
There is a long tradition on the study of measurement error in statistical re-
search. Earlier references go back to Bross (1954), an analysis of the impact of
misclassification on statistical tests and, Bryson (1965), who derives bounds for the
bias due to errors of classification on a binomial population. Currently, there is a
significant body of research in the statistical literature which accounts for the effect
of measurement error on the outcome variable using Bayesian approaches (see, e.g.,
Paulino et al. (2003); Stamey et al. (2008)). A broad review of measurement error
and misclassification in statistics and epidemiology is contained in Gustafson (2004).
In econometrics, the problem was first studied by Aigner (1973) who shows that
in the presence of a binary misclassified regressor in a linear regression, least squares
(LS) estimate is biased towards zero. Literature in econometrics has mainly dealt with
measurement problems on the independent variables, thereby investigating misclassi-
fication of regressors. A well known strategy for dealing with this type of misreporting
is to use a secondary measurement or an instrumental variable. Recent papers fol-
lowing this approach for nonclassical errors and nonlinear models are, for instance,
Mahajan (2006), Schennach (2007) and Hu and Schennach (2008). Misclassification
on the dependent variables, however, has received less attention.
First studies on misclassification of responses on qualitative choice models are
Lee and Porter (1984), Douglas et al. (1995), and Poterba and Summers (1995).
More recently, Hausman et al. (1998) introduce a binary choice model with misclas-
sification and a semiparametric approach to deal with measurement error. Other
applications with binary outcomes subject to misclassification are Caudill and Mixon
(2005), de Coulon and Wolff (2007), and Ramalho (2007). In the context of panel
data, Dustmann and van Soest (2001) analyse the determinants of speaking fluency
on the wages of immigrants, distinguishing between time-varying and time-persistent
misclassification. Furthermore, Keane and Sauer (2009) explicitly treat classification
error using a dynamic discrete choice model of labour supply, examining the hypoth-
esis of endogeneity of fertility and non-labour income. In a related paper, Keane and
Sauer (2010) introduce a new simulated maximum likelihood estimation algorithm
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for estimating dynamic panel data models with misclassification. Methodologically,
a similar research to this thesis is Brachet (2008), who proposes a method that ad-
dresses both the endogeneity and measurement error problems to estimate the effect
of maternal smoking on birth outcomes.1
There are different approaches to investigate whether the array of civic outcomes
suffer from misclassification. The chosen approach would depend on the kind of
measurement error one is interested to model. I assume that there is no error in the
underlying latent variable that defines the observed response. Hence, I suppose that
y∗ is a perfect indicator of civic outcomes. On the contrary, if there is an error in y∗,
the OPM would not be able to identify this as it would collapse into the idiosyncratic
term. However, one could still identify the error term by using a nonparametric
structural approach such as Matzkin (2007).
The OPM model assumes that the wrong outcome is reported and accounts for
this by including misclassification probabilities in the standard likelihood function
of ordered response models. Given that the main interest is on the misclassification
process and estimated coefficients, I use an OPM. Nevertheless, if one is indifferent
about the misreporting probabilities and consider them as nuisance parameters, then
a semiparametric estimation such as a monotone rank estimator would suffice (see, for
instance, Cavanagh and Sherman (1998) and Abrevaya (1999)). This estimator as-
sumes monotonicity and is very useful when the researcher suspects mismeasurement
but lacks any additional prior information for forming a reliable model of mismea-
surement.
Alternatively, one could model the boundaries as linear functions of observed ex-
planatory variables (i.e., Terza (1985)) or extend this by allowing for random bound-
aries that vary across individuals as in Das (1995). The latter approach is more
appealing when individuals’ responses are given in numerical scales which are more
likely to suffer from unobserved heterogeneity; this is the case of civic behaviours in
the dissertation. However, due to problems with identification given data availabil-
ity, I did not pursue this extension. Alternatively, a fruitful approach is a chopit
model (e.g., Kristensen and Johansson (2008)) but, since anchoring vignettes are not
available, one is not able to follow this particular model. As previously mentioned,
misreporting probabilities are one of the main objectives of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5,
and this is captured by the OPM and the extension I propose in Chapter 6.
1A review on different approaches on measurement error models in econometrics can be found, for
example, in Bound et al. (2001) and Carroll et al. (2006).
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3.3. PARAMETRIC MISCLASSIFICATION MODEL
3.3.1. OPM
Here I follow Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) and Dustmann and van Soest (2004)
to introduce a parametric misclassification model. I begin by defining an OP model
for J categories. The latent variable y∗i = x
′
iβ + εi (for i = 1, ..., N) is related to
the ‘observed’ (or reported) dependent variable ωi via a partition of the real line into
J +1 cutpoints c0 ≡ −∞ < c1 < ... < cJ−1 < cJ ≡ +∞,
ωi = j if cj−1 ≤ y∗i < cj, for j = 1, ..., J. (3.1)
As the framework is of an OP, I assume that the error term is normally distributed:
εi|xi ∼ N(0, σ2). Let yi be the ‘true’ response which is related to the latent variable
y∗i as in the OP model of Eq. (3.1). Under the hypothesis of lack of misreporting,
yi ≡ ωi, and the true response is observed. However, if there is misreporting, yi 6= ωi,
and one needs to define a misclassification probability. Let the probability that
observations belonging to category j are classified in category k as,
pij,k = Pr(ωi = k|yi = j,xi) for j, k ∈ (1, ..., J) and j 6= k. (3.2)




pi1,1 pi1,2 . . . pi1,J





piJ,1 piJ,2 . . . piJ,J
 , (3.3)
where the diagonal elements are the probabilities that observations are correctly
classified, and by definition each matrix row adds up to one.
Given this misclassification process, the probability of the observed dependent
variable is
Pr(ωi = k|xi) =
J∑
j=1
pij,k Pr(yi = j), for k ∈ (1, ..., J), (3.4)
where Pr(yi = j) = Φ(cj−x′iβ)−Φ(cj−1−x′iβ); Φ(.) denotes the univariate normal
c.d.f., and σ is fixed to 1. The OPM model includes l [l = J × (J − 1)] additional
parameters to be estimated given by the off-diagonal elements of matrix ΠJ . Let
θ = (β′, c′, pi′)′, where the parameter β excludes the constant term. The cutpoints,
misclassification probabilities and beta coefficients can be jointly estimated by the
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k pij,k = 1 and σ ≡ 1.
For the parametric model to be valid, the misclassification process must be cor-
rectly specified. In other words, the probabilities of misclassification must be a func-
tion only of the subset (defined by the cutpoints in Eq. (3.1)) to which y∗ belongs
and not of the level of y∗. Otherwise maximum likelihood (ML) estimates would
yield inconsistent estimates. Hence, the main identification assumption is that pij,k
are not a function of the covariates.2
Consistency relies on stochastic conditions on the behaviour of the misclassifi-
cation probabilities which guarantees that E(ωi|xi) increases with the index x′iβ for
the sign of β to be identified. In terms of the matrix ΠJ in (3.3), this condition
implies that the elements of the first column must be weakly decreasing as you go
down row-by-row, the sum of the elements of the first two columns must be weakly
decreasing as you go down row-by-row, and so on. Hence, the implicit assumption is
that observational units with larger true values for their dependent variable are more
likely to report larger values than observational units with smaller true values (see
Abrevaya and Hausman (1999), p. 252, for details).
To test the validity of the OPM, one cannot use a standard test because the null
hypothesis places the parameters on the boundary of the parameter space. Instead
of using a likelihood ratio/Wald test with a χ2 distribution, one needs to use a chi-
bar-squared distribution (χ¯2), which is distributed as a mixture of χ2 distributions
(Shapiro (1985)). Given that finding the weights is a difficult numerical problem
and also there is not a closed expression form for the weights when the number of
restrictions tested is higher than 4, the χ¯2 statistic is normally simulated. Reasonably
accurate estimates of the weights can be easily obtained by Monte Carlo simulation
(Andrews (2001), Liu and Wang (2003)).3
3.3.2. OPM for three alternatives and civic outcomes frequencies
Next, I present the likelihood function along with the stochastic conditions for J
= 3. This is the model used in Chapters 4 and 5 as civic outcomes are recoded in a
2Lewbel (2000), Lemma 2, shows that even when the probabilities of misclassification depend in
unknown ways on the covariates, binary models with misclassification are semiparametrically iden-
tified. However, he concludes that the estimators are not very practical since they involve up to
third order derivatives and repeated applications of nonparametric regression.
3See Appendix A for details.
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three-point scale.
The matrix of misclassification probabilities is
Π3 =
pi1,1 pi1,2 pi1,3pi2,1 pi2,2 pi2,3
pi3,1 pi3,2 pi3,3
 . (3.6)
Separating the log-likelihood function for each k (or column of matrix Π3)
`(θ) = `(θ1) + `(θ2) + `(θ3), (3.7)
where the parameter vector θk contains the coefficients β and the corresponding
misclassification probabilities (pij,k, for fixed k) and cutpoints. Expanding the sum
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subject to pi11 = 1− pi12 − pi13, pi22 = 1− pi21 − pi23 and pi33 = 1− pi31 − pi32. The
weakly (sufficient) stochastic condition for J = 3 is,
pi1,1 ≥ pi2,1 ≥ pi3,1 and pi3,3 ≥ pi2,3 ≥ pi1,3, (3.9)
which is a stronger condition than that needed for E(yi|xi) to be increasing with
x
′
iβ. A necessary condition is,
pi1,2 + pi2,1 − pi2,3 + 2pi1,3 < 1 and pi2,3 + pi3,2 − pi2,1 + 2pi3,1 < 1 (3.10)
which is satisfied for small values of the misclassification probabilities (see, Dustmann
and van Soest (2004)).
For Italy, the dependent variables (or civic outcomes) are recoded as follows. For
interest in politics, the categories ‘fairly’ and ‘very’ are grouped together and I recode
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TABLE 3.1
Civic outcomes frequencies (Italy)
Variables Mean
Interest in politics:
not at all = 1 0.4027
not very = 2 0.3321
fairly or very = 3 0.2651
Importance of the problem of tax evasion:
non-existent or marginal or the same = 1 0.2144
serious = 2 0.4567
very serious = 3 0.3289
Not paying ticket on public transport:
always justifiable (1 to 3) = 1 0.0559
occasionally justifiable (4 to 7) = 2 0.1442
never justifiable (8 to 10) = 3 0.7999
Keeping money and not return it to the rightful owner:
always justifiable (1 to 3) = 1 0.0533
occasionally justifiable (4 to 7) = 2 0.1200
never justifiable (8 to 10) = 3 0.8267
Not leaving your name for the owner of a car you scraped:
always justifiable (1 to 3) = 1 0.0487
occasionally justifiable (4 to 7) = 2 0.1023
never justifiable (8 to 10) = 3 0.8490
Number of observations 3,059
the three categories as 1 (not at all), 2 (not very) and 3 (fairly or very). Similarly,
the variable tax evasion problem is recoded as: 1 (non-existent or marginal or the
same), 2 (serious) and 3 (very serious). Lastly, for the civic behaviour variables, I
changed the scale 1 to 10 to a 1 to 3 scale, recoding 1 to 3 as 1 (always justifiable),
4 to 7 as 2 (occasionally justifiable), and 8 to 10 as 3 (never justifiable).4 Table 3.1
presents the resulting civic outcomes frequencies.
For the UK, civic outcomes are also recoded into J = 3, grouping categories in
the same way as for Italy. For instance, for the dependent variable ‘general interest in
politics’, answers with ‘a lot or a great deal’ of interest in politics are grouped together
(=3), whereas ‘not very much’ is recoded as 2 and ‘not at all’ as 1. Likewise, civic
behaviours’ 1 to 10 scale is changed into a J = 3 scale, with 1 to 3 = 1 (always
justifiable), 4 to 7 = 2 (occasionally justifiable), and 8 to 10 = 3 (never justifiable).
Thus, answers to the civic opinion ‘interest in politics’ and civic behaviours for Italy
and the UK are recoded and labeled equivalently so that their estimations for the two
countries are comparable. The remaining outcomes, that is, concerning guilt, time
4The reason for combining categories together is due to small sample cells which, if not grouped,
the parametric model would not be able to identify. For example, only a 0.57% of respondents
answer ’non-existent’ for the tax evasion question. Combining categories due to a small number
of observations is common in the literature. However, since misreporting may be affected by this
recoding, I also present some sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours using a five point scale.
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TABLE 3.2
Civic outcomes frequencies (UK)
Variables Mean
a) Civic opinions:
General interest in politics:
not at all = 1 0.0493
not very much = 2 0.2535
lot, or a great deal = 3 0.6972
Attention to politics:
low (0 to 3) = 1 0.2326
medium (4 to 7) = 2 0.5607
high (8 to 10) = 3 0.2067
Discuss politics with family and friends:
low (0 to 3) = 1 0.3478
medium (4 to 7) = 2 0.3244
high (8 to 10) = 3 0.3278
Active in a voluntary organisation:
not at all = 1 0.5112
not very = 2 0.1754
somewhat and very = 3 0.3134
b) Additional outcomes related to politics and voting:
Political activity takes too much time and effort:
strongly disagree and disagree = 1 0.3031
neither = 2 0.2857
agree and strongly agree = 3 0.4112
Family and friends think that voting is a waste of time:
strongly disagree and disagree = 1 0.6799
neither = 2 0.1218
agree and strongly agree = 3 0.1983
Feel very guilty if not vote:
strongly disagree and disagree = 1 0.2499
neither = 2 0.1202
agree and strongly agree = 3 0.6299
Neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote:
strongly disagree and disagree = 1 0.1745
neither = 2 0.1062
agree and strongly agree = 3 0.7193
c) Addtional outcomes about trust:
Most people can be trusted:
low (0 to 3) = 1 0.1000
medium (4 to 7) = 2 0.5948
high (8 to 10) = 3 0.3052
Trust local government:
low (0 to 3) = 1 0.1903
medium (4 to 7) = 2 0.7371
high (8 to 10) = 3 0.0726
Number of observations 4,161
Continued on next page
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d) Civic behaviours:
Failing to report accidental damage done to a parked vehicle:
always justifiable (1 to 3) = 1 0.04
ocasionally justifiable (4 to 7) = 2 0.13
never justifiable (8 to 10) = 3 0.83
Keeping money that you have found:
always justifiable (1 to 3) = 1 0.05
ocasionally justifiable (4 to 7) = 2 0.14
never justifiable (8 to 10) = 3 0.81
Avoiding a fare on public transport:
always justifiable (1 to 3) = 1 0.04
ocasionally justifiable (4 to 7) = 2 0.17
never justifiable (8 to 10) = 3 0.79
Number of observations 3,651
and effort when voting, other measures of trusts, etc., are changed in an analogous
way.
3.4. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
This section examines the properties of the OP model under misclassification.
Simulations for the ML estimator given by Eq. (3.5) for J = 3 and J = 5 are carried
out for different levels of misreporting. I begin by introducing the simulation design
and algorithm.
The Monte Carlo design has three covariates: x1 is drawn from a binomial distri-
bution with probability of success equals to 0.6, x2 is normally distributed, and x3
follows a lognormal distribution. The error term is drawn from a standard normal
distribution. The latent dependent variable is given by
y∗i = 1.5xi1 + 0.6xi2 + 1.1xi3 + εi. (3.11)
The algorithm structure for J = 3 is as follows.5
1. Draw R times the covariates from the x distributions outlined above and the
error term ε for a sample size N . (r = 1, ..., R, are the number of repetitions.)
2. Generate the latent variable using Eq. (3.11).
3. Select the values of the cutpoints c1 and c2 as to mimic the distribution of a
civic outcome for J = 3. Create the ‘true’ values of the dependent variable
according to: y = 1 if y∗ ≤ c1, y = 2 if c1 < y∗ ≤ c2 and y = 3 if y∗ > c2 for
each repetition.
5An identical procedure was implemented for J = 5. Only two additional cutpoints and extra
conditions for generating the observed dependent variable with misclassification are required.
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4. For each r, generate the ‘observed’ dependent variable with misclassification ω
as follows.6 First, define matrix Π, for instance, a matrix with low misclassifi-
cation,
Π3(low) =
pi1,1 pi1,2 pi1,3pi2,1 pi2,2 pi2,3
pi3,1 pi3,2 pi3,3
 . (3.12)
5. Second, for each repetition, draw a uniform vector u of sample size N and set
ω = y.
6. Finally, recode the observed dependent variable ω applying the following rule
by each matrix row in Eq. (3.12):
• if y = 1 and u < pi1,2 recode ω = 2, if y = 1 and u < pi1,3 recode ω = 3;
• if y = 2 and u < pi2,1 recode ω = 1, if y = 2 and u < pi2,3 recode ω = 3;
• if y = 3 and u < pi3,1 recode ω = 1, if y = 3 and u < pi3,2 recode ω = 2.
7. For each repetition r, using the observed variable ω with mismeasurement,
estimate the model with misclassification using Eq. (3.5) r times until r = R.
8. To introduce increasing levels of misclassification, repeat steps 4 to 7 changing
Eq. (3.12) to Π3(medium) and Π3(high).
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 report the Monte Carlo simulations results under low,
medium and high misclassification scenarios (for N = 5000, R = 200).
I use the bias, standard deviation, root mean squared error and overall root mean
squared error to compare the OP and OPM estimates. Note that the last quantity
summarises the overall performance of the OP and OPM models.
Let θ denotes the true parameter vector, θˆ the estimated parameter vector, and
by θk, θˆk I denote any element of these vectors. The measures used for comparison
are given by,



















[θˆ − θ][θˆ − θ]′)] 12 .
(3.13)
6A similar idea is proposed by Keane and Sauer (2010) in the context of a dynamic panel data
probit.
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TABLE 3.3
Monte Carlo simulations results: Π3
OP OPM
Parameter True value Mean Std. dev. RMSE RMSE-all Mean Std. dev. RMSE RMSE-all
Low misclassification (0.025 ≤ pij,k ≤ 0.10)
β1 1.5 1.3613 0.0446 0.1475 0.4206 1.5274 0.0652 0.0711 0.1441
β2 0.6 0.5428 0.0211 0.0620 0.6107 0.0292 0.0301
β3 1.1 0.9562 0.0223 0.1504 1.1210 0.0402 0.0440
c1 2 1.8749 0.0488 0.1437 2.0409 0.0694 0.0788
c2 4 3.6564 0.0684 0.3583 4.0591 0.1303 0.1388
pi1,2 0.0250 0.0029 0.0084 0.0225
pi1,3 0.0250 0.0001 0.0013 0.0249
pi2,1 0.1000 0.0690 0.0230 0.0392
pi2,3 0.0375 0.0034 0.0107 0.0345
pi3,1 0.0750 0.0002 0.0025 0.0748
pi3,2 0.1000 0.0262 0.0086 0.0745
Medium misclassification (0.05 ≤ pij,k ≤ 0.20)
β1 1.5 1.2568 0.0442 0.2487 0.7411 1.5020 0.0715 0.0023 0.0672
β2 0.6 0.5011 0.0209 0.1016 0.6022 0.0327 0.0026
β3 1.1 0.8440 0.0207 0.2600 1.1072 0.0406 0.0092
c1 2 1.7932 0.0482 0.2208 2.0005 0.1263 0.0088
c2 4 3.3901 0.0653 0.6189 3.9998 0.1571 0.0113
pi1,2 0.050 0.0363 0.0180 0.0141
pi1,3 0.050 0.0000 0.0011 0.0500
pi2,1 0.200 0.1911 0.0539 0.0100
pi2,3 0.075 0.0585 0.0322 0.0171
pi3,1 0.150 0.1187 0.0417 0.0325
pi3,2 0.200 0.1792 0.0366 0.0226
High misclassification (0.10 ≤ pij,k ≤ 0.40)
β1 1.5 1.0918 0.0444 0.4118 1.2194 1.5053 0.1046 0.0341 0.0444
β2 0.6 0.4362 0.0210 0.1652 0.6021 0.0511 0.0117
β3 1.1 0.6736 0.0177 0.4296 1.1030 0.0625 0.0182
c1 2 1.7091 0.0473 0.3053 2.0070 0.1070 0.0336
c2 4 2.9866 0.0607 1.0201 4.0039 0.1865 0.0531
pi1,2 0.100 0.0905 0.0095 0.0300
pi1,3 0.100 0.0915 0.0095 0.0297
pi2,1 0.400 0.3907 0.0076 0.0321
pi2,3 0.150 0.1367 0.0076 0.0443
pi3,1 0.300 0.2730 0.0290 0.0900
pi3,2 0.400 0.3732 0.0307 0.0892
As can be seen in Table 3.3, the downward bias of the OP estimates increases with
the amount of misclassification, ranging from 6% to 13% for Π3(low), and 15% to
39% for Π3(high). Also note that the standard errors for the OPM estimates increase
with the level of misclassification, whereas the standard errors for the standard OP
do not. Thus, besides inconsistency, the OP model overstates the precision of the
estimates. The OPM estimates, however, tend to the true values, have lower root
mean squared errors (RMSE) and show a superior overall performance according to
the overall root mean squared error (RMSEall) measure.
Simulations for J = 5 are contained in Table 3.4 using an upper Π5 matrix.
7
Qualitative similar results hold. That is, estimates, biases, RMSE and RMSE-all
are higher for the OP model, and they increase with the level of misclassification.
Additionally, in both designs higher values for pij,k are more easily identified, tending
to their true values. As expected, the main conclusion from these simulations is that,
7Elements below the diagonal are fixed and equal to the upper part, i.e., pik,j = pij,k.
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TABLE 3.4
Monte Carlo simulations results: Π5
OP OPM
Parameter True value Mean Std. dev. RMSE RMSE-all Mean Std. dev. RMSE RMSE-all
Low misclassification (0.025 ≤ pij,k ≤ 0.15)
β1 1.5 1.2799 0.0393 0.2249 0.9467 1.5258 0.0838 0.0265 0.0613
β2 0.6 0.5003 0.0199 0.1022 0.6116 0.0409 0.0124
β3 1.1 0.6677 0.0227 0.4369 1.1347 0.0633 0.0357
c1 0.1 -0.2383 0.0400 0.3446 0.0986 0.2188 0.0042
c2 0.8 0.4122 0.0393 0.3946 0.8014 0.2168 0.0048
c3 1.4 0.9505 0.0413 0.4562 1.3944 0.1659 0.0069
c4 2 1.5708 0.0449 0.4378 1.9807 0.1527 0.0200
pi1,2 0.025 0.0253 0.1359 0.0050
pi1,3 0.025 0.0198 0.0803 0.0075
pi1,4 0.025 0.0083 0.0523 0.0174
pi1,5 0.025 0.0002 0.0788 0.0248
pi2,3 0.05 0.0480 0.2108 0.0044
pi2,4 0.05 0.0440 0.2448 0.0072
pi2,5 0.05 0.0435 0.1188 0.0074
pi3,4 0.1 0.1013 0.2417 0.0041
pi3,5 0.1 0.1081 0.1343 0.0092
pi4,5 0.15 0.1668 0.0627 0.0177
Medium misclassification (0.05 ≤ pij,k ≤ 0.30)
β1 1.5 1.1552 0.0390 0.3571 1.4046 1.5224 0.0804 0.0228 0.1044
β2 0.6 0.4430 0.0195 0.1616 0.6167 0.0390 0.0172
β3 1.1 0.4556 0.0169 0.6475 1.1227 0.0689 0.0233
c1 0.1 -0.3897 0.0380 0.4946 0.1013 0.1279 0.0047
c2 0.8 0.2294 0.0368 0.5752 0.8040 0.1915 0.0058
c3 1.4 0.7184 0.0383 0.6878 1.3898 0.0799 0.0105
c4 2 1.3803 0.0417 0.6335 1.9937 0.0727 0.0064
pi1,2 0.05 0.0481 0.0815 0.0080
pi1,3 0.05 0.0322 0.0542 0.0191
pi1,4 0.05 0.0078 0.0482 0.0426
pi1,5 0.05 0.0004 0.0252 0.0496
pi2,3 0.1 0.0924 0.2286 0.0095
pi2,4 0.1 0.0825 0.1518 0.0184
pi2,5 0.1 0.0904 0.1116 0.0109
pi3,4 0.2 0.2009 0.1638 0.0051
pi3,5 0.2 0.2297 0.0476 0.0305
pi4,5 0.3 0.3594 0.0040 0.0601
High misclassification (0.075 ≤ pij,k ≤ 0.45)
β1 1.5 1.0761 0.0398 0.4260 1.6519 1.2653 0.1491 0.3905 0.5777
β2 0.6 0.4059 0.0199 0.1951 0.5302 0.0619 0.1171
β3 1.1 0.3288 0.0140 0.7726 0.7871 0.0262 0.4991
c1 0.1 -0.4748 0.0378 0.5776 0.0157 0.1052 0.1557
c2 0.8 0.1291 0.0364 0.6738 0.7634 0.1175 0.0688
c3 1.4 0.5804 0.0377 0.8226 1.5694 0.1496 0.3178
c4 2 1.3186 0.0411 0.6858 2.3064 0.2195 0.4961
pi1,2 0.075 0.1796 0.0796 0.1924
pi1,3 0.075 0.0863 0.0481 0.0345
pi1,4 0.075 0.0425 0.0498 0.0430
pi1,5 0.075 0.0427 0.0646 0.0430
pi2,3 0.15 0.2545 0.2333 0.1933
pi2,4 0.15 0.1367 0.0962 0.0230
pi2,5 0.15 0.2418 0.0524 0.1656
pi3,4 0.3 0.3610 0.2111 0.1105
pi3,5 0.3 0.3768 0.0276 0.1121
pi4,5 0.45 0.5000 0.0000 0.0500
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although the reduction in biases achieved with the OPM model comes at the expense
of increased standard errors, the overall performance of the OPM model (measured
by the overall root mean squared error) is far superior than the OP model.
Finally, it should be pointed out that alongside the overall performance of the
OP and OPM under a scenario of misclassification, a crucial concern for prediction is
how statistical significance of the estimated coefficients varies under the two models.
In particular, when moving from the OP to the OPM, the increase in the estimated
coefficients should be compared with the higher standard errors. This may lead
to a lack of causality of education if the reduction in the bias achieved with the
OPM model, is less than the lower precision of the estimated coefficient, formally:
∆βˆed,OPM  ∆se(βˆed,OPM).
3.5. MISCLASSIFICATION ASSUMPTIONS
This section describes the expected misclassification patterns by group of civic
outcomes and also by educational levels. The following assumptions are used as a
guideline to interpret the misreporting results of Chapters 4 and 5.
Recall the classification of the set of dependent variables into two groups. On the
one hand, in the case of Italy, the civic indicators ‘interest in politics’ and ‘problem
of tax evasion’ are defined as “civic opinions”, whereas the outcomes ‘not paying for
your ticket on public transport’, ‘keeping money obtained by accident when it could
be returned’, and ‘not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally
scraped’ are classified as “civic behaviours”. For the UK, on the other hand, there
are four indicators I term as “civic opinions”, that is, ‘general interest in politics’,
‘attention to politics’, ‘discuss politics with family and friends’ and ‘active in a vol-
untary organisation’. Moreover, I consider further outcomes related to civic opinions:
whether being involved in politics is time consuming, whether voting is a waste of
time, and whether the lack of voting is associated with feelings of guilt and neglecting
the duty as a citizen. There are also two additional measures of trust: in people, and
in the local government. The three “civic behaviours” for the UK are exactly the
same as the ones for Italy: failing to report accidental damage done to a parked vehi-
cle (car damage), keeping money that you have found (keeping money), and avoiding
a fare on public transport (avoiding fare).
This distinction between civic opinions and civic behaviours provides a clear
framework of what kind of results to expect and hence which hypotheses are more
relevant to test in terms of misclassification patterns by civic outcomes. For instance,
whether the assumption of monotonicity of correct report for civic behaviours holds,
where typically there is under (over) reporting of undesirable (desirable) social be-
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haviours. I now provide some useful constraints on the misclassification process
relying on this classification. I also elaborate on how these constraints may vary by
schooling levels.
To begin with, note that an implicit restriction is that the estimated misclas-
sification probabilities (off-diagonal elements of ΠˆJ) must be less than one half, to
guarantee that the probabilities of correct report (diagonal elements) are positive.
The first assumption states that the probability of reporting the true value is higher
than that of reporting other values,
Assumption 3.1: pˆijj > pˆijk, for j, k ∈ (1, ..., J) and j 6= k.
This assumption is very plausible because, intuitively, there is only one way to
report the truth, while there are several number of alternative ways to misreport.
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that, for each of the observed answers, the
probability of correct report is higher than one half.8 Note that this assumption is
the same as Assumption 2.7 in Hu (2008) and constraint two in Swartz et al. (2004),
and is consistent with most validation studies on occupational choices (Bound et al.
(2001)). For example, in a recent study on the extent of measurement error in self-
reported occupation data, Sullivan (2009) finds a lower bound of correct report of
60% across (eight) employment status. Hence, it is expected that for most civic
outcomes the observed responses ω would contain enough correct information on the
true responses y so that Assumption 3.1 would hold.
The next assumption (monotonicity of correct reporting) is motivated by social
psychology. When answering questions related to socially sensitive topics, individuals
would typically under-report undesirable behaviours and attitudes and over-report
desirable ones. This is due to social desirability, “a pervasive tendency of individu-
als to present themselves in the most favorable manner relative to prevailing social
norms” (King and Bruner (2000), p.80). This is a well known phenomenon which
has prompted the development of methodologies to improve the quality of self-report
measures in psychological research. For instance, Rasinski et al. (2005), introduce
an implicit goal priming methodology to reduce the bias on a series of questions on
socially sensitive behaviours involving excessive alcohol consumption. Moreover, this
assumption turns out to have identifying power in misclassification models. Molinari
(2008) (Assumption 4) shows this when analysing misreporting of participation in
welfare programs. Monotonicity of correct report implies that the probabilities of
8If pˆijj > 1/2,∀j ∈ (1, ..., J), the misclassification matrix is strictly diagonally dominant and then
invertible. Thus, it guarantees a solution to the misclassification equation system: Pω = Πˆ′P y.
This condition also has been assumed in the literature (see, e.g., Assumption 2.2 in Hu (2008)).
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correct report are increasing along the diagonal of ΠˆJ ,
Assumption 3.2: pˆi1,1 < ... < pˆi(J−1),(J−1) < pˆiJ,J .
As questions about civic behaviours in the sample are clearly sensitivity topics,
I consider Assumption 3.2 to be relevant for this group of civic outcomes. In other
words, I believe the misclassification problem to be decreasing, the more civically
behaved individuals are according to their reported answers.
Assumption 3.3(i) indicates a differential pattern of misreporting by civic out-
comes. The assumption for civic opinions implies that individuals who apparently
show more political engagement are more prone to misreporting, because probabil-
ities below the diagonal of ΠˆJ are significantly higher than the ones above it. This
is in line with over-reporting of voting behaviour found in the literature (e.g., Karp
and Brockington (2005)).9 For civic behaviours, however, misreporting probabilities
below the diagonal of ΠˆJ should tend to zero as individuals who report having good
civic behaviours will clearly have no incentive to state that they are not so.
Assumption 3.3: (i) For civic opinions, pˆij,k are small on the upper part of ΠˆJ(j <
k). For civic behaviours, pˆij,k are small on the lower part of ΠˆJ(j > k). (ii) For
civic behaviours, elements on the upper part of ΠˆJ are increasing along each row,
pˆij,j+1 < pˆij,j+2 < ... < pˆij,J .
In addition, Assumption 3.3(ii) states that individuals whose truthful civic re-
sponsibility are the lowest, tend to report the highest scores. Again, I believe that
this can be explained by social desirability bias (e.g., Paulhus (1991)). Individuals’
motives (e.g., approval, guilt, embarrassment), or expectancies regarding the eval-
uative consequences of their behaviours, led them to present themselves in socially
acceptable terms in order to gain the approval of others. Thus, this sub-group of
respondents would lie and report their answers at the top of the scale rather than
at the middle of it. I also consider social desirability bias a plausible hypothesis to
expect misreporting to be stronger for civic behaviours than civic opinions.
Finally, Assumption 3.4 describes how misreporting may vary by schooling levels.
Assumption 3.4: (i) For civic opinions, misreporting is more likely to hold for
higher education levels and can mostly be explained by misclassification of answers
9People are often embarrassed to admit that they have failed to meet the basic obligation to vote
since voting is considered an essential duty of citizenship and a fundamental right. I am able to
examine this hypothesis for the UK because, as previously mentioned, two indicators ask: whether
feelings of guilt are present if one does not vote, and also whether one is neglecting his duty as a
citizen if he does not vote.
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at the top of the scale (i.e., small pˆiJ,J). (ii) For civic behaviours, misreporting is
equally likely to hold for different education levels and can mostly be explained by
misclassification of answers at the bottom of the scale (i.e., small pˆi1,1).
Assumption 3.4(i) relies on an established result from the political science liter-
ature: a positive association between voting misreporting and socioeconomic status.
There are diverse hypotheses for over-reporting. Alternatively, theories place empha-
sis on either feelings of guilt (Bernstein et al. (2001)), a desire to look good before
the interviewer, or see over-reporting as an expression of satisfaction with the status
quo (Silver et al. (1986)). More educated individuals are the most probable to mis-
report as they are under the most pressure from these factors. Because individuals
who are more interested in politics are, overall, more likely to vote, this finding from
political science is also applicable to the civic opinions ‘interest, attention and dis-
cussing politics’. Even in the case of Italy, where there is significant discontent with
current politics, more educated individuals will tend to over-report their interest in
politics so as to remain consistent with their class interests. Otherwise, any deviation
from the group norms by means of not over-reporting would create discomfort for
the non-conforming person.
Assumption 3.4(ii) is more conflictive. As mentioned above in Assumption 3.2,
it is expected that social desirability would drive the whole sample results for civic
behaviours. But, should this still hold regardless of the education level of individ-
uals? Indeed, social psychology provides some support for this assumption. Social
psychologists have characterised two types of social norms: injunctive and descrip-
tive. Descriptive norms (called the norms of “is”) refer to what is commonly done,
and by registering what others are doing, one can usually choose efficiently and
well. Injunctive norms (called the norms of “ought”) refer to what is commonly
approved/disapproved by promising social rewards and punishments (Cialdini et al.
(2006)). Studies have demonstrated how descriptive norms affect behaviour in a
variety of real world situations (e.g., littering, recycling, climate change). The as-
sumption is based upon empirical evidence showing a strong effect of descriptive
norms on behaviours regardless of their background (Nolan et al. (2008)).
In other words, if more or less educated individuals believe most people are mis-
reporting their civic behaviours, the effect of descriptive norms (e.g., everybody lies
when answering these questions) would lead them to do so too. This is related to
circumstances under which providing normative information backfires, producing the
opposite effect (see, for example, Cialdini (2007); Griskevicius et al. (2008)).
I also expect similar misreporting patterns along the lines of Assumption 3.1 to
Assumption 3.4 for the UK’s additional outcomes related to politics and voting, as
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well as for measures of trust. Evidently, individuals who had not voted are less
likely to accept that they either have feelings of guilt or are neglecting their duty
as citizens by not voting and, consequently, they would be more prone to misreport
these two indicators. This might also hold across education levels. On the contrary,
I believe that the outcome dealing with the ‘time constraint of political activity’
is less likely to be misreported. But the question on whether ‘voting is a waste of
time’ may suffer from misreporting (depicted by Assumption 3.3(i)), as one may feel
embarrassed to judge politics as ineffective and to appear as an egoistic and self-
interested voter. With regards to the indicators measuring social trust (specifically,
trust in people and trust in the local government), they may be misreported too,
following a similar misclassification pattern as civic behaviours. Recall that the
formers embody measures of social trust.
I finish Section 3.5 by discussing the extent to which the misclassification problem
may vary in the two countries. Formally, would the probabilities of correct report
(pˆijj, j ∈ (1, ..., J) of Assumption 3.1) be lower in Italy or in the UK? I think that
the issue of lack of trust, mainly in Italy, would lead to bad steady states and so-
cial traps, making misreporting perhaps more significant in this country. In fact,
a higher tolerance of self-interest acts (as the thesis’ civic behaviours variables) is
lower in northern European countries. This shows that social trust is partly cultur-
ally inherited but can also be fostered by economic equality carried out by impartial
political institutions (Rothstein (2005)). The extent to whether Assumption 3.1 to
Assumption 3.4 are more valid in either Italy or the UK, however, is a new empirical
matter since most of the studies undertaken in this field of misreporting, are based
on the individual level rather than cross-country comparison.
3.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, I have reviewed why misreporting is a frequent concern with self-
reported measures, I have also shown its empirical consequences through simulations,
in terms of biased and inconsistent estimates with an overstated precision and lastly, I
have presented different approaches to tackle it. The key driving force of misreporting
is SDB, the tendency in which individuals present themselves in the most favourable
manner relative to prevailing social norms, in order to gain approval of others. This
will result in an under-report of undesirable behaviours and an over-report of desirable
ones. These systematic unreliable responses by interviewees may therefore yield an
invalid relationship between education and social capital.
Chapter 3 outlines the numerous models to deal with misclassification. The chosen
approach is related to the type of measurement error one is interested in modeling.
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Given that my core aim was on the misclassification process and estimated coeffi-
cients, I used an OPM. In other words, my double objective by using the OPM is to
pin down the existing misreporting patterns assumed in the literature (mainly from
the political and social psychology fields) and how SDB affects causality of schooling.
The OPM model assumes that the wrong outcome is reported, and accounts for
this by including misclassification probabilities in the standard likelihood function of
ordered response models. For the parametric model to be valid, the misclassification
process is subject to different conditions. Namely, an stochastic condition which con-
strains the level of the elements of the misclassification matrix and that misreporting
is not a function of covariates. These conditions, which guarantee identification of
the coefficients are, nonetheless, a relative drawback by imposing a rigid structure
to the misclassification model. Indeed, being highly parameterised is a disadvantage
for the OPM model. The other model applied in Chapters 4 and 5 is the IV-OPM,
where the probable endogeneity of schooling within the OPM is accounted for. I used
a standard IV technique where the endogenous education variable is replaced by its
fitted values from the first stage regression. Here, shortcomings originate from both
the nonlinearity of the model and the discreteness of the endogenous regressor.
There are methodological alternatives to capture measurement error in the hu-
man to social capital framework. For instance, semiparametric estimation such as
a monotone rank estimator would suffice (e.g., Cavanagh and Sherman (1998) and
Abrevaya (1999)), or one could model the boundaries as linear functions of observed
explanatory variables (i.e., Terza (1985)), and extend this by allowing for random
boundaries that vary across individuals as in Das (1995). In these models, however,
one is indifferent about the misreporting probabilities and consider them as nuisance
parameters. But as mentioned earlier, misreporting probabilities are one of the main
objectives of the Chapters and this is captured by the OPM and extensions. Perhaps
one could employ nonparametric versions of the models to deal with endogeneity in
nonlinear models and allowing for covariate-dependent misclassification (e.g., Hu and
Schennach (2008), Hu (2008)).
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A. APPENDIX: MISCLASSIFICATION TEST
In this appendix I outline how to test the null hypothesis H0: pij,k = 0 for j 6= k against the
alternative H1: pij,k > 0, for at least one misclassification probability. In other words, a statistical
test for the OP model against the OPM model. Divide the parameter vector θ into three components:
the p beta coefficients, the j -1 cut points and the l [l = J × (J − 1)] off-diagonal elements of the
matrix of misclassification probabilities ΠJ . That is, θ = (β
′, c′, pi′)′. Suppose that one wants to
test that the l estimated misclassification probabilities are zero against the alternative that they
are higher than zero. Stack these l estimated misclassification probabilities pˆij,k (for j 6= k) in a row
vector Ψˆl. Then, the hypothesis test is:
H0: Ψˆl = 0 against H1: RΨˆl > 0, (A.1)
where R is a (l by l) identity matrix. Since the asymptotic distribution of the LR statistic (or
χ2 statistic as it is distributed) is not defined under null, because under H0, Ψˆl is not an interior
point of the parameter space and it is located at its boundary, it is assumed that θ is approximated
under the null by a convex cone C (Shapiro (1985), p. 137). Now, by Theorem 2.1 of Shapiro
(1985), the χ2 distribution is replaced by a distribution the χ¯2. Let Z ∼ N(0, V ) be a l -dimensional
normal random vector, then
χ¯2(V,R) = Z ′V −1Z −minRΨˆl>0(Z − Ψˆl)′V −1(Z − Ψˆl). (A.2)
The basic distributional result concerning the random variable χ¯2 is that is distributed as a
mixture of chi-squared distributions, that is,





i ≤ c). (A.3)
Computation of the weights ωi = ωi(l, V,R) are a difficult numerical problem. For l > 4, there
is not a closed expression form for the weights, but reasonably accurate estimators of the weights
can be obtained by Monte Carlo simulations (see, Liu and Wang (2003), p. 123). Proceed as follows:
1. Generate Z from Z ∼ N(0, V ).
2. Compute χ¯2(V,R).
3. Repeat the first two steps M times.
4. Estimate pr(χ2i ≤ c) by the proportion of times that χ¯2(V,R) ≤ c.
Chapter 4
Civic outcomes, misclassification and education:
the case of Italy
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter, following the approach of Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) and
Dustmann and van Soest (2004), I examine how the presence of misclassification
affects the impact of education on a number of civic outcomes in Italy. Estimates from
an OP are compared with those from an OPM. In order to conclude that education
has a causal effect on civic outcomes, as well as to account for misclassification, one
also needs to control for the potential endogeneity of education. Thus, an IV ordered
probit with misclassification (IV-OPM) is estimated. In line with the approach of
Brandolini and Cipollone (2002) and Brunello et al. (2009), a reform of the Italian
educational system is used as an instrument for education.
A standard result in the political science literature is that more educated people
are more likely to be civically engaged than less educated individuals (e.g., Pattie
et al. (2003)). The approach adopted in this Chapter enables me to ascertain the
extent to which this result is genuine or whether it is mainly driven by a systematic
over-reporting of more educated individuals relative to the less educated ones. More-
over, I am also able to determine whether individuals’ persistent tendency to provide
socially desirable responses leads to a spurious causal link between education and a
range of measures of social trust, as well as how this bias varies by schooling levels.
I apply the parametric techniques (described in detail in Chapter 3) to models
using five different measures of civic outcome as dependent variables. Individuals are
asked: 1) about their ‘interest in politics’, 2) to rate ‘the importance of the problem
of tax evasion relative to all the problems faced by the government’, 3) whether they
‘would not pay the ticket on public transport’, 4) whether they ‘would keep money
obtained by accident when it would be possible to return it’, and 5) whether they
‘would leave their name for the owner of a car they accidentally scraped’. Given
the distinct nature of these measures, it is possible to classify the first two as “civic
opinions” and the last three as “civic behaviours”. This classification relies on the
two main dimensions of social capital proposed by Uphoff (2000), that is, “structural
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social capital” (civic engagement) and “cognitive social capital” (social trust). These
indicators are recoded in a three-point ordinal scale where higher values indicate a
higher sense of civic duty.1
The main empirical contribution of Chapter 4 is given by using an array of civic
outcomes as well as controlling for misreporting. Previous research studying the
causal link of education and civic outcomes do not explicitly control for misclassifi-
cation and focus on one aspect of social capital, civic engagement. By including civic
behaviours into the analysis, this Chapter provides evidence on how, after accounting
for misreporting, education is related to indicators of social trust. Furthermore, to
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study attempting to simultaneously account
for the misclassification and endogeneity biases of education. Hence, I am able to
establish the directions of both types of bias on the education parameter.
I find that misclassification is significant across civic outcomes, leading to substan-
tial changes in the estimated effects. Chapter 4’s main finding is that, if one does not
account for the tendency of individuals to provide socially desirable responses, this
leads to a spurious relationship between education and civic behaviours. The contri-
bution highlights how causality varies by group of civic outcomes, with relationships
being endogenous to the social structure of the specific country under analysis.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 I discuss the IV ap-
proach. Section 4.3 contains the empirical results by civic outcomes and educational
levels. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes. Recall that the data and the methodology used
in this Chapter are contained in the previous Chapters 2 and 3.
4.2. IV APPROACH
In this section I briefly discuss the IV approach and explain why education may
be endogenous. For a detailed account of how endogeneity may affect the causal
effect of education on measures of civic engagement in Italy, and how the associated
bias’ sources on this relationship may vary across group of civic outcomes, see the
related paper: Di Pietro and Delprato (2009).
Despite numerous reasons to expect a positive association between education and
civic outcomes, the OPM estimates may not provide a valid relationship unless one
takes into account the potential endogeneity of education. This would be the case
if unobserved factors drive both civic awareness and the acquisition of education.
For example, it is likely that parents who foster an interest in further education
in their children, also stress to them the importance of being civically responsible.
1The Italian data used is described in Section 2.3 and the recoding and resulting outcomes’ frequen-
cies in Section 3.3.2.
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Endogeneity could also originate from the unobservable given by intelligence and,
such as determination and drive, would simultaneously influence education decisions
and levels of trust. Indeed, as argued by Sturgis et al. (2010a) intelligence fosters
greater interpersonal trust as more intelligent individuals are more accurate in their
assessments of the trustworthiness of others. This means that more intelligent people
are less often betrayed over the life-course and, consequently, they are able to benefit
from norms of reciprocity.
To account for endogeneity problems I use an educational reform as a source of
exogenous variation in individuals’ levels of schooling that is otherwise unrelated to
civic outcomes. Milligan et al. (2004) employ an equivalent IV strategy using changes
in compulsory school laws to disentangle the impact of education on civic outcomes.2
As usual with any IV procedure, I expect that the estimated coefficient of the
education covariate to be larger than the ones from the OP or OPM models but with
a higher standard error. This is a common outcome when using a two-stage proce-
dure (Wooldridge (2002), p. 104), where one faces a trade-off between inconsistent
estimators that have relatively small standard errors and consistent but imprecise
estimators. The upward bias in the education coefficient relies on the assumption of
a positive correlation between unobservables (e.g., determination, drive, intelligence)
and education.3 This assumption, generally put forward within the literature (see, for
instance, Dee (2004), Milligan et al. (2004), Oreopoulos (2006), Oreopoulos (2007))
results in a larger IV coefficient of education than when applying OLS.
Two reforms of the Italian educational system have been used as instruments for
schooling. The first reform (Law 1859, 31 December 1962) implied the unification
of the previous high school in a single compulsory junior high school (in force from
1963). Before 1962 it was mandatory to complete elementary school (5 years of
schooling), whereas from 1962 onwards it became compulsory to attend at least 8
years of schooling. The second reform (Law 910, 11 December 1969) opened university
access to all students regardless of the high school track attended. Several papers have
employed these reforms to estimate the impact of education on earnings: Brunello
and Miniaci (1999) and Brunello et al. (2001) use the latter reform, while Brandolini
and Cipollone (2002) and Brunello et al. (2009) exploit the 1962 middle school reform.
However, the 1969 reform presents two main weaknesses. Firstly, although it provided
2Alternative instruments used in the literature are measures of local accessibility in schools (Dee
(2004)) and socioeconomic background variables (Brady et al. (1995)).
3In the simplest case of a liner model with one covariate, this can be seen by decomposing the
probability limit of the estimated education coefficient as: plim βˆed = βed+pi
cov(ed,unob)
var(ed) . Note that
the bias is positive since the covariance of education and unobservables is positive as well as the
independent effect of the unobservables on a civic outcome which is given by pi.
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an opportunity for a wider university access, it did not represent a truly exogenous
increase of years of education. Additionally, its impact can be confused with the
previous middle school reform. Thus, I attempt to overcome those limitations by
using the 1962 compulsory school reform.
I next turn to the issue of the potential treated group of the 1962 reform and
its empirical evidence. As noted by Brandolini and Cipollone (2002), individuals
immediately and directly affected by the reform were those without a middle school
degree and who were less than 15 years old in 1963, that is, people born between
1949 and 1957. However, instead of using this smaller treated group (around 4%
of the sample), most of the studies above have defined the reform using a dummy
taking the value of one for people born after 1949, controlling for cohort effects. This
is partially due to the low degree of compliance as it almost took 15 years for the
reform to take full effect.
Nevertheless, its validity as an instrument is mixed. For instance, Brandolini and
Cipollone (2002) find an effect of the 1962 reform in terms of highest qualifications
and enrolment ratios, and Fort (2007) for number of years of education. Conversely,
Brunello and Miniaci (1999) and Brunello et al. (2001) show a little impact which
may be explained by a general increasing trend in education. To a certain extent our
evidence agrees with those latter studies.4
A common procedure to handle endogeneity in nonlinear models is a control
function approach, where estimated residuals from the reduced form are added in
the second stage regression to control for endogeneity (e.g., Blundell and Powell
(2004)). This method, however, does not work if any of the endogenous regressors
are non-continuous. Because the endogenous variable education is discrete, there is
not point identification.5 An alternative is to use fitted values for the endogenous
covariate from the first stage regression mimicking two-stage least squares (2SLS).
Unfortunately, as first pointed out by Amemiya (1985), this is not generally valid
in a nonlinear regression setting with non-additive errors. Measurement error (or
endogeneity) of education can no longer be considered as an additively separable
disturbance and, therefore, it is not possible to find an instrument which would be
correlated with the regressor without being correlated with the composite disturbance
4A nonparametric regression of years of education on year of birth did not result in a significant
discontinuity at the policy change. However, in a related paper (Di Pietro and Delprato (2009)),
there is additional support to use the 1962 reform as an instrument for schooling. For instance,
estimates indicate that the reform has shifted the educational distribution from primary school to
lower secondary school and it is uncorrelated with underlying trends of increasing education.
5Chesher (2007) clearly illustrates this point by providing partial identification results for discrete
outcome models. In particular, the identification set in an OP is affected by the discreteness of the
outcome and strength of the instrument. See Chesher (2010), Section 3.3, for details.
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(see, for an example, Wang and Hsiao (2007), p. 428). Although this is a very
important limitation, I still follow a standard (fitted value) IV technique.
I now introduce the IV-OPM. Rewrite the latent variable equation as y∗i = z
′
1iβ1 +
ω2iβ2 + εi, where xi ≡ (z1i, ω2i), and ω2i denotes the observed endogenous schooling
variable. A weakly increasing function G transforms the latent variable to the ‘true’
outcome: yi = G(y
∗
i ). The model for the endogenous regressor is determined by a
linear regression for the reduced form with an independent error,
ω2i = α0 + z
′
iα1 + νi and νi⊥zi (4.2.1)
where zi ≡ (z1i, z2i) is the vector of instruments, and z2i provides the exclusion re-
strictions. As usual, I assume that the instrument is uncorrelated with the structural
error term, E(z′iεi) = 0, and is relevant, α1 6= 0. The vector of exclusion restric-
tions, z2i, is constructed from (i) a dummy for the 1962 reform (= reform62), (ii)
an interaction of the 1962 reform with the respondent’s father’s education level (=
r62edpad), and (iii) an interaction of the 1962 reform with the respondent’s mother’s
education level (= r62edmad). This selection of instruments is guided by the hypoth-
esis that educational reforms should have, in general, a differential impact by family
background which is concentrated among respondents from lower socioeconomic lev-
els (Card (2001)). I use the fitted value of schooling from Eq. (4.2.1) and plug it into
the latent variable equation to account for endogeneity.
Estimations from the first stage regression provides support for the choice of the
vector of exclusion restrictions. The instruments are relevant as they are significantly
correlated with years of schooling: αˆ1,reform62 = 1.71 (p-value = 0.00), αˆ1,r62edpad =
-0.11 (p-value = 0.01) and αˆ1,r62edmad = -0.10 (p-value = 0.06). The negative sign
of the interaction variables support the hypothesis that the reform had a differential
effect by family background in Italy, with increases in educational attaintment for
the cohort born after 1949 among those individuals who have less educated parents.
Based on the strength of the first stage equation, the selected instruments are not
weak. The F -statistic is 202.29, well above Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for
weak instruments.6
It is plausible that, at least in Italy, unobservables that encourage individuals to
develop a taste for education (e.g., determination and drive) are likely to be more
strongly correlated with civic behaviours. For instance, parents who foster an interest
in further education in their children, are more likely to impress upon them the
importance of being civically responsible, perhaps to a bigger extent than they stress
6Endogeneity tests are discussed in Section 4.3.
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to them to pursue an interest in public affairs. This could be explained by social
sanctioning on civic behaviours. It should be noted that, both the mixed empirical
evidence of the reform found in the literature and the nonlinearity of the OPM model,
lead to cautious interpretation of the IV-OPM results.
4.3. RESULTS
Estimates for the ordered response models explained in Section 3.3 are presented
in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. All models are estimated by maximum likelihood and
consistent standard errors for the IV-OPM are obtained by bootstrapping. Given
that the misclassification probabilities are constrained to be on the unit interval, a
constrained maximum likelihood procedure is used. Note that it is acknowledged
in the literature that if a parameter is on the boundary of the parameter space,
then bootstrapping is inconsistent (see, Andrews (2000)). Nonetheless, most of the
estimated misclassification probabilities are far away from their boundaries. Thus,
applying the bootstrap method to the constrained models will suffice.
As regards to the bias on the estimated impact of education across models, I
anticipate an upward bias on its coefficient as a result of misclassification and/or
endogeneity. That is: βˆed,OP  βˆed,IV-OP ≶ βˆed,OPM  βˆed,IV-OPM. The model
accounting for endogeneity and misreporting would yield, on the one hand, a double
positive bias on the schooling coefficient but, on the other hand, a double increase
in its standard error. Hence, compared to the OP model, whether the resulting
impact is significant or not, would depend on which empirical phenomenon dominates.
Nevertheless, the OP should certainly underestimate the impact of schooling on civic
outcomes.
4.3.1. Parametric estimations for civic outcomes
The first part of Table 4.1 presents the results for the civic opinion ‘interest in
politics’. The three sets of parametric estimates of the slope coefficients are generally
equivalent in terms of signs and significance levels. Because the main interest is
on the education coefficients and misclassification probabilities, I briefly discuss the
results of the other explanatory variables.
The coefficient on age is statistically significant across models, with older individ-
uals being more likely to have an interest in politics than younger individuals; this
result is in line with the literature (Algan and Cahuc (2006)). Interest in politics
increases with age at a decreasing rate. As shown in some studies (e.g., Brady et al.
(1995)), there are significant gender differences in civic participation, with males
more likely to follow public affairs (Dow (2009)). A positive association of income
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TABLE 4.1
Parametric estimates for civic opinions (Italy)
Interest in politics Tax evasion
Variables OP OPM IV-OPM OP OPM IV-OPM
Education 0.0908** 0.175** 0.2146* 0.0244** 0.1446* 0.1603
(0.0066) (0.0477) (0.1284) (0.0063) (0.0744) (0.1662)
Age 0.0524** 0.0973** 0.0715** 0.033** 0.128 0.1354
(0.0095) (0.0356) (0.0293) (0.009) (0.0893) (0.111)
Age2/100 -0.0445** -0.0815** -0.0591** -0.0203** -0.053 -0.0615
(0.0086) (0.0311) (0.0291) (0.0081) (0.093) (0.1117)
Male 0.3164** 0.6188** 0.6177** 0.0195 -0.0334 -0.0932
(0.0485) (0.1994) (0.2063) (0.0469) (0.4063) (0.4432)
Father’s education -0.0065 -0.0011 -0.0257 0.0121 0.0897 0.0712
(0.0083) (0.0198) (0.0573) (0.0081) (0.1255) (0.127)
Mother’s education 0.0276** 0.0648** 0.051 0.0107 0.1711 0.1699
(0.0091) (0.0252) (0.0353) (0.0089) (0.1547) (0.1668)
Income 0.0015** 0.024** 0.0428** 0.0007 0.048 0.0621
(0.0007) (0.0079) (0.0154) (0.0006) (0.0426) (0.0533)
Number of children -0.0755** -0.2555** -0.3258** 0.0214 -0.0479 -0.0888
(0.0259) (0.0942) (0.1032) (0.0251) (0.3406) (0.3165)
Married 0.0938* 0.1168 0.0509 0.1621** 1.2115 1.0447
(0.0533) (0.1162) (0.1589) (0.0515) (0.8081) (0.7978)
Center -0.0837 -0.379** -0.4194** 0.3799** 2.5361* 2.4444*
(0.0597) (0.1518) (0.1595) (0.0578) (1.317) (1.3876)
North 0.0475 -0.0719 -0.1481 0.1254** 0.5417 0.3996
(0.0509) (0.1265) (0.1517) (0.0493) (0.6227) (0.563)
cˆ1 2.3091** 4.4156** 4.1681** 0.9696** 6.5619** 7.0145**
(0.2593) (1.3383) (1.2158) (0.2471) (1.608) (1.8964)
cˆ2 3.2924** 6.514** 6.4494** 2.2448** 9.922** 9.9186**
(0.2616) (2.0614) (1.9698) (0.2491) (0.4173) (0.4393)
pˆi1,2 0.0864 0.0731 0.3483** 0.4118**
(0.0652) (0.0542) (0.1698) (0.1506)
pˆi1,3 0.0029 0.0013 0.1078 0.1124
(0.0079) (0.0055) (0.1326) (0.1268)
pˆi2,1 0.2049** 0.2091* 0.3493** 0.3906**
(0.1013) (0.1095) (0.0916) (0.1107)
pˆi2,3 0.204** 0.2418** 0.1849** 0.156
(0.0899) (0.0642) (0.086) (0.1076)
pˆi3,1 0.1691** 0.2055** 0.1247** 0.1319**
(0.0321) (0.0317) (0.0191) (0.0172)
pˆi3,2 0.2074** 0.228** 0.455** 0.4533**
(0.0401) (0.0452) (0.0232) (0.0281)
Log-likelihood -3037.29 -3003.59 -3060.15 -3144.52 -3118.45 -3123.48
χ¯2 (P-value) 1.560 (0.051) 6.302 (0.008) 0.302 (0.480) 0.369 (0.367)
χ2(1) (P-value) 0.110 (0.740) 0.011 (0.916)
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Bootstrapped OPM and IV-OPM, 100 number of repetitions. Log-likelihood is the average over 100 repetitions.
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and mother’s education agrees with the socioeconomic literature and the theory of
civic voluntarism from political science. Belonging to a larger family and living in
the central region have a detrimental effect on being interested in politics. More-
over, misclassification of this self-reported outcome not only introduces a positive
bias on most of the coefficients of around 50%, but also an increase in all standard
errors. This agrees with the simulations in Section 3.4 which show that the OP model
yields biased estimates with higher RMSE. The same also holds when one controls
for endogeneity in the IV-OPM model.
A likelihood ratio (LR) test which is distributed as chi-bar squared (χ¯2) confirms
that the OPM which allows for misclassification errors outperforms the OP. The
χ¯2 statistic is 1.56 with a probability value of 5%, so the null hypothesis that the
misclassification probabilities are equal to zero is rejected.7
Perhaps surprisingly, the null of exogeneity of education is accepted. Because the
interest lies solely in the potential endogeneity of education, I use a Hausman test
only for this parameter.8 The χ2(1) statistic is 0.11 (p-value = 0.74). Note that I
also arrive to the same conclusion in the IV-OP model. The estimated coefficient
for education in the IV-OP model is 0.16 (p-value = 0.001), and the χ2(1) equals
1.94 with probability 0.17. As in other settings, a test on a subset of parameters
can lead to a conclusion different from that of a test on all parameters, although
this is not surprising if one takes into account evidence of the IV-strategy and the
nonlinearly of the models. Nevertheless, results are consistent in the sense that the
lack of endogeneity holds, regardless of whether one considers either true or reported
answers. Also, the education coefficient in the OPM and IV-OPM models does not
lead to different conclusions as well as the models’ χ¯2 tests. Hence, I rely on the
OPM model to discuss the estimates of the misclassification probabilities.
Misclassification probabilities satisfy the stochastic conditions of Eqs. (3.9) and
(3.10). Although this outcome is (statistically) misreported, there is sufficient correct
information in the sample on ‘interest in politics’ for Assumption 3.1 to hold, with
probabilities of correct report being higher than one half.9 People are more likely to
tell the truth than to lie about how keen they are in politics. However, misreporting
for reported answers taking the value 2 (not very) and 3 (fairly/very) are significant
and Assumption 3.3 holds too. While the probability of correct report for the answer
(not at all) pˆi1,1 is 0.91, the values for pˆi2,2 and pˆi3,3 are 0.59 and 0.62, respectively. In
7The LR test is not distributed as a χ2 because the test is one-sided and the vector of misclassification
probabilities is on the boundary of the parameter space under the null hypothesis. See Appendix A.







9For ease of exposition, estimated probabilities are also displayed in matrix form in Table 4.4.
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other words, individuals who apparently show more political engagement are more
likely to misreport. This is consistent with findings from political science that support
over-reporting of civic opinions. Although there is discontent with current public
affairs in Italy, feelings of guilt, stigma or satisfaction with the status quo make
individuals over-state their reported attention to public affairs (Karp and Brockington
(2005)). Moreover, misclassification plays a major role in the magnitude of the effect
of schooling, i.e., its coefficient increases from 0.09 to 0.18. If inference were carried
out by calculating marginal effects based upon the OP estimates, it would be very
misleading. This highlights the importance of accounting for misreporting.
Estimations for the variable ‘the problem of tax evasion’ are presented in the
second part of Table 4.1. Because the null of non-misreporting is accepted, I mention
some covariates using the OP. Individuals living in the north and central regions tend
to express a deeper concern regarding the problem of tax evasion, as well as people
who are older or married. As expected, since higher educated individuals should be
better informed regarding tax evasion in Italy, education has a direct and significant
relationship with this civic opinion. Higher educated people tend to judge tax evasion
as more problematic. As before, there is not evidence of endogeneity in either the
IV-OPM or IV-OP. (For the latter model the χ2(1) = 0.02, p-value = 0.88).
The main result for this civic opinion is that it is not misclassified according to
the χ¯2 p-value. Firstly, the fact that reported and true answers to this question
tend to agree could be due to the widespread knowledge of considerable evasion in
the Italian tax system (Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005)). In fact, amongst major OECD
countries, Italy presents the highest levels of tax evasion, around 28% (Schneider
(2000)). One explanation is given by Brosio et al. (2002). They argue that tax
evasion is tacitly accepted as a compensation for the welfare loss deriving from too
high centrally set tax rates, particularly in poorer regions where this welfare burden
is stronger. Secondly, unlike ‘interest in politics’, factors such as guilt and stigma are
not likely to be operating. In the remainder of this section, I turn my attention to
the other three civic indicators.
Table 4.2 contains the results for civic behaviours. The first one ‘not paying for
your ticket on public transport’ is abbreviated as ‘not paying ticket’. Besides a small
effect of schooling, very few covariates are significant (only regional dummies in the
OP model). Intuitively, honest behaviour based on shared norms in a society (social
trust) should not markedly diverge across background family variables (e.g., parents
education, family income). The null hypothesis of non-misreporting is rejected (χ¯2 =
6.94, p-value = 0.00), and the necessary stochastic condition in (3.10) holds. Again,
the null of exogeneity of education is accepted for both the IV-OPM and IV-OP
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models.10 Moreover, because pˆi2,3 > pˆi2,2 (see also Table 4.4), Assumption 3.1 does
not hold and the OP estimates are extremely biased. That is, observed answers taking
the value of 2 do not contain enough information on true responses. Assumption 3.1
may be invalid as it mainly stems from educational and occupational data, but not
from indicators of social trust which suffer from SD.
While Assumption 3.2 (monotonicity of correct report) does not strictly hold,
there is enough evidence to suggest that this variable suffers from SDB (e.g., King
and Bruner (2000)). The largest misclassification probabilities are pˆi1,3 and pˆi2,3. This
means, in turn, that people whose reported answers show a lower degree of social trust
are more concerned in presenting themselves in socially acceptable terms and, conse-
quently, they tend to lie about how they would react to this hypothetical situation.
Albeit, pˆi1,2 and pˆi1,3 are not significant according to their t-tests,
11 Assumption 3.3(i)
and Assumption 3.3(ii) are relevant. Elements below the diagonal of Πˆ3 are small:
individuals who report that they are more likely to pay for public transport, are not
likely to lie, since they do not have any incentive (or pressure) to state that they
would not do so otherwise. This is not the case, however, for lower civically behaved
individuals.
The impact of education on the outcome ‘not paying ticket’ becomes insignificant
when controlling for misreporting (βˆed,OPM = 0.11, p-value = 0.37). This is one of the
crucial results of this Chapter. Methodologically, the absence of causality is due to
a very high amount of misreporting which increases schooling’s standard error more
than the coefficient’s bias. The OP overestimation of the estimate’s precision for this
self-reported outcome is a key empirical issue in this context. From a conceptual point
of view this result is explained by a significant SDB, where individuals under-report a
socially undesirable behaviour. If one does not account for this, an erroneous causal
link would have been obtained. This is supported by research in social psychology
which has introduced various mechanisms to reduce this type of bias (e.g., Rasinski
et al. (2005)). A possible explanation is that, the lower level of trust in Italy leads
to a higher tolerance of self-interest acts, regardless of education levels. Indeed,
tolerance of civic behaviours such as not paying the ticket on a public transport is
much lower in Scandinavian countries than in southern European countries (Halpern
(2005), p. 66). Thus, education does not seem to enhance an honest and cooperative
behaviour.12
10Similarly to the previous tests for the two civic opinions, the IV estimate of education becomes
very imprecise compared to the gain in consistency using the IV approach. Thus, the χ2(1) is small
and the null accepted. This is also true for the other two civic behaviours.
11Note that t-tests on misreporting probabilities are not strictly valid (Dustmann and van Soest
(2004), p. 317).
12I check whether this result holds for a different social structure, that is, using UK samples in
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Estimates for the second civic behaviour ‘keeping money’ are analogous to ‘not
paying ticket’ (see columns (4)-(6) of Table 4.2). The OP estimate of education shows
only a small effect and it is exogenous. Nearly all pˆij,k are different from zero based on
their t-values, in particular, pˆi1,2 and pˆi1,3 are now significant. Even with a p-value of
8.5% for the misclassification test statistics, the amount of misreporting is large. The
model is consistent since the estimated probabilities fulfill the stochastic condition of
Eq. (3.10). Let’s examine the misclassification assumptions of Section 3.5.
Lying is more likely than telling the truth for answers at the bottom of the scale
so that Assumption 3.1 fails: pˆi1,1 < pˆi1,2 < pˆi1,3. Note that for this indicator the
monotonicity of correct report (Assumption 3.2) holds, i.e., probabilities of correct
report are increasing along the diagonal of Πˆ3. This arises as lying is less frequent
by more civically behaved individuals according to the hypothesis that SDB drives
misreporting, with pˆij,k (for j > k) being small. Moreover, because pˆi1,3 > pˆi1,2,
individuals whose truthful civic responsibility is the lowest, tend to report the highest
scores (see Assumption 3.3(ii)). The overall interpretation of the estimation results
for this indicator is very similar to the previous civic behaviour. Certainly, SDB also
leads to a lack of causality of education on ‘keeping money’ (i.e., βˆed,OPM = 0.13,
p-value = 0.26) and the upward bias and standard error of education in column (5)
are pretty close to those in column (2).
Results for the third civic behaviour are displayed in the last three columns of
Table 4.2. Estimates and tests are in line with the other two indicators of social
trust. Education is insignificant in the OPM model, exogenous by the χ2(1) statistic
from IV-OPM and IV-OP models, and there is statistical evidence to accept the
null hypothesis that the dependent variable ‘not leaving name’ is misclassified (χ¯2
= 6.63, p-value = 0.00). There are also analogous results concerning estimated
misclassification probabilities and how they fit Assumption 3.1 to Assumption 3.3.
(Compare Πˆ3 for the three outcomes in part (a) of Table 4.5). That is, individuals
motives (e.g., approval, guilt, embarrassment) lead to a high misreporting of reported
answers at the bottom of the scale. In short, SDB operates equally across the array
of civic behaviours.
Considered together, estimates for civic outcomes highlight two main findings.
On one hand, because of SDB, indicators capturing aspects of social trust are more
likely to suffer from misreporting to a larger extent than indicators on civic engage-
ment. On the other hand, the amount of under-reporting of a socially undesirable
behaviour can be so powerful that it makes a key causal relationship statistically non-
significant. This follows, in turn, from the hypothesis that the cultural dimension
Chapter 5.
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of social trust plays a major role than education. I investigate this further in Sec-
tion 4.3.3 by splitting the sample into low and high educational levels and examining
their misreporting patterns.
4.3.2. Sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours
In this section I examine whether the main results of civic behaviours are affected
by recoding observations in three categories. Recall that estimates in Table 4.2 were
obtained by changing a 1 to 10 scale to a 1 to 3 scale, and by grouping and recoding 1
to 3 (=1), 4 to 7 (=2) and 8 to 10 (=3). To provide further support to these previous
results I also carry out the same analysis using a five point scale. Observations were
recoded in five categories as follows: (1,2)=1, (3,4)=2,..., (9,10)=5, and an OPM
model is estimated using a full Π5 as to measure misclassification across the whole
scale.
Table 4.3 contains the results for the five point scale. These results are in line with
previous estimations. For the three outcomes the OPM outperforms the OP13 and
the estimated effect of schooling is not significant when accounting for misreporting.
Thus, the main finding is still valid and therefore not affected by the earlier recod-
ing. Although there is an important positive bias introduced by misclassification in
βˆed,OPM, the large increase in its standard errors renders the relationship of education
with any of the three civic behaviours non-statistically significant. Again, this is due
to SDB, with respondents providing biased answers so as to gain social approval.
The estimated Πˆ5 matrices are, overall, qualitatively similar to Πˆ3. First, Assump-
tion 3.1 fails for J = 5 too. For instance, the probabilities of correct report, which
are less than a half for the variable ‘not leaving name’, are pˆi2,2 (=0.15), pˆi3,3 (=0.28)
and pˆi4,4 (=0.42). Second, the monotonicity of correct report assumption partially
holds for the two outcomes. That is, for ‘not paying ticket’ pˆi3,3 < pˆi4,4 < pˆi5,5 and,
for ‘not leaving name’, pˆi2,2 < pˆi3,3 < pˆi4,4 < pˆi5,5. Lastly, Assumption 3.3(i) remains
valid for all outcomes. To sum up, misreporting behaviours are not affected by the
J = 3 recoding and Πˆ5 matrices are in agreement with most hypotheses set out in
Assumption 3.1 to Assumption 3.3.
4.3.3. Parametric estimations for civic outcomes by education level
The next issue to be examined is how the whole sample results are driven by
misreporting of certain educational levels. Is it the case, for instance, that the previ-
ously found lack of causality amongst education and social trust measures could be
13The χ¯2 p-values for ‘keeping money’ and ‘not leaving name’ are below 5%, but for ‘not paying
ticket’ the null is only rejected at 10%.
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TABLE 4.3
Sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours (Italy): Π5
Not paying ticket Keeping money Not leaving name
OP OPM OP OPM OP OPM
Education 0.0327** 0.1229 0.0284** 0.0637 0.0269** 0.2493
(0.0073) (0.1386) (0.0076) (0.0411) (0.0078) (0.1825)
pˆi1,2 0.0849** 0 † 0.0636
(0.0352) (0.0481)
pˆi1,3 0.0778* 0 † 0.0761*
(0.0409) (0.0426)
pˆi1,4 0.0564 0 † 0.0625
(0.0489) (0.0484)
pˆi1,5 0.0696 0 † 0.0716
(0.0453) (0.0451)
pˆi2,1 0.0254 0.0285 0.0025
(0.048) (0.05) (0.0118)
pˆi2,3 0.1815 0.1243 0.1389
(0.1463) (0.0971) (0.0846)
pˆi2,4 0.0419 0.0454 0.2783**
(0.0909) (0.0619) (0.1078)
pˆi2,5 0.1937 0.0698 0.4303**
(0.1748) (0.0888) (0.1473)
pˆi3,1 0.0362 0.0248 0.0388
(0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0435)
pˆi3,2 0.0568 0.059 0.1308
(0.0447) (0.0503) (0.1079)
pˆi3,4 0.2091** 0.0352 0.0508
(0.0667) (0.0755) (0.0919)
pˆi3,5 0.4855** 0.1756 0.4974**
(0.0592) (0.1168) (0.0167)
pˆi4,1 0.0087 0.0379 0.0513
(0.0128) (0.0262) (0.0479)
pˆi4,2 0.076 0.1133** 0.0206
(0.0628) (0.051) (0.0384)
pˆi4,3 0.1677** 0.0184 0.0222
(0.0803) (0.0522) (0.0492)
pˆi4,5 0.4479** 0.4963** 0.4843**
(0.1335) (0.0169) (0.0645)
pˆi5,1 0.0132** 0.0093** 0.0133**
(0.002) (0.0039) (0.0026)
pˆi5,2 0.0309** 0.0159** 0.0233**
(0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0031)
pˆi5,3 0.0665** 0.0635** 0.044**
(0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0043)
pˆi5,4 0.1137** 0.0803** 0.0925**
(0.0113) (0.0123) (0.0085)
Log-likelihood -2750.79 -2734.29 -2589.41 -2580.06 -2378.19 -2354.03
χ¯2 (P-value) 2.726 (0.095) 5.129 (0.038) 5.180 (0.013)
The 1 to 10 scale is changed to a 1 to 5 scale, with (1,2)=1, (3,4)=2,..., (9,10)=5, and Π5.
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Bootstrapped OPM, 100 number of repetitions. Log-likelihood is the average over 100 repetitions.
† estimate at lower bound.
Chapter 4. Civic outcomes, misclassification and education: the case of Italy 66
TABLE 4.4
Parametric estimates for civic opinions by education level (Italy): Π3
Interest in politics Tax evasion
a) Whole sample (N = 3059)
0.9107 0.0864 0.0029 0.5439 0.3483** 0.1078
0.2049** 0.5911 0.204** 0.3493** 0.4658 0.1849**
0.1691** 0.2074** 0.6235 0.1247** 0.455** 0.4203
χ¯2 (P-value): 1.560 (0.051) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.302 (0.480)
b) At least primary school (N = 982)
0.8938 0.0984** 0.0078 0.6482 0.1626 0.1892**
0.2485** 0.5219 0.2296** 0.1392 0.6494 0.2114**
0.2169** 0.11 0.6731 0.0743 0.1794* 0.7463
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.498 (0.275) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.329 (0.152)
c) At least secondary school (N = 2077)
0.8172 0.0995 0.0833 0.4273 0.4283** 0.1444**
0.1003 0.727 0.1727** 0.0773 0.5585 0.3642**
0.2163** 0.233** 0.5507 0.1525** 0.3998** 0.4477
χ¯2 (P-value): 3.161 (0.010) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.557 (0.163)
Bootstrapped OPM estimates, 100 number of repetitions.
Whole sample estimates are from Table 4.1.
Sub-samples results control for the same covariates of Table 4.1 apart from
education.
Diagonal elements of Πˆ3 are 1 minus the sum of pˆij,k across rows.
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
explained by high misreporting regardless of individuals schooling levels? Addition-
ally, do only more educated people over-report civic opinions because, for example,
they are more concerned with their class interests? In this section I attempt to an-
swer these questions. The main hypothesis I rely on is contained in Assumption 3.4.
Results are presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 which contain OPM estimates for
two sub-samples: low schooling level (at least primary school) and high schooling
level (at least secondary school).
First, consider the civic opinions’ estimates of Table 4.4. The outcome ‘the prob-
lem of tax evasion’ is not misclassified by either less or more educated respondents
(both χ¯2 are non-significant at the 5% level). The previous absence of misreport-
ing for the whole sample is further confirmed with the OPM results by education
level. The extensive tax evasion in Italy seems to be acknowledged by both groups,
and there is no reason to expect that psychological factors such as guilt and stigma
should vary amongst these two sub-samples. Conversely, for the other civic opinion
‘interest in politics’, misreporting of the whole sample is driven by higher educated
individuals. The χ¯2 p-value of the OPM using the sub-sample of people with at
least primary school is 0.28, whilst the sub-sample composed of people with at least
secondary school is 0.01.
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TABLE 4.5
Parametric estimates for civic behaviours by education level (Italy): Π3
Not paying ticket Keeping money Not leaving name
a) Whole sample (N = 3059)
0.6635 0.0986 0.2379 0.2439 0.2677** 0.4884** 0.4468 0.1581 0.3951**
0.0412 0.4799 0.4789** 0.0235 0.566 0.4105** 0.1293 0.42 0.4507**
0.0419** 0.0814** 0.8767 0.0433** 0.0972** 0.8595 0.0291** 0.0527** 0.9182
χ¯2 (P-value): 6.942 (0.000) χ¯2 (P-value): 1.796 (0.085) χ¯2 (P-value): 6.631 (0.003)
b) At least primary school (N = 982)
0.3805 0.2623** 0.3572** 0.6099 0.2033** 0.1868** 0.5928 0.1682** 0.239**
0.1332 0.7007 0.1661 0.0888 0.7399 0.1713 0.0201 0.6235 0.3564**
0.0489** 0.1311** 0.82 0.0607** 0.1005** 0.8388 0.0471** 0.0741** 0.8788
χ¯2 (P-value): 3.262 (0.004) χ¯2 (P-value): 2.288 (0.031) χ¯2 (P-value): 3.281 (0.003)
c) At least secondary school (N = 2077)
0.3039 0.3616** 0.3345* 0.4018 0.3037** 0.2945** 0.4095 0.2937** 0.2968**
0.1782 0.5877 0.2341 0.1808 0.531 0.2882* 0.1454 0.5807 0.2739
0.0241* 0.0457 0.9302 0.0205* 0.0743** 0.9052 0.0197** 0.0381* 0.9422
χ¯2 (P-value): 5.315 (0.002) χ¯2 (P-value): 1.163 (0.236) χ¯2 (P-value): 5.730 (0.009)
See references in Table 4.4.
The above results confirm Assumption 3.4(i) that relates misreporting of civic en-
gagement indicators (in this case over-reporting) to socioeconomic status. It is found
that, similarly to a well-studied civic indicator in the political science literature (i.e.,
voting behaviour), more educated individuals are under the most pressure regarding
feelings of guilt, stigma or class interests (e.g., Bernstein et al. (2001)). Therefore,
they are more likely to misreport (over-report) how keen they are on politics.14 This
can easily be inferred from the probability of correct report for reported answers
equal to 3 (interest in politics: fairly/very). Nearly half of those are misreported,
that is, pˆi3,3 = 0.55. The conjecture from these estimations is that, the dissimilar
misreporting pattern by education level which is only present for the group of high
schooling individuals, may be the reason why I still obtain a significant causality link
between education and interest in politics.
Next, I repeat this analysis for civic behaviours in Table 4.5. A key feature of
these results is that for nearly all OPM estimations I find strong evidence to conclude
that civic behaviours are misreported, despite the schooling attainment considered.15
The misclassification tests agree with the hypothesis outlined in Assumption 3.4(ii)
14In Chapter 5, for the UK, I am able to directly examine this hypothesis by looking at questions
related to stigma and feelings of guilt related to the lack of voting.
15Out of the six OPM models estimated, only the χ¯2 p-value is above 5% for the civic behaviour
‘keeping money’, using the higher schooling level sub-sample. This is probably why, for this outcome,
the null that all pˆij,k = 0 is rejected for the whole sample at a 8.5% significance level.
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which states that misreporting is equally likely to hold for different education levels.
The main argument I believe may explain this result, is drawn from empirical
research in social psychology which tends to find a strong impact of descriptive social
norms (see, e.g., Cialdini et al. (2006)). Civic behaviours are regulated by social
norms, which are divided into injunctive (the norms of “ought”) and descriptive (the
norms of “is”). I find the hypothesis that descriptive norms affect behaviours in real
life, quite appealing in the current application.16 Respondents choose (or report) their
answers by registering what is generally done by most people in those situations and
then would under-report their behaviours. Another alternative explanation is that,
at least for Italy, the cultural dimension of social trust (which is defined by the array
of civic behaviours variables) exerts a stronger influence than schooling. From a
methodological point of view, the fact that misreporting holds for both educational
levels produces itself, a non-significant link between education and the group of social
trust outcomes.
In comparing estimations by educational levels for each outcome, one can assert
that all pˆij,k are very similar in terms of their values and statistical significance. In
particular, for all civic behaviours, pˆi1,2 and pˆi1,3 are quite large and significant at 5%
by their t-values. In other words, Assumption 3.2 is still valid for either less or more
educated individuals. (See diagonal elements in parts (b) and (c) of Table 4.5.) This
is also reflected in the small values of pˆij,k below Πˆ3 diagonal (i.e., Assumption 3.3(i)).
Summarised, the results indicate homogenous misreporting patterns across the whole
sample and schooling levels.
The above analysis for Italy suggests three results regarding misclassification by
educational level present in the data: (i) misreporting of civic opinions is related to
socioeconomic status, that is to say, over-report is more probable to hold the higher
the educational attainment of an individual, (ii) the amount to which respondents
under-report socially undesirable behaviours is not a function of their socioeconomic
backgrounds, so that SBD drives misreporting despite schooling levels, and (iii) the
former result may indicate why education is significant, even allowing for misclassifi-
cation, whereas I believe that the latter finding plays a crucial important role in the
absence of causality of education and measures of civic behaviours.
4.4. CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter has examined the causal effect of education on civic outcomes in
Italy for a range of civic measures. Its particular concern was how misclassification
of the self-reported dependent variables affected this relationship. By using an array
16For related research in social psychology, see, for instance, Cialdini (2007) and Nolan et al. (2008).
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of civic outcomes, this enabled me to extend previous research and to study how
SDB affected the causal link of education and indicators of social trust, i.e., civic
behaviours. I also investigated the bias introduced by endogeneity of schooling by
using an IV-OPM. Another issue explored in Chapter 4 was to discern whether the
misclassification bias could be mainly explained by a sub-group defined by a certain
education level.
In line with previous studies that use other types of self-reported dependent vari-
ables, my findings show that self-reported measures in Italy are prone to suffer from
misreporting. This leads to seriously biased parameter estimates as well as to an
overestimation of their precision, which can obscure key empirical causality links.
Thus, correcting for misclassification in self-reported assessments of civic awareness
is crucial. Furthermore, the direction of the bias on the impact of education on civic
outcomes induced by misclassification, follows the same direction as the one intro-
duced by endogeneity, with positive biases in both cases. But, perhaps surprisingly, I
accept the hypothesis that education is exogenous in the IV-OPM models, although
caution is needed in the interpretation of this result due to our IV strategy and the
non-linearity of the model.
Most importantly, qualitative overall conclusions are affected by incorporating
misclassification. That is, education increases civic awareness for civic opinions but
modifies the relationship between schooling and civic behaviours, becoming statisti-
cally non-significant. This lack of causality suggests two possibilities. It may indicate
that SDB operates differently within the two dimensions of social capital and is a
more important issue regarding measures of civic behaviours than indicators on civic
engagement. This is in line with empirical studies which show that the aspects of so-
cial capital tend to positively correlated, although correlations are usually quite low
(Rothstein (2001), Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003), van Oorschot et al. (2006)).
Alternatively, it may reflect that, at least in Italy, the cultural component of social
trust plays a more crucial role than schooling. Both explanations are at odds with
the hypothesis that they hold in spite of individuals educational levels.
More specifically, out of the five civic outcomes analysed for Italy, there is only
lack of evidence of misclassification for the civic opinion ‘the problem of tax evasion’.
Therefore, a clear improvement over the standard OP is achieved for most civic vari-
ables. Moreover, the misclassification problem is severer for civic behaviours and
empirically explained by the assumption of monotonicity of correct report, which
justifies the classification of civic outcomes into two groups. The whole sample re-
sults are supported by estimates of both schooling levels, but not for civic opinions
where I only found that misclassification holds for more educated individuals. On
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the contrary, civic behaviours are misreported regardless of which education level is
considered. The misclassification bias for civic behaviours obeys to an under-report
of the lower civically behaved group whereas, for ‘interest in politics’, the group that
apparently show a higher degree of political engagement are more prone to over-
report it. These misreporting patterns obtained are in line with existing theories
from social psychology and political science.
Chapter 5
Civic outcomes, misclassification and education:
the case of the UK
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Differences in political systems, social norms, cultural aspects and expectations
across European countries, would lead to specific country effects with regards to
distribution of types of social capital. Mutual trust, for instance, is considered by
some authors endogenous to certain elements of the social structure (Torsvik (2004)).
Endogeneity, or the dynamic interaction between norms and institutions, may lead
to social traps; that is, to situations where individuals, groups or organisations are
unable to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where
cooperation would benefit all (Rothstein (2005), Francois (2008)). These bad steady
states, where institutions are dysfunctional and beneficial norms are violated, are
often the case in southern European countries such as Italy, which is classified within
the group of low trust societies by Fukuyama (1995). The impact of schooling on
different dimensions of social capital, then, may be endogenous to a country’s social
structures too. If the relationship of education with dimensions of social capital is
country specific, it may also be true that the two elements which may obscure it (i.e.,
endogeneity and misclassification) would have a differential impact by country. In
other words, the extent of the problem of endogeneity and misreporting in the human
to social capital framework, might be country specific.
This is why the UK analysis is included in the thesis: as a way to validate the
results for Italy, but also to investigate the extent to which simultaneity and misre-
porting are influenced by macro characteristics. I believe, that finding out whether
unobservables behind education choices and social desirability (SD) are local to social
structures is vital.
There is mixed evidence on the distribution of social capital across Europe. The
main argument of the previous Sections 1.1 and 2.2 is that there are macro or compo-
sitional characteristics in a specific country (e.g., religion diversity, level of economic
equality, etc.), and institutional policies (educational expansions, welfare policies,
etc.), which determine the level and generation of social capital. Thus, it is often
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argued that public policies which enhance social and economic equality carried out
by impartial political institutions, would create social capital and trust (Rothstein
(2005), Rothstein and Uslaner (2006)). On the one hand, welfare policies are an
example of the latter, as their aim is to reduce large economic inequalities by means
of interconnected policies regarding social protection, labour participation, educa-
tion, etc. Moreover, welfare policies create a context of national solidarity and fellow
feeling, which is conducive to increasing trust levels too, and also offer a role model
for adherence to social norms of cooperation and mutual support (van Oorschot and
Finsveen (2009)). For example, van Oorschot and Arts (2005) find that more social
security expenditure increases informal social capital (contact frequency with friends
and family). The reduction of large cultural and human capital inequalities, on the
other hand, mostly results from education policy. Compositional characteristics also
play a role. Countries with protestant religious traditions and ethnic homogeneity
seem to exhibit higher levels of generalised social trust (Delhey and Newton (2005)).
Because all these contextual effects differ across Europe, one would expect, in theory,
significant country effects in the generation of social capital, as well as how education
is linked to civic outcomes in Italy and in the UK.
Nonetheless, recent empirical studies do not seem to find significant country effects
to support the hypothesis of an unequal distribution of aggregate levels of social
capital for Europe (van Oorschot et al. (2006)). They also do not find significant
impacts on social capital stemming from dissimilar welfare state contexts. In other
words, the common conclusion is that, after accounting for country fixed effects,
original associations tend to disappear. More specifically, van Oorschot et al. (2006)
conclude that social capital tends to be higher only in Scandinavia. The rest of
the European countries and regions do not differ substantially in aggregate levels
of social capital since they have common elements such as that they are modern,
relatively aﬄuent, and have more or less comprehensive (post) industrial welfare
states. Upon this evidence, one could argue that the aggregate levels of civic outcomes
used in this thesis are then similarly distributed between Italy and the UK and, hence,
the validation exercise would show up analogous results for these two countries. In
short, this may suggest an equal influx of endogeneity and misclassification into the
schooling-civic outcomes relationship.
The basic aim of Chapter 5 is, therefore, to disentangle all these forces, providing
a cross-national perspective on whether the relationship between education and civic
outcomes might vary when accounting for issues of endogeneity and misreporting.
Many empirical UK studies on social capital deal with its determinants.1 Li et al.
1See also Section 2.2 for more references.
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(2005) analyse the socio-cultural determinants of three types of social capital (neigh-
bourhood attachment, social network and civic participation) and their impact on
social trust. These results show that education is highly significant on social net-
works, civic participation and generalised trust, but not significant in neighbourhood
attachment. Educational attainment is also an important predictor for increasing
levels of civic action for young people (Fahmy (2006)), and people with higher qual-
ifications show higher trust too (Sturgis et al. (2010a)). Similarly to the research on
other countries, these studies find that education is a consistent predictor for mea-
sures of social capital in the UK relying on different data sources.2 Yet, they do not
control for endogeneity and misreporting and focus on particular dimensions of social
capital.
In this Chapter, I study how misreporting impacts on the causality of school-
ing on various measures of social capital in the UK. Social desirability bias (SDB),
the tendency by which individuals would tend to under-report socially undesirable
behaviours and over-report socially desirable ones (Paulhus (1991)), may produce
systematic unreliable responses by interviewees and therefore an invalid relationship
between education and social capital. As in the analysis for Italy in Chapter 4, I rely
on results from the parametric discrete choice models (described in Chapter 3), that
is, estimates of an OP are compared with those from an OPM and IV-OPM. In line
with the literature (e.g., Milligan et al. (2004)), a reform of the British educational
system is used as an instrument to account for endogeneity.
The models are then applied to an array of measures capturing different dimen-
sions of social capital. Civic opinions are: ‘interest in politics’, ‘pay attention to
politics’, ‘discuss politics’ and being ‘active in a voluntary organisation’. The three
civic behaviours are: ‘failing to report accidental damage done to a parked vehicle’,
‘keeping money that you have found’, and ‘avoiding a fare on public transport’. I
also include as outcomes whether respondents believe that ‘political activity takes
too much time and effort’, ‘family and friends think that voting is a waste of time’,
‘feel very guilty if not vote’, ‘neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote’, as well as
outcomes concerning interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. The framework by
van Oorschot et al. (2006), containing three dimensions for social capital (networks,
trust, and civism), fits this group of UK indicators. Most of them belong to the third
dimension, civism, with civic behaviours measuring the degree of trustworthiness and,
civic opinions, the aspect of political engagement. These indicators are recoded in a
2Li et al. (2005) use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); Fahmy (2006) the General House-
hold Survey (GHS); and Sturgis et al. (2010a) the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and
the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70).
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three-point ordinal scale where higher values indicate a higher sense of civic duty.3
The analysis in this Chapter shows that most civic outcomes are misclassified and,
consequently, misreporting is an important empirical issue for the UK too. Likewise
endogeneity, since the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected for most indicators.
The direction of the bias introduced by endogeneity follows the same direction as the
one introduced by misreporting, with upward biases in both cases. In other words,
unobserved factors which lead individuals to develop a taste for education, are also
positively correlated with civic opinions and civic behaviours. In fact, results appear
to suggest that the extent of this correlation is such that, the impact of education on
civic behaviours becomes statistically significant when accounting for endogeneity.
This is the main difference with the Italian case: schooling has significant positive
effects on all civic outcomes in the UK. Chapter 5’s main finding is that educational
achievement emerges as a strong predictor for the different dimension of social capital.
Additionally, estimations by educational levels show a significant misreporting of
civic behaviours regardless of the schooling level considered, but, for civic opinions,
misreporting only holds for the group of more educated individuals.
Chapter 5 is structured as follows. I address the IV approach below, in Section 5.2.
Section 5.3 provides the main empirical results by group of civic outcomes, education
levels, and a sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours. Conclusions are included in
Section 5.4. The data and methodology used are contained in Chapters 2 and 3.
5.2. IV APPROACH
In this section, I discuss the approach in dealing with endogeneity. As previously
stated, unless one takes into account unobserved factors that simultaneously influ-
ence education decisions and civic outcomes, the OPM estimates may not provide
a valid relationship. Indeed, it is likely that parents who foster an interest in fur-
ther education in their children, also stress to them the importance of being civically
responsible. Explanations on the impact of unobservables are linked to the civic vol-
untarism model, especially by the resources and psychological factors. For example,
privileged families are more likely to boast a politically rich home environment dom-
inated by frequent political discussions, with politically active parents acting as role
models. Moreover, intelligence is another unobservable which is found to foster levels
of trust and clearly impacts upon education decisions as well.
I rely on an educational reform in the UK which provided an exogenous variation
in individuals years of schooling but it is otherwise unrelated to civic outcomes.
There are two changes in educational law within the UK mentioned in the literature:
3For details on the recoding process, see Section 3.3.2.
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the first reform, implemented in 1947, raised the minimum leaving school age from
14 to 15 years-old; the second reform raised the minimum age again in 1972, from
15 to 16. Both reforms have been used extensively in the economic literature as
instruments. Milligan et al. (2004), for instance, employ them to produce IV estimates
of the probability of voting in the UK and in broader measures of civic engagement
(attention to public affairs, follow politics, etc.). They find that the reforms had
a remarkably rapid influence on educational attainment as well as that education
improves participation, not only measured by voter turnout, but also within these
broader measures. Similarly, Oreopoulos (2006) finds that the change in compulsory
school laws had a powerful and immediate effect upon the number of years that the
subpopulation of people affected by the reforms stay at school, which translates into
a 14% higher earnings. In sum, studies tend to find a strong validity using these UK
reforms as instrumental variables.
I concentrate only on the 1972 reform because the BES and EVS samples have,
as the lowest value for education variable (age finished full-time education) 15 or
younger, and therefore the exogenous increase in the schooling age from 14 to 15 of
the first reform 1947 would not be captured by the data. People directly affected
by the reform were those who in 1972, were 15 years old, or one might alternatively
consider people who were at school in 1972, and so were between 6 and 15 years old
in 1972. This latter treated group is of a fair size, approximately 20% of the BES
sample and around 23% of the EVS sample. As in the other studies, I define the
reform using a dummy taking the value of one, for people born on or after 1957 (=
reform72).
I now present some checks on the validity of the reform.4 Recall that the BES
and EVS samples are employed to estimate the impact of education on civic opinions
and civic behaviours, respectively. Firstly, I examine whether there is a discontinuity
at the time of the policy change. Figure 5.1 illustrates the remarkable influence
of the raising of the minimum leaving school age on educational attainment in the
UK, and thus the evidence coincides with those previous studies (e.g., Milligan et al.
(2004)). Figure 5.1 also shows that the fraction of individuals leaving school at age
15 fell from 25% in 1972 to less than 16% in 1973, whereas for the EVS sample,
the decrease was from 23% to 3%. And although the proportion of students leaving
full-time education at age 15 was decreasing leading up to the reform (depicted in
the figure as the vertical line at year 1957), the discontinuity of this proportion at
the time of the reform is significant.
Additionally, I present further evidence by applying a regression discontinuity
4Endogeneity tests are contained in Section 5.3.



































































Figure 5.1.— Nonparametric regression of education on year of birth.
(RD) approach. In sharp RD designs, the jump in y (i.e., fraction left full-time
education at age 15) at the cutoff point Z0 = 0 (≡ birth - 1957) is the estimate of
the causal impact of XT (assignment to treatment depends on a variable Z being
above a cutoff Z0). Local Wald estimates (equivalent to a local IV estimate) of the
casual impact are obtained by local linear regressions on both sides of the cutoff
point Z0, which are negative and significant for the proportion of individuals leaving
full-time education at 15 for either sample. For the BES sample the estimate is -0.076
(p-value = 0.000), and, for the EVS sample, the local estimate is -0.029 (p-value =
0.000). Local linear regressions for 20 years before and after the reform are shown in
Figure 5.2, where it can be seen a large discontinuity at Z0 = 0 for the BES sample. In
summary, there is enough evidence from the UK samples of a considerable exogenous
change in the schooling variable.
Secondly, as outlined by Card (2001), because educational reforms are generally
intended to reduce the inequality on the distribution of schooling in the population, I
then check if the reform had been concentrated amongst the individuals who originate
from lower socioeconomic levels. Certainly, this seems to be the case for either data
source when running separate regressions by social classes. For the BES sample,
the dummy for the reform is only significant and positive for lower social classes:
socialclass4 (manual foremen and supervisors, αˆ1,reform72 = 0.61, p-value = 0.01) and
socialclass5 (working class, αˆ1,reform72 = 0.40, p-value = 0.00). For the EVS sample,
the coefficient for the reform dummy is significant and positive for all social classes,
except from the socialclass1 (upper and upper-middle class) where αˆ1,reform72 = 0.08
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Figure 5.2.— Local linear regressions of education before and after the reform.
(p-value = 0.70). These results suggest a specification that includes interactions of
1972 reform with background variables such as social class.
I use a standard IV technique where the endogenous education variable is replaced
by its fitted values from the first stage regression. The problem with this (and control
function approach) is due to both the nonlinearity of the model and discreteness of
the endogenous regressor. Although these are very important limitations, I still
follow a standard (fitted value) IV technique.5 The vector of exclusion restrictions
(or instruments) is constructed from: (i) a dummy for the 1972 reform (= reform72),
(ii) interactions of the 1972 reform with respondent’s social class (= r72classi).
First stage estimates are in line with the expectations for both samples. For the
BES dataset, the reform dummy and interaction with the highest social class are
significant: αˆ1,reform72 = 0.32 (p-value = 0.00), αˆ1,r72class1 = -0.37 (p-value = 0.00),
and αˆ1,r72classi , for i = 2, 3, 4 are not statistically significant.
6 The instruments are
not weak since the F-stat is very high (= 122.02). Also, for the EVS sample, I obtain
equivalent results: the F-stat is again very high (= 108.59), and the instruments are
relevant, with coefficients αˆ1,reform72 = 0.53 (p-value = 0.00), αˆ1,r72class1 = -0.31 (p-
value = 0.02), αˆ1,r72class2 = 0.05 (p-value = 0.68) αˆ1,r72class3 = 0.21 (p-value = 0.04).
In short, for the two datasets the instruments are relevant and not weak. Moreover,
the interactions show the correct signs that support the hypothesis of a differential
5All technical details (references about IV in nonlinear models, the chosen IV approach’s equations,
etc.) are contained in Section 4.2.
6The dummy socialclass5 (working class) is the base category.
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impact of the reform by socioeconomic background.
5.3. RESULTS
I now present the results for the discrete choice models described in Chapter 3.
In particular, Section 5.3 includes estimations for the OP, OPM and IV-OPM, along-
side a sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours and parametric estimations by high
and low educational levels. The models that incorporate misclassification are esti-
mated by constrained maximum likelihood, since probabilities are positive and less
than one by definition, and furthermore consistent standard errors for the IV-OPM
are obtained by bootstrapping. I only briefly discuss the results of the other ex-
planatory variables in this section as the key objective of the thesis is to inves-
tigate the estimated education coefficients and misclassification probabilities. As
previously mentioned, I expect a positive bias on the estimated education coeffi-
cient as a result of misclassification and/or endogeneity across models. That is:
βˆed,OP  βˆed,IV-OP ≶ βˆed,OPM  βˆed,IV-OPM.
5.3.1. Parametric estimations for civic outcomes
Estimates for the four civic opinions are displayed in Table 5.1. On the one hand,
the first three outcomes, ‘general interest in politics’, ‘attention to politics’, and
‘discuss politics’, all measure the degree of engagement in politics as a whole. Being
interested, paying attention to and discussing politics are clearly linked as shown by
their correlations (≈ 0.50 between each other). These indicators are relevant because
people who are interested in the political sphere are clearly more likely to want to
participate in the electoral process. For the same dataset, Sanders et al. (2005)
find that amongst those with relatively high levels of interest, 75% voted in the
general election. On the other hand, the fourth civic opinion, ‘active in a voluntary
organisation’, is not directly linked with political participation and belongs to the
social participation dimension of social capital; which is why the average correlation
is smaller (of ≈ 0.15 with the other three indicators).
I now discuss the results for the first three indicators jointly. The coefficient on
age is statistically significant across models. In line with earlier findings (e.g., Algan
and Cahuc (2006)), older people are more likely to be interested in, pay attention to
and discuss politics.7 Political engagement increases with age, but as indicated by
the coefficient of age2, at a decreasing rate. This is also suggested by most empirical
studies that state that political activity rises in the early years, peaks in middle age,
and falls in later years (Fahmy (2006)). As hypothesized by the civic voluntarism
7Indeed, the key finding of Sanders et al. (2005) is that, as in the BES 2001, age remains a crucial
predictor of voting.
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model (Verba et al. (1995), Verba et al. (2005)), people’s economic situation is posi-
tively associated with higher levels of social capital. For any of the three indicators,
individuals with higher incomes are more engaged in politics. Regarding gender,
men are more likely to be engaged in politics, a result usually found in the literature
(Burns et al. (2001)). Due to differences in taste (Dow (2009)) and resources, men
score significantly higher in measures of interest in politics, knowledge of politics,
consumption of news media, etc. Surprisingly, there is no impact of employment sta-
tus or being married however having children, in general, is related to ‘be interested
in and discussing politics’. Similarly to existing research, some of the social class
variables are significant predictors of political engagement. The negative sign of the
social class dummies is due to the base category being the highest class, socialclass1
(salariat), and as it is shown by their estimated values, the lowest significant effect
on political issues is the dummy socialclass5 (i.e., working class). With regards to
country effects, there are no regular differences between countries. This is in line
with Sanders et al. (2005) who find that there are no significant national variations
in turnout patterns; Scottish and Welsh voters are virtually indistinguishable in this
regard from voters in England.
Crucially, the estimated coefficient of education is statistically significant in the
specification of the three measures of political engagement and it is also one of the
highest.8 This is consistent with most empirical studies that find that schooling is
one of the strongest determinants of social capital in different countries (Delhey and
Newton (2003), Bekkers (2007), van Oorschot and Finsveen (2009)), and with UK
studies (e.g., Li et al. (2005), Fahmy (2006)). As earlier shown in the simulations
of Chapter 3, if misclassification holds, the OP model yields biased estimates with
higher RMSE. This is certainly the case for the estimations of Table 5.1 since mis-
classification not only introduces positive biases on most coefficients of more than
50%, but also an increase in all standard errors. The chi-bar squared (χ¯2) test con-
firms that civic opinions are mostly misreported, with the OPM, which allows for
misclassification errors, outperforming the OP.9 For the civic opinions ‘attention to
politics’ and ‘discuss politics’, the χ¯2 statistics are 1.003 (p-value = 0.010) and 0.966
(p-value = 0.027) respectively, so that for both indicators the null hypothesis that
the misclassification probabilities are equal to zero is rejected. The outcome ‘general
interest in politics’, however, is not misclassified according to the IV-OPM results10
of the χ¯2 test, because the OPM yields a χ¯2 = 0.565 (p-value = 0.000). In sum, as in
the case of Italy, there is a tendency of self-reported civic opinions to be misreported
8This is true for any of the OP, OPM and IV-OPM models.
9See Appendix A for details on the test.
10Note that the IV-OPM is only accepted as the correct model at a p-value of 8.7%.
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TABLE 5.1
Parametric estimates for civic opinions (UK)
General interest in politics Attention to politics
Variables OP OPM IV-OPM OP OPM IV-OPM
Education 0.1833** 0.3289** 0.6272** 0.148** 0.2416** 0.6074**
(0.0168) (0.0867) (0.1947) (0.014) (0.0509) (0.182)
Age 0.0287** 0.0485** 0.0618** 0.0297** 0.0413** 0.065**
(0.0068) (0.0173) (0.0163) (0.0061) (0.0128) (0.0201)
Age2/100 -0.0136** -0.0221* -0.0276** -0.0135** -0.0147 -0.0234
(0.0065) (0.0131) (0.0113) (0.0057) (0.0112) (0.0169)
Employed 0.0157 0.0193 0.0266 -0.1143** -0.1493** -0.1825**
(0.051) (0.0826) (0.0678) (0.0455) (0.0689) (0.0786)
Income 0.0387** 0.0622** 0.0067 0.0285** 0.0424** 0.0084
(0.0085) (0.0214) (0.0229) (0.0072) (0.0149) (0.0228)
Male 0.4** 0.6292** 0.552** 0.4405** 0.6673** 0.8039**
(0.0446) (0.1737) (0.0882) (0.0385) (0.1136) (0.1417)
Married 0.0785* 0.0605 0.093 -0.0253 -0.0601 -0.0689
(0.0455) (0.0766) (0.0704) (0.0398) (0.0716) (0.0872)
Number of children -0.049** -0.0608* -0.0388 -0.0507** -0.0516 -0.0406
(0.0231) (0.0323) (0.0288) (0.021) (0.032) (0.0357)
Socialclass2 -0.0837 -0.1647 -0.0581 -0.0796 -0.1283 -0.0534
(0.0576) (0.1048) (0.0933) (0.05) (0.0849) (0.1027)
Socialclass3 -0.1858* -0.2525 -0.028 -0.1394 -0.2301 -0.1032
(0.0998) (0.2148) (0.1885) (0.0873) (0.1802) (0.2293)
Socialclass4 -0.1113 -0.2203 0.0713 -0.0717 -0.0844 0.129
(0.0797) (0.135) (0.1498) (0.069) (0.106) (0.1645)
Socialclass5 -0.2988** -0.4795** -0.1295 -0.2295** -0.3622** -0.1488
(0.0576) (0.1693) (0.1344) (0.0515) (0.0947) (0.1784)
Wales -0.1732** -0.2742** -0.2671** -0.0573 -0.0844 -0.1521*
(0.0534) (0.1059) (0.0717) (0.0474) (0.0718) (0.0852)
Scotland -0.0911* -0.1523* -0.0996 -0.0035 -0.0065 -0.0087
(0.0486) (0.0826) (0.0634) (0.0427) (0.0691) (0.0862)
cˆ1 -0.0459 0.056 1.6033 0.8602** 1.5121** 3.1319**
(0.1906) (0.7494) (1.3024) (0.1706) (0.3926) (0.9193)
cˆ2 1.2047** 2.2722** 3.3586** 2.5394** 3.1647** 4.7479**
(0.1911) (0.8433) (0.951) (0.1736) (0.6545) (1.0643)
pˆi1,2 0.0677 0.0572 0.0752* 0.0484**
(0.0459) (0.0488) (0.0412) (0.0085)
pˆi1,3 0.041 0.0788** 0.022 0.0217
(0.0476) (0.0394) (0.0245) (0.0216)
pˆi2,1 0.1264** 0.1286** 0.0537 0.1078**
(0.0302) (0.0452) (0.0646) (0.0275)
pˆi2,3 0.1401 0.0551 0.0433 0.0471
(0.1345) (0.0477) (0.0467) (0.0416)
pˆi3,1 0 0.0002 0.0696** 0.1006**
(0) (0.0006) (0.03) (0.0021)
pˆi3,2 0.091** 0.096** 0.3242** 0.4271**
(0.0235) (0.0286) (0.0987) (0.0645)
Log-likelihood -2865.5 -2852.84 -2908.78 -3850.89 -3833.42 -3887.91
χ¯2 (P-value) 0.565 (0.000) 0.116 (0.148) 1.686 (0.026) 1.003 (0.010)
χ2(1) (P-value) 2.928 (0.087) 4.382 (0.036)
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Discuss politics Active in a voluntary organisation
Variables OP OPM IV-OPM OP OPM IV-OPM
Education 0.1586** 0.3615** 0.4832** 0.1298** 0.2201** 0.5318**
(0.0139) (0.1171) (0.227) (0.0143) (0.0487) (0.1562)
Age 0.0141** 0.0365* 0.0746** 0.0352** 0.056** 0.0749**
(0.0061) (0.0219) (0.0372) (0.0064) (0.0144) (0.0185)
Age2/100 -0.0128** -0.0369 -0.0742** -0.0322** -0.0512** -0.0604**
(0.0057) (0.0231) (0.0374) (0.006) (0.0129) (0.0153)
Employed -0.04 -0.0836 -0.17 -0.1176** -0.1802** -0.1668*
(0.0453) (0.126) (0.1485) (0.0472) (0.0914) (0.0927)
Income 0.0445** 0.0911** 0.0781** 0.0031 0.0069 -0.0332
(0.0072) (0.0243) (0.0347) (0.0075) (0.0134) (0.0207)
Male 0.1782** 0.4267** 0.3898** -0.0372 -0.0702 -0.0613
(0.0383) (0.1298) (0.1048) (0.0399) (0.0621) (0.0577)
Married 0.0083 0.0054 -0.0684 0.0806* 0.1209 0.1283
(0.0397) (0.0949) (0.104) (0.0416) (0.0774) (0.0925)
Number of children -0.056** -0.1246** -0.1094** 0.006 0.0154 0.0317
(0.0208) (0.0519) (0.0522) (0.0217) (0.0396) (0.0443)
Socialclass2 -0.0911* -0.1901 -0.1035 -0.1244** -0.2152** -0.0485
(0.0498) (0.1424) (0.1691) (0.0516) (0.0965) (0.1138)
Socialclass3 -0.058 -0.2146 -0.3755 -0.008 -0.0029 0.2679
(0.0873) (0.2976) (0.8206) (0.0898) (0.1596) (0.2273)
Socialclass4 -0.1183* -0.3282* -0.4861 -0.3262** -0.4941** -0.1517
(0.0682) (0.1853) (0.4088) (0.0728) (0.1551) (0.1738)
Socialclass5 -0.2408** -0.5838** -0.5286** -0.3719** -0.5941** -0.237
(0.0513) (0.1886) (0.2661) (0.0541) (0.117) (0.1604)
Wales 0.0077 0.0101 -0.0061 0.0645 0.0742 0.033
(0.0473) (0.1353) (0.1257) (0.0494) (0.1089) (0.0972)
Scotland -0.0102 -0.0142 0.0259 -0.0491 -0.1195 -0.0864
(0.0429) (0.1217) (0.1217) (0.0451) (0.1009) (0.094)
cˆ1 0.5065** 0.723 1.7469 1.0459** 1.6311** 3.0712**
(0.1698) (0.6243) (1.3327) (0.1765) (0.4493) (0.876)
cˆ2 1.4039** 3.0066** 3.8727** 1.5275** 2.0709** 3.34**
(0.1705) (1.0482) (1.3989) (0.177) (0.469) (0.9631)
pˆi1,2 0.0796** 0.0943** 0.0634* 0.0724*
(0.0389) (0.0227) (0.0382) (0.0401)
pˆi1,3 0.1762 0.3566** 0.0752** 0.0351
(0.1097) (0.0888) (0.036) (0.0448)
pˆi2,1 0.3618** 0.422** 0.1391 0.2156
(0.1102) (0.0982) (0.1487) (0.1313)
pˆi2,3 0.1493 0.0924 0.2479** 0.1945
(0.1085) (0.0682) (0.1076) (0.1372)
pˆi3,1 0.0098 0.0252 0.1524** 0.1471*
(0.0272) (0.0338) (0.0685) (0.0819)
pˆi3,2 0.2121** 0.1986** 0.1598** 0.1927**
(0.0695) (0.0939) (0.0563) (0.0719)
Log-likelihood -4345.31 -4327.89 -4385.15 -4062.68 -4054.45 -4087.76
χ¯2 (P-value) 0.966 (0.027) 0.592 (0.001) 0.032 (0.582) 0.207 (0.194)
χ2(1) (P-value) 0.392 (0.531) 4.411 (0.036)
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Bootstrapped OPM and IV-OPM, 100 number of repetitions.Log-likelihood is the average over 100 repetitions.
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due to SD.
With regards to endogeneity, the null of exogeneity of education is rejected for
two indicators (interest and attention to politics) at 10%; exogeneity of education is
only accepted for ‘discuss politics’, with a χ2(1) (p-value) = 0.392 (0.531). As the
potential endogeneity of education is the main interest, I use a Hausman test only
for this parameter.11 As in other settings, a test on a subset of parameters can lead
to a conclusion different from that of a test on all parameters. These results are
nevertheless confirmed by additional IV-OP estimations, where the χ2(1) statistics
and probabilities are for interest in politics 5.34 (0.02), attention to politics 2.42
(0.10), and discuss politics, 0.64 (0.42). In short, unobserved factors (determination,
intelligence, etc.) are likely to be driving both education decisions as well as political
engagement. I therefore rely on the IV-OPM model to discuss the estimates of the
misclassification probabilities and how they fit the misclassification assumptions of
Chapter 3.
Estimates of the misclassification probabilities for the indicator ‘general interest
in politics’ (in the IV-OPM model) satisfy the necessary stochastic condition of Eq.
(3.10). Although this outcome is (statistically) misreported, the probabilities that
individuals indeed reveal their truthful interest in politics are quite high: pˆij,j > 0.81
(j = 1, 2, 3), so that Assumption 3.1 holds.12 The largest and statistically significant
misclassification probabilities are pˆi2,1 and pˆi3,2. This agrees with Assumption 3.3(i)
which is based on findings from political science that support over-reporting of civic
opinion (Karp and Brockington (2005)). This over-reporting, in turn, leads to a
large upper bias of the education’s coefficient, increasing from 0.18 in the OP to
0.63 in the IV-OPM. Similar results are obtained for ‘attention to politics’. First,
misclassification plays a major role in the magnitude of the effect of schooling (i.e., its
coefficient raises from 0.15 to 0.61) and, second, Assumption 3.3(i) holds too, with
an important misclassification for the top answers (pˆi3,3 = 0.47), and pˆi3,1 (=0.10)
and pˆi3,2 (=0.42) are statistically different from zero. In other words, individuals
who apparently show the highest political engagement (j = 3) are more likely to
misreport. Finally, estimations for ‘discuss politics’ also confirm the same results in
terms of misreporting (big values for pˆij,k, for j > k) and on the estimated impact of
education (4βˆed). Note that, if inference were carried out by calculating marginal
effects based upon the OP estimates, it would be very misleading. This highlights
the importance of accounting for misreporting.
Estimations for the fourth civic opinion, ‘active in a voluntary organisation’, are







12See estimated Πˆj matrix in Table 5.6.
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presented in the last part of Table 5.1. A higher level of participation in civic organi-
sations is vital since it fosters habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness
(Putnam et al. (1993)). The main result for this civic opinion is that it is not mis-
reported according to the misclassification test, as the χ¯2 p-values for the OPM and
IV-OPM are well above the critical 5%. Reported and true answers to this ques-
tion, then, tend to agree as the impact of SD is weaker than for previous three civic
opinions. Unlike measures of political engagement, factors such guilt and stigma are
not likely to be operating. Perhaps this is because participation in civic organisa-
tions belongs to a different dimension of social capital (networks) and is more time
consuming.
As before, the null of exogeneity of schooling is rejected, so the correct model here
is the IV-OP (not shown in Table 5.1). Intuitively, unobservables impact simultane-
ously on the dependent variable and education, because parents who instil a spirit
of cooperation and solidarity to their children, are also likely to to stress them the
importance to carry on with further education. As for the other three civic opinions,
education is also one of the strongest covariates of being ‘active in a voluntary organi-
sation’. The IV-OP coefficient is 0.34 (p-value = 0.00); hence, there is a large positive
bias induced by endogeneity since βˆed of the OP is 0.13. The remaining covariates’
results are as expected. The variable being in employment, for instance, is negative
related to the indicator, due to the time consuming nature of volunteering activities.
Comparing the results for Italy and the UK thus far, namely the civic opinions
set of estimations of Tables 4.1 and 5.1, reveals that the only difference between
these two countries, principally consists of the endogeneity of education. Causality
of schooling for the different measures of political engagement in the UK are mostly
driven by unobservables, but not for ‘interest in politics’ in Italy, where the null of
exogeneity of education is accepted. The transmission of interest in issues within the
political sphere occurs in the UK, as suggested by the civic voluntarism model at the
family level, but not in the case of Italy. The results are similar since education is a
significant determinant and civic opinions are misreported in the two countries. At
least for civic opinions, contextual factors of each country seem to be relevant at the
micro-level, where endogeneity is often found to be an empirical issue that needs to
be controlled for, whereas the impact of SD and misreporting are more related to the
nature of the indicators.
Table 5.2 contains the results for civic behaviours. These three indicators for the
UK are exactly the same as the ones for Italy: failing to report accidental damage to
a parked vehicle (car damage), keeping money that you have found (keeping money),
and avoiding a fare on public transport (avoiding fare). To begin with, I briefly
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mention some explanatory variables estimations.13 Age and age2 have similar signs
as for civic opinions, with older people more likely to adhere more to social norms
than younger people (van Oorschot and Arts (2005)), but at a decreasing rate. For the
civic behaviour ‘car damage’ most covariates become statistically insignificant as a
result of accounting for endogeneity and misreporting in the IV-OPM. For instance,
income level, gender and social class dummies all change, from being significant
in the OP model, to being insignificant in the IV-OPM formulation. Nonetheless,
for the indicator ‘keeping money’, these individual and socioeconomic background
variables are still significant in the IV-OPM model, albeit in some cases (e.g., for
income) having the wrong sign. For the third civic behaviour ‘avoiding fare’, on the
contrary, the chosen OP model shows an expected positive impact for covariates such
as income, social class and marital status. That is, the higher the income or social
status of an individual, the less likely it is that he judges avoiding the fare on public
transport as acceptable. Marital status is an individual level variable which has
an impact on this civic behaviour because it embodies certain personality types, in
particular, a disposition to trust when selecting into marriage and/or divorce (Allum
et al. (2010)). There is an overall tendency, however, for the effect of socioeconomic
background variables to disappear when accounting for misclassification.14
Equally to civic opinions, misclassification tests indicates that civic behaviours in
the UK also suffer from SDB (King and Bruner (2000)). This tendency for intervie-
wees to lie, under-reporting socially undesirable behaviours, holds for the majority of
indicators. That is, the null hypothesis of non-misreporting is rejected for both ‘car
damage’ and ‘keeping money’ variables (χ¯2 = 5.142 with p-value = 0.0132, and χ¯2
= 3.203 with p-value = 0.0378, respectively), and regardless of which version of the
OPM model one considers. Only for the third outcome, ‘avoiding fare’, does the OP
outperform the misclassified version of the models (χ¯2 = 0.161, p-value = 0.530).
As usual, misclassification leads to upward biases in all estimated coefficients as
well as an increase in their standard errors. Controlling for the plausible endogeneity
of education has an equivalent empirical effect. This is a common outcome when
using a two-stage procedure, where there is always a trade-off between consistency
and precision. The null of exogeneity of education is rejected for two indicators. More
specifically, the civic behaviours which are misclassified according to the χ¯2 test are
also endogenous by the Hausman test. For ‘car damage’ χ2(1) = 6.407, with p-value
= 0.011; and for ‘keeping money’, χ2(1) = 14.039, with p-value = 0.000. Schooling is
13According to the misclassification and endogeneity tests, the chosen models (columns) for the
estimated covariates’ impacts are given by IV-OPM model for ‘car damage’ and ‘keeping money’,
and by the OP column for ‘avoiding fare’.
14See OPM columns of Table 5.2.
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exogenous only for the variable ‘avoiding fare’ ( χ2(1) = 1.707, p-value = 0.191). One
of the possible explanations of endogeneity is due to the unobservable intelligence,
which is not controlled for in the civic behaviours’ specifications. That is, more
intelligent individuals are more accurate in their assessments of the consequences
when ‘damaging a car’ or ‘keeping money’, but the same group of more intelligent
individuals are also more probable to undertake further schooling.
The considerable positive bias induced by endogeneity is what makes schooling
the strongest predictor across civic behaviours. While misclassification modifies the
original relationship of education with civic behaviours in the OP from statistically
significant to insignificant, endogeneity turns the lack of impact of education in the
OPM to a meaningful one in the IV-OPM.15 This is the key difference with esti-
mations for Italy where the null of exogeneity of education is accepted, and βˆed is
statistically equals to zero by their t-tests, in either the OPM or the IV-OPM for the
three civic behaviours. Certainly, I believe that the way in which causality of school-
ing and civic behaviours varies in both Italy and the UK, is the core difference when
comparing Chapter 4 and 5’s empirical results. I finish this section by discussing the
estimated misreporting probabilities below.
The estimated matrix Πˆ3 for the first two civic behaviours are in line with each
other, and follows the misclassification assumptions of Chapter 3. Assumption 3.1
does not hold for either ‘car damage’ and ‘keeping money’. Observed answers taking
values 1 and 2 do not contain enough information on true responses, and so individ-
uals are more likely to lie than to tell the truth for j = 1, 2. That is, pˆi1,1 < 0.50 and
pˆi2,2 < 0.50, while pˆi3,3 ≈ 0.93 (see the first two matrices of Table 5.7). Furthermore,
Assumption 3.2 (monotonicity of correct report) is valid too. Elements along the
diagonal are increasing: pˆi1,1 < pˆi2,2 < pˆi3,3, which means that the misclassification
problem is decreasing the more civically behaved individuals are, according to their
reported answers. Assumption 3.3(i) is also relevant. The estimated misclassification
probabilities below the diagonal of Πˆ3 are small (pˆij,k < 0.10), and above the diag-
onal are rather high (pˆij,k < 0.21). For both indicators, the largest misclassification
probability is pˆi2,3. This means that people whose reported answers show a middle
degree of social trust (j = 2) are more concerned in presenting themselves in the best
socially acceptable terms (j = 3) and, consequently, they are the most likely to lie
about how they react to this hypothetical situation. Taken as a whole, the results
show, equally to the Italian case, that measures of civic behaviours are more likely
to suffer from misreporting to a larger extent than indicators on civic engagement.
15For the variable ‘avoiding fare’, schooling is not associated with civic behaviour in any of the OP,
OPM or IV-OPM models.
Chapter 5. Civic outcomes, misclassification and education: the case of the UK 87
5.3.2. Additional results related to politics, voting and trust
This section contains further results for the UK. Four extra indicators related
to politics and voting, as well as two concerning social trust are analysed. Namely,
whether respondents believe that ‘political activity takes too much time and effort’,
‘family and friends think that voting is a waste of time’, ‘feel very guilty if not vote’,
‘neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote’, as well as two outcomes concerning trust:
whether ‘most people can be trusted’ and whether they ‘trust the local government’.
The last two indicators, according to the framework by van Oorschot et al. (2006),
add another dimension of social capital to the UK analysis which is not captured
by the previous Italian indicators. They are: generalised trust (interpersonal trust,
trust in people) and trust in institutions (state institutions such as the health care
system, the justice system or the government).
Estimations for the four additional dependent variables associated with politics
and voting are presented in Table 5.3. For the first two, I am able to examine whether
the lower levels of political engagement in the UK may be explained, by either the
time constraint of participation in politics or the lack of belief in politics. Recall
that recently there has been a decline in social capital in the UK, also including
trust in politics and politicians (Halpern (2009)). Research in the economics field
(e.g., Gibson (2001), Dee (2004)) suggest alternative mechanisms by which addi-
tional schooling might actually reduce civic engagement. For example, by raising the
opportunity cost of an individual’s time, increased schooling could reduce the amount
of time and attention allocated to civic activities. Education could also reduce voter
participation by promoting an awareness of voting as an essentially expressive act
with an infinitesimally small probability of influencing actual policy. Similarly to the
earlier civic outcomes, misreporting can also have an influence on how these variables
are reported, because respondents may be reluctant to reveal that they are too busy
to participate in politics or that their votes are worthless.
The indicator ‘political activity takes too much time and effort’ is not misreported
and education is not endogenous by the corresponding statistical tests, and so the OP
is then the chosen model. Education has a negative impact on the dependent variable
(βˆed = -0.0572 , p-value = 0.0139), meaning that the more educated an individual is,
the less likely he would be to judge the time aspect of political activity as a reason
for his lack of participation. This implies that, at least when applied to political
activities in the UK, the opportunity cost of time is not higher for more educated
individuals.
Schooling is also exogenous for the indicator ‘voting is a waste of time’, but it is
misreported (χ¯2 = 1.693, p-value = 0.018), so the correct model is the OPM. This
Chapter 5. Civic outcomes, misclassification and education: the case of the UK 88
TABLE 5.3
Parametric estimates for outcomes related to politics and voting (UK)
Political activity takes too much time and effort Voting is a waste of time
Variables OP OPM IV-OPM OP OPM IV-OPM
Education -0.0572** -0.1122** -0.2633 -0.1539** -0.3125** -0.484
(0.0139) (0.0533) (0.2151) (0.0161) (0.0586) (0.4237)
pˆi1,2 0.0794 0.1453 0.0538** 0.0322
(0.114) (0.1492) (0.0202) (0.0349)
pˆi1,3 0.1301 0.158 0.0816** 0.0714*
(0.1166) (0.1185) (0.0174) (0.0407)
pˆi2,1 0.119 0.1948** 0.1979** 0.1976**
(0.095) (0.0297) (0.0201) (0.0203)
pˆi2,3 0.2068 0.1507 0.0861 0.0924
(0.1366) (0.2035) (0.1617) (0.1704)
pˆi3,1 0.1453* 0.1784** 0.1792** 0.1921**
(0.0812) (0.0606) (0.0556) (0.0381)
pˆi3,2 0.1437* 0.0748 0.0418 0.0367
(0.0835) (0.091) (0.0698) (0.0663)
Log-likelihood -4470.92 -4457.77 -4463.71 -3359.04 -3350.94 -3397.97
χ¯2 (P-value) 0.015 (0.935) 0.163 (0.220) 1.693 (0.018) 0.396 (0.044)
χ2(1) (P-value) 0.526 (0.468) 0.167 (0.683)
Feel very guilty if not vote Neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote
Variables OP OPM IV-OPM OP OPM IV-OPM
Education 0.104** 0.2028** 0.2829 0.1069** 0.1868** 0.6025**
(0.0156) (0.0554) (0.2786) (0.0166) (0.0459) (0.2241)
pˆi1,2 0.141** 0.1283* 0.2352** 0.2456**
(0.0701) (0.078) (0.1147) (0.048)
pˆi1,3 0.0051 0.0657 0.0537 0.2108*
(0.0286) (0.1107) (0.1083) (0.1194)
pˆi2,1 0.1485 0.1324 0.1907 0.1479
(0.1853) (0.1765) (0.2288) (0.1429)
pˆi2,3 0.2924* 0.3577** 0.1666** 0.2476**
(0.176) (0.1166) (0.0693) (0.109)
pˆi3,1 0.0932** 0.0923** 0.0446** 0.0447**
(0.0144) (0.02) (0.0137) (0.0148)
pˆi3,2 0.0517** 0.0485** 0.0335** 0.0346**
(0.0122) (0.0164) (0.0127) (0.0116)
Log-likelihood -3433.76 -3404.07 -3432.76 -2986.71 -2964.54 -2984.91
χ¯2 (P-value) 4.148 (0.000) 2.922 (0.000) 5.091 (0.002) 2.804 (0.004)
χ2(1) (P-value) 0.086 (0.769) 3.591 (0.058)
See references in Table 5.1.
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variable might suffer from misreporting as one may feel embarrassed to judge politics
as ineffective and appear as an egoistic and self-interested voter. Measures of political
engagement are also misreported due to similar reasons, which is why the estimated
misclassification probabilities follow Assumption 3.3(i) for civic opinions.16 Note
that the education coefficient is negative and statistically significant; voting is not
considered a waste of time for more educated people. The negative link of schooling
with the two indicators challenges the alternative mechanisms proposed by some
studies in the economics field. Time constraint is not an issue for more educated
individuals, who also do not consider the voting process futile.
The variables ‘feel very guilty if not vote’ and ‘neglect my duty as a citizen if not
vote’ are linked to over-reporting of voting behaviour found in the literature (Karp
and Brockington (2005)). There are diverse hypotheses for over-reporting. Alterna-
tively, theories place emphasis on either feelings of guilt (Bernstein et al. (2001)),
a desire to look good before the interviewer, or see over-reporting as an expression
of satisfaction with the status quo (Silver et al. (1986)) The indicators allow me to
investigate the extent in which feelings of guilt and duty in the participation of the
political process, might vary by schooling levels.
As can be seen in the second part of Table 5.3, these feelings vary by schooling
levels. The coefficient βˆed is statistically significant and positive for both outcomes,
which are misreported by the χ¯2 test. More educated persons are more likely to have
stronger feelings of guilt, or believe that they are neglecting their duty as citizens,
if they do not vote. This positive association between education and the indicators,
validates the hypotheses of over-reporting and therefore supports Assumption 3.4(i).
In short, more educated individuals would tend to misreport civic opinions as they
are under the most pressure from these factors.
Table 5.4 contains estimations for the two aspects of the trust dimension of social
capital: generalised trust (interpersonal trust, trust in people) and trust in insti-
tutions (state institutions such as the health care system, the justice system or the
government). For the first indicator, ‘trust people’, I am able to replicate the positive
impact of education on generalised trust found in the literature. For the UK, Sturgis
and Smith (2010), for instance, also find a significant and direct effect of having a
degree on generalised and particularised (i.e., in the neighborhood, in the local area)
forms of trust. As stated by Allum et al. (2010), education is without doubt the
most consistent as well as the strongest predictor of generalised trust. Indeed, this is
reflected by the estimations of the first three columns of the table, where education
is still significant whether or not I control for misreporting and endogeneity. By the
16That is, pˆij,k are small on the upper part of ΠˆJ(j < k).
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TABLE 5.4
Parametric estimates for outcomes related to trust (UK)
Trust people Trust local government
Variables OP OPM IV-OPM OP OPM IV-OPM
Education 0.1008** 0.3791** 0.3049* 0.026* 0.0444** -0.4613
(0.0142) (0.1606) (0.1629) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.3768)
pˆi1,2 0.2735 0.0841** 0.1999** 0.4354**
(0.2296) (0.0359) (0.0000) (0.1545)
pˆi1,3 0.1999 0.076* 0.0999** 0.2208**
(0.2021) (0.0398) (0.0001) (0.0977)
pˆi2,1 0.1609** 0.1402** 0.0026 0.1007**
(0.0749) (0.0617) (0.0072) (0.0466)
pˆi2,3 0.0627 0.0803** 0.061** 0
(0.0748) (0.0361) (0.0030) (0.0001)
pˆi3,1 0.0353* 0.0129 0.2973** 0.2071
(0.0181) (0.0227) (0.0100) (0.2354)
pˆi3,2 0.4834** 0.3805** 0.3999** 0.3901**
(0.0393) (0.0704) (0.0000) (0.1983)
Log-likelihood -3605.18 -3586.59 -3617.43 -3022.25 -2998.65 -2977.53
χ¯2 (P-value) 1.542 (0.098) 1.251 (0.045) 0.154 (0.033) 0.337 (0.030)
χ2(1) (P-value) 7.399 (0.007) 1.720 (0.190)
See references in Table 5.1.
χ¯2 and Hausman tests, the chosen model is the IV-OPM. Thus, this self-reported
data on generalised trust for the UK is, as the majority of the earlier indicators,
subject to SD and misreported. Unobservable traits, too, are driving the reported
answers of this variable. These unobservables could be either specific to the individ-
uals (e.g., intelligence) and the families or communities in which they were raised.17
The second aspect of the trust dimension, trust in institutions, is directly affected
by education as well. Yet the magnitude of the impact, as expected, is much smaller
(0.04 < 0.31), and the null of exogeneity of education is accepted (χ2(1) = 1.720,
p-value = 0.190). As interpersonal trust, the variable ‘trust local government’ is mis-
classified. In summary, SD affects both types of trust, but unobservables only affect
interpersonal trust.
5.3.3. Sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours
In this section, I examine if the recoding of civic behaviours into three categories
affects the main conclusions drawn from the estimates of Table 5.2. Recall that these
results were obtained by changing a 1 to 10 scale to a 1 to 3 scale, and by grouping
and recoding 1 to 3 (=1), 4 to 7 (=2) and 8 to 10 (=3). To provide further support
to the civic behaviours estimations, I also carry out the same analysis using a five
point scale, with observations recoded as follows: (1,2)=1, (3,4)=2,..., (9,10)=5.
Estimations for J = 5, using a full misclassification matrix Π5, are displayed in
17The different levels at which unobservables operate could be explained by the socialisation process
at an early stage of the life-course, which creates family social capital (e.g., Coleman (1988)); and,
moreover, there is new evidence suggesting that trust may also have a genetic basis (Hatemi et al.
(2009)).
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TABLE 5.5
Sensitivity analysis for civic behaviours (UK): Π5
Car damage Keeping money Avoiding fare
Variables OP OPM OP OPM OP OPM
Education 0.0982** 0.3723 0.0481** 0.0674 0.0092 0.0107
(0.0195) (0.3987) (0.0188) (0.0517) (0.0179) (0.0311)
pˆi1,2 0.0509 0.0875** 0.0187
(0.0491) (0.0299) (0.039)
pˆi1,3 0.0752* 0.0712* 0.0218
(0.0426) (0.0409) (0.0412)
pˆi1,4 0.0654 0.0659 0.063
(0.0468) (0.0425) (0.0477)
pˆi1,5 0.0405 0.0421 0.0708
(0.0488) (0.0446) (0.0447)
pˆi2,1 0.077 0.1191 0.0613
(0.0916) (0.1159) (0.072)
pˆi2,3 0.1601 0.0975 0.0674
(0.1386) (0.1079) (0.094)
pˆi2,4 0.3362** 0.1857 0.2556**
(0.1463) (0.1421) (0.0882)
pˆi2,5 0.1767 0.2115 0.2847**
(0.1916) (0.1639) (0.0554)
pˆi3,1 0.036 0.1861** 0.0095
(0.0298) (0.0635) (0.0377)
pˆi3,2 0.0449 0.0445 0.0158
(0.0489) (0.0332) (0.0532)
pˆi3,4 0.0862 0.1601** 0.254**
(0.0789) (0.0742) (0.0914)
pˆi3,5 0.4811** 0.3244** 0.2995**
(0.0538) (0.0993) (0.0042)
pˆi4,1 0.0179 0.0149 0.0404
(0.0261) (0.0123) (0.0749)
pˆi4,2 0.0614 0.0935** 0.0058
(0.0554) (0.0254) (0.0329)
pˆi4,3 0.0795 0.1897** 0.2017
(0.0768) (0.0427) (0.1263)
pˆi4,5 0.4898** 0.4832** 0.2999**
(0.0599) (0.0371) (0.0000)
pˆi5,1 0.0056** 0.0039** 0.0012
(0.002) (0.0017) (0.0022)
pˆi5,2 0.0107** 0.0052** 0.0021
(0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0025)
pˆi5,3 0.0564** 0.0445** 0.0085
(0.0086) (0.0055) (0.0147)
pˆi5,4 0.063** 0.0772** 0.0551**
(0.019) (0.0067) (0.0228)
Log-likelihood -2836.16 -2803.49 -3025.66 -3001.49 -3289.68 -3276.13
χ¯2 (P-value) 6.416 (0.021) 5.605 (0.032) 1.018 (0.417)
The 1 to 10 scale is changed to a 1 to 5 scale, with (1,2)=1, (3,4)=2,..., (9,10)=5, and Π5.
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Bootstrapped OPM, 100 number of repetitions. Log-likelihood is the average over 100 repetitions.
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Table 5.5. Only the OP and OPM models are included, since the central aim of this
exercise is to check whether the recoding into a J=3 scale qualitatively influences the
estimated education coefficient as well as the outcome of the misclassification test.
The results confirm the previous estimations. On the one hand, for the same two
civic behaviours (‘car damage’ and ‘keeping money’) the OPM outperforms the OP
(both χ¯2 p-values are less than 5%). This is explained by SDB, with respondents
providing biased answers so as to gain social approval. On the other hand, the OPM’s
estimated impact of education is not significant for any of the three civic behaviours.
Misclassification increases the standard errors relatively more than βˆed,OPM, which
renders the relationship of education to be non-statistically significant.
The misreporting patterns of ‘car damage’ and ‘keeping money’ given by the
misclassification probabilities matrices Πˆ5 are qualitatively similar to the ones from
Πˆ3. The probability of telling the truth is less than a half for answers taking values j
= 2, 3, 4, so that Assumption 3.1 fails for J = 5 too. Although the monotonicity of
correct report assumption fails, Assumption 3.3(i) remains valid for the two outcomes.
That is, pˆij,k are small on the lower part of ΠˆJ(j > k). The largest misreporting
probabilities are in the last column of matrix Πˆ5, so that individuals mainly lie by
reporting answers at the top the civic behaviour scale. In summary, misreporting
behaviours are not affected by the J = 3 recoding.
5.3.4. Parametric estimations for civic outcomes by education level
I now briefly investigate how the earlier whole sample misclassification results
are explained by educational levels. When comparing the estimated misclassification
probabilities of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen that the probabilities of correct
report are much lower for civic behaviours than for civic opinions. That is, whereas
Assumption 3.1 does not hold for either ‘car damage’ and ‘keeping money’, it does
hold for ‘general interest in politics’, ‘attention to politics’, and ‘discuss politics’.
Can this higher misreporting of civic behaviours be explained by a significant misre-
porting from the group of less (or more) educated individuals? Additionally, do only
more educated people over-report civic opinions because, for example, they are more
influenced by factors such as stigma, feelings of guilt or are more concerned with their
class interests? This section offers answers to these questions for the UK data. The
main hypothesis I rely on is contained in Assumption 3.4. I estimate OPM models
for two sub-samples: low education (left full-time education at 15 or younger), and
medium/high education level (left full-time education at 16 or older). Results for
these two sub-samples are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.
To begin with, consider the civic opinions estimates of Table 5.6. Unlike the
three measures of political engagement, the outcome ‘active in a voluntary orga-
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TABLE 5.6
Parametric estimates for civic opinions by education level (UK): Π3
General interest in politics Attention to politics
a) Whole sample (N = 4161)
0.864 0.0572 0.0788** 0.9299 0.0484** 0.0217
0.1268** 0.8163 0.0551 0.1078** 0.8451 0.0471
0.0002 0.096** 0.9038 0.1006** 0.4271** 0.4723
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.116 (0.148) χ¯2 (P-value): 1.003 (0.010)
b) Left full-time education at 15 or younger (N = 1399)
0.9026 0.0516 0.0458 0.8783 0.0929** 0.0288
0.0229 0.8188 0.1583** 0.024 0.8319 0.1441**
0.0149 0.0627 0.9224 0.2255* 0.1905 0.584
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.378 (0.451) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.669 (0.151)
c) Left full-time education at 16 or older (N = 2762)
0.8302 0.0819** 0.0879** 0.8785 0.0889** 0.0326
0.2001** 0.7346 0.0653 0.2153** 0.7062 0.0785*
0.0008 0.1089** 0.8903 0.061** 0.4579** 0.4811
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.278 (0.004) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.801 (0.054)
Discuss politics Active in voluntary organisation
a) Whole sample (N = 4161)
0.7442 0.0796** 0.1762 0.8925 0.0724* 0.0351
0.3618** 0.4889 0.1493 0.2156 0.5899 0.1945
0.0098 0.2121** 0.7781 0.1471* 0.1927** 0.6602
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.966 (0.027) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.207 (0.194)
b) Left full-time education at 15 or younger (N = 1399)
0.9425 0.0304 0.0271 0.9299 0.0431 0.027
0.4666** 0.3338 0.1996** 0.1528 0.7873 0.0599
0.0903 0.2056* 0.7041 0.2462** 0.2805** 0.4733
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.275 (0.052) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.158 (0.126)
c) Left full-time education at 16 or older (N = 2762)
0.6059 0.241** 0.1531** 0.8677 0.0564 0.0759*
0.3069** 0.3693 0.3238** 0.17 0.7588 0.0712
0.1169** 0.2576** 0.6255 0.2393 0.0441 0.7166
χ¯2 (P-value): 0.237 (0.092) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.164 (0.265)
Bootstrapped OPM estimates, 100 number of repetitions.
Whole sample estimates are from Table 5.1.
Sub-samples results control for the same covariates of Table 5.1 apart
from education.
Diagonal elements of Πˆ3 are 1 minus the sum of pˆij,k across rows.
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
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TABLE 5.7
Parametric estimates for civic behaviours by education level (UK): Π3
Car damage Keeping money Avoiding fare
a) Whole sample (N = 3651)
0.4108 0.3239* 0.2653 0.4239 0.2156 0.3605* 0.4766 0.1962 0.3272**
0.0922 0.4604 0.4474** 0.0931 0.4243 0.4826** 0.0119 0.6106 0.3775**
0.0129** 0.0538** 0.9333 0.0079** 0.0607** 0.9314 0.0027 0.0402 0.9571
χ¯2 (P-value): 5.142 (0.0132) χ¯2 (P-value): 3.203 (0.0378) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.161 (0.530)
b) Left full-time education at 15 or younger (N = 2240)
0.5108 0.133 0.3562** 0.3013 0.2988** 0.3999** 0.6605 0.1009 0.2386**
0.0345 0.6133 0.3522** 0.0998** 0.5247 0.3755** 0.0508 0.6233 0.3259**
0.0228** 0.0665** 0.9107 0.0136** 0.0534** 0.933 0.0106 0.0728** 0.9166
χ¯2 (P-value): 1.763 (0.059) χ¯2 (P-value): 1.035 (0.108) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.055 (0.803)
c) Left full-time education at 16 or older (N = 1411)
0.6416 0.1866 0.1718 0.4717 0.2007** 0.3276** 0.6769 0.0992 0.2239
0.0924 0.5144 0.3932** 0.0833** 0.614 0.3027** 0.001 0.6213 0.3777**
0.0133** 0.0424** 0.9443 0.0007 0.0595** 0.9398 0.0028 0.0363 0.9609
χ¯2 (P-value): 3.597 (0.036) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.984 (0.013) χ¯2 (P-value): 0.219 (0.457)
See references in Table 5.6.
nization’ is not misreported for the whole sample. Futhermore, as expected, it is
neither misreported by the lower educated nor the higher educated groups of in-
dividuals (both χ¯2 statistics p-values ≥ 12.6%). On the contrary, the other civic
opinions are misclassified for at least one of these groups. Consider, for example,
the indicator ‘general interest in politics’, which is not statistically misreported for
the whole sample (χ¯2 ≈ 0.15). This lack of misreporting is driven by the group of
lower educated individuals ( χ¯2 = 0.378, p-value = 0.451), as factors such as stigma,
feelings of guilt or class interests (e.g., Bernstein et al. (2001)) are indeed operating
for the higher educated group of individuals (χ¯2 = 0.278, p-value = 0.004), which
make them over-report their interest in political issues. These factors are also in-
fluencing the higher educated group when answering the question on whether they
‘pay attention to politics’ (for p-values < 0.054), but have no influence on the less
educated group of people, for whom the variable ‘pay attention to politics’ is not
statistically misclassified (χ¯2 p-value = 0.151). The two indicators’ misclassification
patterns follow Assumption 3.4(i). Only the outcome ‘discuss politics’ is misclassified
in spite of the education level considered (both χ¯2 statistics are less then 5%). In
general, misreporting for civic opinions are attributable to individuals with higher
levels of schooling.
Table 5.7 replicates the same analysis for civic behaviours. Apart from ‘avoiding
fare’, which is not misreported by either education level (or in the whole sample),
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results for the other two civic behaviours suggest that there is fairly strong evidence
to conclude that civic behaviours are misreported despite the schooling attainment
considered.18 Misreporting is equally likely to hold for different education levels
and, therefore, the misclassification probabilities agree with the hypothesis outlined
in Assumption 3.4(ii). The main argument I believe may explain this result, is
drawn from empirical research in social psychology which tends to find a strong
effect of descriptive social norms (see, e.g., Cialdini et al. (2006)). Elements above
the diagonal of Πˆ3 are the highest, particularly the significant (by their t-values)
elements pˆi1,3 and pˆi2,3 (≥ 0.35). In other words, Assumption 3.2 is still valid for
either less or more educated individuals. Taken as a whole, estimations indicate
homogenous misreporting patterns across the whole sample and schooling levels for
the majority of civic behaviours. This result for the UK is in line with the lower and
higher educated sub-samples of individuals for the Italian case.
5.4. CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, I investigated how misreporting impacts on the causality of
schooling on various measures of social capital in the UK. Social desirability bias
(SDB) may produce systematic unreliable responses by interviewees and therefore an
invalid relationship between education and social capital. As in the previous Chapter,
I rely on results from parametric discrete choice models which account for misclas-
sification (OPM) and also for the probable endogeneity of schooling (IV-OPM). An
issue also studied in this Chapter was to discern whether the misclassification bias was
mainly explained by the sub-group defined of lower or higher educated individuals.
Besides, by comparing the analysis of Chapter 4 for Italy and the current Chapter 5
for the UK, I am able to provide a cross-national perspective on whether the rela-
tionship of education to civic outcomes might vary, when accounting for issues of
endogeneity and misreporting. Because there is mixed evidence on how social capital
is distributed across Europe, it is then important to know whether unobservables
behind education choices and social desirability (SD) are local to social structures or
are country specific.
In line with previous studies that use other types of self-reported dependent vari-
ables, the analysis in this Chapter shows that most civic outcomes are misclassified
and, consequently, misreporting is an important empirical issue for the UK too. On
the one hand, the three different measures of political engagement are over-reported;
specifically, individuals who apparently show the highest political engagement are
more likely to misreport due to factors such as stigma and feelings of guilt. This
18Only for the sub-sample of lower schooling for the variable ‘keeping money’, χ¯2 p-value is ≈ 0.11.
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over-reporting, in turn, plays a major role in the magnitude of the estimated effect of
schooling. The fourth civic opinion, ‘active in a voluntary organisation’, is not mis-
reported according to the misclassification test, because unlike measures of political
engagement, the impact of SD is not as strong. The group of civic behaviours, on the
other hand, suffer from misreporting to a larger extent than indicators on civic en-
gagement. The extent of misclassification is such that, for certain values, individuals
are more likely to lie than to tell the truth. Also, the assumption of monotonicity of
correct report holds, which means that the problem is decreasing, the more civically
behaved individuals are, according to their reported answers.
With regards to the additional indicators related to politics and voting, the neg-
ative link of schooling with the first two indicators ‘political activity takes too much
time and effort’ and ‘voting is a waste of time’, challenges the alternative mechanisms
proposed by some studies in the economics field. This implies that, at least when
applied to political activities in the UK, the opportunity cost of time is not higher
for more educated individuals, who also do not consider the voting process futile. In
fact, estimations suggest that the more educated an individual is, the less likely he
would judge the time aspect of political activity as a reason for his lack of partici-
pation and also the less likely he would consider voting a waste of time. The other
indicators ‘feel very guilty if not vote’ and ‘neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote’
allow me to investigate the extent to which, feelings of guilt and duty in the par-
ticipation of the political process, vary by educational levels. Indeed, these feelings
vary by schooling levels as, even after controlling for misclassification, the coefficient
of education is statistically significant and positive for both outcomes. This offers
a direct and additional support to the hypothesis of SD driving misclassification of
civic outcomes. Moreover, self-reported data on generalised trust (trust people) and
trust in institutions (trust local government) are, as the majority of the earlier in-
dicators, subject to SD and misreported. Unobservable traits are driving reported
answers only for the measure of interpersonal trust, ‘trust people’. Education has a
positive and significant effect on both types of trust, with a lower magnitude for the
impact on trust in institutions.
A common empirical issue across the array of civic outcomes is endogeneity since
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of education is rejected for most indicators. The
direction of the bias introduced by endogeneity follows the same direction as the
one introduced by endogeneity, with upward biases in both cases. In other words,
unobserved factors which lead individuals to develop a taste for education, are also
positively correlated with civic opinions and civic behaviours. In fact, results appear
to suggest that the extent of this correlation is such, that the impact of education on
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civic behaviours becomes statistically significant when accounting for endogeneity.
This is the main difference with the Italian case: schooling has significant positive
effects on all civic outcomes in the UK. Chapter 5’s main finding is that educational
achievement emerges as a strong predictor across different dimensions of social capi-
tal.
Additionally, estimations by educational levels show significant misreporting of
civic behaviours regardless of the schooling level considered, but, for civic opinions,
misreporting only holds for the group of more educated individuals. This lack of mis-
reporting, principally for measures of political engagement, is driven by the group of
lower educated individuals. Factors such as stigma, feelings of guilt or class interests
only operate within the higher educated group of individuals, which cause the group
to over-report their interest in political issues. Estimations for civic behaviours,
however, indicate homogenous misreporting patterns across the whole sample and
schooling levels. This result for the UK, as well as the one from civic opinions, are in
line with the the lower and higher educated sub-samples of individuals for the Italian
case.
The core difference, when comparing Chapter 4 and 5’s empirical results, is how
causality of schooling and civic behaviours varies in Italy and the UK. As far as civic
opinions are concerned, the only difference between these two countries, principally
consists of the endogeneity of education. Causality of schooling for the different
measures of political engagement in the UK is mostly driven by unobservables, but
not for ‘interest in politics’ in Italy, where the null of exogeneity of education is
accepted. As suggested by the civic voluntarism model, the transmission of interest
in politics in the UK occurs at the family level, but this is not the case in Italy.
Chapter 6
A hurdle ordered probit with misclassification
6.1. INTRODUCTION
A large body of social science research shows that sensitive questions are misre-
ported in surveys. A question could be regarded as sensitive because respondents
perceive it as intrusive, believing that by giving a truthful answer they may dis-
close important information triggering potential repercussions (Tourangeau and Yan
(2007)). In this Chapter, however, the focus is mainly on questions that triggers
social desirability concerns, which naturally arises when respondents are asked ques-
tions on social behaviours and illegal activities. Because respondents are apparently
reluctant to admit to an interviewer that they lack civic awareness or have engaged
in illegal activity, they would tend to choose answers which are viewed as more so-
cially acceptable. This tendency to present themselves in the most favourable manner
relative to prevailing social norms is known as social desirability (SD) or social desir-
ability bias (SDB) (see, e.g., King and Bruner (2000) and Tourangeau et al. (2001)).
Typically, individuals would tend to under-report socially undesirable behaviours and
over-report socially desirable ones (Paulhus (1991)).
A systematic misreporting would result in a large amount of observations at one
end of the outcome variable distribution. Standard parametric procedures, such as
the ordered probit (OP), are commonly used to analyse ordered categorical depen-
dent variables but are unable to explain the prevalence of answers taking certain
values. Because they ignore the issue of SD and misreporting, this leads to inconsis-
tent estimates for the parameters of interest (Ramalho (2002)).1 This could obscure
crucial causal links and yields ambiguous relationships.
In Chapter 6, I propose an alternative framework to deal with a skewed and
misclassified distribution of observed answers. The model can be applied to questions
on sensitive issues whose answers are given into an ordered 1 to J scale. The model is
particularly appropriate for discrete and ordered scales where J = 10, as in the case
of most civic behaviours, or for data on satisfaction or happiness, where generally
J = 7. The main assumption of the model is that individuals approach the question
as a two step process. Firstly, they decide whether they belong to either the low
1For a misclassification review, see Section 3.2.
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or high group as measured by reporting their answers below or above the median of
the 1 to J scale, respectively. This is in line with the two-part model assumption
found in the literature as well as sequential models based on conditional probabilities.
Secondly, answers in the top half (where most observations are located) are subject
to misclassification.
These two assumptions characterise a hurdle and binary ordered probit with mis-
classification (HOPM and BOPM, respectively), which depends on whether or not
one allows for the correlation of the latent equations as defined by the two-part
hypothesis. Ignoring misclassification defines their non-misclassified versions of the
former models: a hurdle ordered probit (HOP) and binary ordered probit (BOP).
I carry out extensive Monte Carlo simulations under different true models or data
generation processes (d.g.p.) to evaluate the models in terms of biases, precision of
estimates, and marginal effects (MEs). Various tests and information criteria are
used to compare the performance of the different models. I then apply the models
to a civic behaviour based on Italian data, measuring the willingness to leave the
name when scraping a car, which is likely to be misreported. By comparing observed
probabilities for the ordered categories to the estimated true answers, it is possible
to describe individuals patterns of misreporting.
Chapter 6 is organised as follows. I introduce the different econometrics models
in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, I discuss the tests used to compare the parametric
models. Section 6.4 presents extensive Monte Carlo evidence on the finite sample
performance of the proposed models. The empirical application to civic behaviours
is contained in Section 6.5, and Section 6.6 concludes. Full expressions for the MEs
are included in Appendix B.
6.2. ECONOMETRIC MODELS
6.2.1. A hurdle OP
When the outcome variable has a substantial proportion of values at one end
of its distribution, some kind of mixture model is required to provide a good fit
of the data. A hurdle (or two-part) model is commonly used in this situation as it
introduces flexibility by modeling different types of d.g.p. using two latent equations.
Thus, combining a binary choice model and a OP model is a standard practice in the
empirical literature. This modeling approach is well established within the field of
health economics in the analysis of smoking, drinking and health expenditures (Jones
(2000)). For example, when modeling cigarette consumption with microdata, it is
typically assumed that consumption is subject to two decisions: whether to smoke and
how much to smoke (see, e.g.,Yen (2005), Kasteridis et al. (2010), Madden (2008)).
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There are also applications of hurdle models from a Bayesian perspective. Deb et al.
(2006) study the effect of managed care on medical expenditure using a model in
which the insurance status is assumed to be endogenous and managed this by using
a hurdle and multinomial probit model, as the variable of interest has a significant
amount of zeros.
This section relies on some ideas recently advanced by Harris and Zhao (2007).
Their approach, however, is conceptually different, as they study a zero-inflated or-
dered probit (ZIOP) model to take into account the possibility that the presence
of zeros in tobacco consumption can arise from two latent equations. Although this
Chapter also deals with a skewed outcome, it is additionally misclassified. This is the
first assumption. The hypothesis of SDB from social psychology makes the analysis
conceptually different. I rely on a two-part model because of its flexibility to allow
covariates to have a different impact upon the division of an ordered scale. The sec-
ond crucial assumption is that, when individuals are asked a question on a sensitive
topic involving a social behaviour, they take their decisions in two steps. First, they
decide to which group they belong: the low or high civically behaved. Second, having
decided they belong to the high civically behaved group, they choose their ranking in
this group by answering an integer j ∈ [(J/2)+1, ..., J ], where the response variable is
coded j = 1, ..., J . The two step answering process is also related to sequential models
(e.g., Tutz (1991)) based on conditional transitional probabilities: Pr(yi = j|yi ≥ j).
I now introduce the model. Let y be the observed (or reported) response. Because
the OP model assumes that there is not misclassification, observed responses coincide
with true responses. Thus, y also denotes the true outcome under this model. Vari-
able y takes discrete ordered values 1, 2,...,J, with a large proportion of observations
at the top half of its distribution. Mapping an underlying latent variable y∗ to the
outcome y via the cut points cj (j = 1,2,...,J ) consists of a standard OP model; how-
ever, due to the large proportion of values at the end of y distribution, proceeding
in this way would be inefficient. Instead, as it has been suggested in the literature, I
rely on a hurdle OP model which consists of two latent processes.
The first latent process is a probit selection equation that explains whether y
values are above or below the median of y and the second latent equation is an OP
for values of y above the median. Let J be even,2 and divide the whole sample N
by the median of y; that is, low values yl if y ∈ [ymin, ymedian), and high values yh
if y ∈ (ymedian, ymax]. Low and high values of y have their associated latent variable
representations y∗l and y
∗
h. The first crucial point is that, to account for the negative
2I assume that J is even for practical reasons, i.e., the notation fits the empirical application in
Section 6.5.
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skewness of the distribution of y, I formulate a probit for whether individuals’ answers
are either in the bottom half or top half of the distribution.3 The whole sample latent
equation is
d∗ = x′β + ε, (6.1)
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, β a vector of unknown coefficients,
and ε a normally distributed error term. Instead of d∗, the researcher observes an
indicator variable d, where d = 1 if y ∈ yh and d = 0 if y ∈ yl. Then, the probability
of answers being above the median is,
Pr(d = 1|x) = Pr(d∗ > 0|x) = Φ(x′β), (6.2)
where Φ(.) is a univariate normal cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). Con-
ditional on d = 1, answers to y are represented by the discrete variable yh that is
generated by a second latent equation,
y∗h = z
′γ + u, (6.3)
where z is a vector of covariates, γ a vector of regression coefficients, u a normal
idiosyncratic term, and there is no requirement that x is equal to z. The relationship
between yh and y
∗





+ 1, if y∗h ≤ c(J/2)+1;
j, if cj−1 < y∗h ≤ cj for j = J2 + 2, ..., J − 1;
J, if cJ−1 < y∗h.
(6.4)
If the two decisions are not independent, the latent equations (6.1) and (6.3) are
linked. It could be probable that high civically behaved people are not randomly
selected from the population. Hence, I assume that the two disturbance terms are















where the variances have been normalised to one. However, since these two deci-
sions could also be independent, I also experiment with models where ρ = 0.
3Although one could consider other distributions for y such as the negative binomial, I assume that
y follows a truncated normal distribution as it is standard in the literature. For a discussion about
the normality assumption, see Greene (2003) (p. 789).
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The HOP model, given by Eqs. (6.1)-(6.5), implies a recoding of the outcome y
equal to zero for values below the median. Formally, the researcher would observe
the following transformation of y,
y˜ = d× yh =

0, if (d∗ ≤ 0);
(J/2) + 1, if (d∗ > 0 and y∗h ≤ c(J/2)+1);
j, if (d∗ > 0 and cj−1 < y∗h ≤ cj) for j = J2 + 2, ..., J − 1;
J, if (d∗ > 0 and cJ−1 < y∗h).
(6.6)
The corresponding probabilities are given by the following expressions,
Pr(y˜) =

Pr(y˜ = 0|z,x) = Pr(d = 0|x) = [1− Φ(x′β)];
Pr(y˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x) = Φ2(x′β, c(J/2)+1 − z′γ;−ρ);
Pr(y˜ = j|z,x) = Φ2(x′β, cj − z′γ;−ρ)− Φ2(x′β, cj−1 − z′γ;−ρ)
for j = J
2
+ 2, ..., J − 1;
Pr(y˜ = J |z,x) = Φ2(x′β, z′γ − cJ−1; ρ),
(6.7)
where Φ2(.) denotes the bivariate c.d.f. The parameter vector θ = (β
′, γ′, c′, ρ)′
of the HOP model can be straightforwardly estimated by maximum likelihood (ML).






1(y˜i = j) ln[Pr(y˜i = j|xi, zi, θ)], (6.8)
where j /∈ (1, 2, ..., J
2
). As mentioned earlier, all these models assume that true
answers are reported because misreporting is not present. Moreover, a hypothesis
test on the independence of the error terms ε and u can be performed by a Wald
test or a t-test on ρ. Note that the HOP becomes a BOP if there is no correlation
between the error terms.4
6.2.2. A hurdle OPM
Because the dependent variable y measures a sensitive topic, it is likely to be
misclassified. This bias arises since respondents will tend to answer, though uncon-
sciously, according to what is considered to be socially acceptable in order to gain
approval of others, and will result in an under-report of undesirable behaviours and
4The probabilities for the BOP model are: Pr(y˜ = 0|z,x) = [1− Φ(x′β)],Pr(y˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x) =
Φ(x′β)[Φ(c(J/2)+1−z′γ)],Pr(y˜ = j|z,x) = Φ(x′β)[Φ(cj−z′γ)−Φ(cj−1−z′γ)] for j = J2 +2, ..., J−1,
and Pr(y˜ = J |z,x) = Φ(x′β)[1− Φ(cJ−1 − z′γ)].
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an over-report of desirable ones. There is a long tradition within social psychology
in the research of SDB (see, for instance, Hattie et al. (2006); Tourangeau and Yan
(2007)). Typically, this bias would vary by the format of the question, its context, and
privacy in the data-collection mode and may be a very important property to reduce
it (Ong and Weiss (2000)). But the current framework does not involve responses
under anonymity. Hence, I employ an ordered response model with misclassification
probabilities to account for SDB.
I follow Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) and Dustmann and van Soest (2004) to
introduce a parametric misclassification model. Under misclassification, the wrong
outcome is reported, in other words, true and reported answers do not coincide
any longer. As stated before, I assume misreporting on the top half part of the
distribution of y. Thus, instead of observing the ‘true’ response yh, I observe a
‘misclassified’ version of it which is denoted as ωh. As I suppose that there is no
error in the underlying latent variable y∗h, the reported dependent variable ωh is still
generated by the latent variable model of Eq. (6.3).
I now define the misclassification probabilities that link true and reported re-
sponses. Let the probability that observations belonging to category j are classified
in category k as,
pij,k = Pr(ωh = k|yh = j, z) for j, k ∈ [(J/2) + 1, ..., J ] and j 6= k. (6.9)
In the top half of the scale for answers of y there are (J/2) outcomes subject to
mismeasurement, which entails [(J/2) × ((J/2) − 1)] misclassification probabilities.
However, as the dependent variable represents a civic behaviour subject to SDB,
individuals will clearly have no incentive to lie, reporting a lower civic awareness than
the one given by their true answers.5 This means that misclassification probabilities
pij,k for j > k should tend to zero. Therefore, the misreporting pattern can be
depicted by an upper triangular matrix of misclassification probabilities,
Π(J/2) =

pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+1 pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+2 . . . pi(J/2)+1,J





0 0 . . . piJ,J
 , (6.10)
where the diagonal elements are the probabilities that observations are correctly
classified, and by definition each matrix row adds up to one.
5Recall that higher values of the dependent variable indicates a higher sense of civic duty according
to observed (or reported) answers on the original 1 to J scale.
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For the whole sample, let ω˜ (= d× ωh) be the transformation of y that accounts
for both the skewness on the distribution of y as well as the misclassification of yh.
These two assumptions define the HOPM model, with the following probabilities for
the ‘reported’ (or misclassified) dependent variable ω˜,
Pr(ω˜) =

Pr(ω˜ = 0|z,x) = Pr(y˜ = 0|x) = Pr(d = 0|x) = [1− Φ(x′β];
Pr(ω˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x) = pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+1Pr(y˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x);
Pr(ω˜ = (J/2) + 2|z,x) = pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+2Pr(y˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x)
+ pi(J/2)+2,(J/2)+2Pr(y˜ = (J/2) + 2|z,x);
...
Pr(ω˜ = J |z,x) = ∑Jj=(J/2)+1 pij,JPr(y˜ = j|z,x) for j = J2 + 1, ..., J ;
(6.11)
with Pr(y˜ = j|z,x) defined in Eq. (6.7) and subject to ∑k pij,k = 1.
The misclassification process assumed in (6.10) implies that there is an under-
reporting for the lowest value above the median (ω˜ = (J/2) + 1)) and over-reporting
for the highest value (ω˜ = J). This can easily be seen in Eq. (6.11) because
pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+1 < 1 and piJ,J = 1, respectively. The hypothesis that individuals tend to
under-report socially undesirable behaviours and over-report socially desirable ones
is a well known phenomena in social psychology (e.g., King and Bruner (2000)). For
the remaining categories, however, either under-reporting or over-reporting can hold.
Formally,
Proposition 6.1: Suppose that the misclassification process is given by Π(J/2) in
(6.10). Then, for values of ω˜ = k ∈ [(J/2) + 2, ..., J − 1], there is either: (i)
Under-reporting of category k: Pr(ω˜ = k) < Pr(y˜ = k) ⇐⇒ ∑k−1j<k pij,kPr(y˜ = j) <
Pr(y˜ = k)
∑J
j>k pik,j; (ii) Over-reporting of category k: Pr(ω˜ = k) > Pr(y˜ = k) ⇐⇒∑k−1
j<k pij,kPr(y˜ = j) > Pr(y˜ = k)
∑J
j>k pik,j.
proof. This is shown by letting Pr(ω˜ = k) =
∑k−1
j<k pij,kPr(y˜ = j) + pik,kPr(y˜ = k)
and replacing pik,k = 1−
∑J
j>k pik,j. Q.E.D.
Although, in general, one would expect under-reporting when category j is near
(J/2) + 1 and over-reporting when j tends to J .
The HOPM model6 includes l additional parameters to be estimated given by the
elements of the matrix Π(J/2) [l = (J/2)× ((J/2)− 1)− J ]. Let θ˜ = (β′, γ′, c′, ρ, pi′)′.
6As before, a binary version of this model (BOPM) is obtained by setting ρ = 0 and replacing
Pr(y˜|.) accordingly.
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1(ω˜i = j) ln[Pr(ω˜i = j|xi, zi, θ˜)], (6.12)
for j /∈ (1, 2, ..., J
2
). There are two conditions for the HOPM to be valid. On the
one hand, the misclassification process must be correctly specified. In other words,
the probabilities of misclassification must be a function only of the subset (defined by
the cutpoints in Eq. (6.4)) to which y∗h belongs and not of the level of y
∗
h. Otherwise
maximum likelihood (ML) estimates would yield inconsistent estimates. Thus, the
main identification assumption is that pij,k are not a function of the covariates. On
the other hand, a stochastic condition on the behaviour of the misclassification prob-
abilities which guarantees that E(ωh|z) increases with z′γ and thus γ is identified. In
terms of the matrix Π(J/2) this condition implies that the elements of the first column
must be weakly decreasing as you go down row-by-row, the sum of the elements of
the first two columns must be weakly decreasing as you go down row-by-row, and
so on. Hence, the implicit assumption is that observational units with larger true
values for their dependent variable are more likely to report larger values than obser-
vational units with smaller true values (see Abrevaya and Hausman (1999), p. 252,
for details).
6.2.3. Marginal effects
Researchers are often interested in MEs rather than estimates of the parameter
vector itself. The HOPM model contains two sets of MEs which warrant examination.
Firstly, the ME of a covariate on the probability of answers belonging to the top half
part of the distribution, Pr(d = 1). Secondly, the impact of an explanatory variable
on the probability of the misclassified outcome ω˜ conditional on d be equal to 1, that
is, Pr(ω˜ = j|d = 1).
In the remaining of this section I concentrate on the MEs for a continuous variable
(i.e., xk) instead of dummy variable. The ME on the probability that y ∈ yh is given







where φ(.) is the p.d.f. of a standard normal univariate distribution.
To analyse the partial effect of an infinitesimal change of xk on the probability of
the dependent variable ω˜, I need to partition the covariates and related coefficients.7
7I use the same approach and notation as in Harris and Zhao (2007), p. 1077-1079.
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Let w denotes common covariates that appear in both x and z with associated
coefficients βw and γw, and let the unique variables of the latent equations be x˜ and






















For the whole model denote the full group of unique covariates as x∗ = (w′, x˜′, z˜′)′,
and set the associated coefficient vectors for x∗ as β∗ = (β′w, β˜
′, 0′)′ and γ∗ =
(γ′w, 0
′, γ˜′)′. The MEs of covariate x∗ on the probabilities of the reported dependent













∂Pr(ω˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x)
∂x∗
= pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+1






∂Pr(ω˜ = (J/2) + 2|z,x)
∂x∗
= pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+2
∂Pr(y˜ = (J/2) + 1|z,x)
∂x∗
+ pi(J/2)+2,(J/2)+2

















Since it is supposed that the outcome variable is not affected by misreporting
when it takes values in the lower half of the distribution, true and reported outcomes
(as well as MEs) are the same for the model which accounts for misclassification and
also for the hurdle (or binary) model. MEs differ, however, for true and reported
outcomes whose answers are in the top half of the distribution. Suppose that all
elements of the coefficient vectors β∗ and γ∗ are positive. Then, Eq. (6.15) shows
an under-estimation of the MEs for the reported outcome ω˜ when j = (J/2) + 1
and an over-estimation for j = J which is due to pi(J/2)+1,(J/2)+1 < 1 and piJ,J = 1,
respectively. For other values of ω˜, probabilities and HOPM (BOPM) MEs could
be either under or over-estimated compared to the HOP (BOP) model. This would
depend on two factors. Firstly, whether condition (i) or (ii) of Proposition 6.1 holds
and, secondly, on the downward bias of estimated γ coefficients which are affected by
misreporting. Full expressions for the MEs can be found in Appendix B.
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6.3. TESTING THE DIFFERENT MODELS
Considering the econometrics models described in Section 6.2, there are three
types of tests that the researcher might be interested in. Namely, whether sample
selection is present, the validity of the hurdle and binary modeling assumptions and,
finally, if the dependent variable suffers from misclassification. I discuss each of them
in turn below.
Statistical comparisons of the correlated and uncorrelated versions of the models
can be straightforwardly tested, by comparing the t-ratio of the estimate of ρ and its
standard error to the appropriate critical value of the standard normal distribution.
In the present framework, a t-test on ρ = 0 would imply a test between hurdle and
binary models, that is, the HOPM (or HOP) against the BOPM (or BOP). Yet, there
are some doubts about the power of t-test in this context unless the sample size is
large. For example, Nawata and McAleer (2001) find that the t-test performs poorly
as it rejects the correct null hypothesis far too frequently, especially when x = z.
Although the simulations in Section 6.4 use a large N to avoid this problem, t-test
for ρ should still be interpreted cautiously when it rejects the null hypothesis of lack
of sample selection.
Because researchers typically are more likely to fit an OP when faced with the
discrete ordered dependent variable y, a natural test would be to compare the OP
model with the remaining models. The OP model discards latent equation (6.1) as
well as the probit selection rule of Eq. (6.2), and thus no splitting process of the
observed dependent variable y is assumed according to low and high values. In other
words, (x′β) → +∞ ⇒ Φ(x′β) → 1 and then Pr(d = 1|x) → 1. Note that testing
these sort of models entails comparing the non-nested models. Specifically, hurdle and
binary models propose a recoding where the outcome variable y ∈ (0, J
2
+ 1, ..., J),
whereas in the OP model y ∈ (1, 2, ..., J). From a conceptual point of view, they
belong to a class of non-nested models that represent conflicting theories of economic
behaviour at micro level (e.g., Szroeter (1999)) as their random utility models, which
generate them, assume different choice sets. Nevertheless, one can still rely on some
standard statistics to compare them. In particular, the LR statistic is employed.8
In addition, I use a well established test on the literature due to Vuong (1989),
which is based on the Kullback-Leibler information criterion (KLIC) that measures
the distance between the given and the true distribution. The OP model and the
hurdle (and binary) models are strictly non-nested as their parameters intersection is
8This test is used by Harris and Zhao (2007) in a similar context and they find a good performance
in their Monte Carlo simulations. The LR test has good properties in non-standard conditions such
as non-i.i.d observations and lower rates of convergence. See, for instance, Vu and Zhou (1997) and
Banerjee (2005).























Figure 6.1.— Alternative econometrics models.
the null set (see, Vuong (1989), Definition 2). Formally, the conditional distributions
of the competing models are for the OP model: Fξ ≡ {Fy|x(.|.; ξ); ξ ∈ Ξ ⊂ <p},
and for the HOP model Gθ ≡ {Fy˜|z,x(.|.; θ); θ ∈ Θ ⊂ <q}, where ξ = (c∗, γ) and
θ = (β, γ, c, ρ), and these models are strictly non-nested because Fξ ∩ Gθ = ∅. For
the HOPM model redefine θ as θ˜ so as to include the misclassification parameter pi
and for the binary (or without correlated error terms) representation of these models,
set ρ = 0. Moreover, for the OPM model which accounts for misreporting along the
whole original scale of y, let j vary from 1, ..., J in Eq. (6.11) to obtain the appropri-
ate dependent variable (denoted by ν˜) with misclassification matrix ΠJ . Figure 6.1
presents the whole range of models, along with their corresponding dependent vari-
ables and parameters’ constraints under which are obtained.
Suppose one is testing the OP model against the HOP model, and let f(.|.) and
g(.|.) be their corresponding predicted probabilities. The null hypothesis of the Vuong








Let mi = ln[f(.|.)/g(.|.)] denote the ratio of the previous expression; the Vuong









D−→ N [0, 1]. (6.17)
For a critical value c, discrimination between the two models is not possible if
|υ| < c, the test favours the HOP model if υ < −c and the OP if υ > c. When
testing the OP against the other models, one should replace the denominator of Eq.
(6.16) by their appropriate predicted probabilities.
I also compare all models by using the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian
information criterion (BIC), and consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC). For
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more details about information criteria statistics and non-nested model testing in
general, see, Cameron and Trivedi (2005), p. 278-284.
Finally, I briefly describe how to test for misclassification. Note that I am exam-
ining whether Π(J/2) ≡ I(J/2) and thus I am testing the HOPM (BOPM) against the
HOP (BOP). The main problem when testing misclassification is that one cannot use
a standard test because the null hypothesis places the parameters on the boundary of
the parameter space. Instead of using a likelihood ratio/Wald test with a χ2 distri-
bution, one needs to use a chi-bar-squared distribution (χ¯2), which is distributed as a
mixture of χ2 distributions (Shapiro (1985)). The χ¯2 statistic is normally simulated,
given that finding the weights is a difficult numerical problem as well as that there is
not a closed expression form for the weights when the number of restrictions tested is
higher than 4. Reasonably accurate estimates of the weights can be easily obtained
by Monte Carlo simulation (i.e., Andrews (2001) and Liu and Wang (2003)).
A formal definition of the test procedure is included in Appendix A of Chapter 3.
Only redefine the parameters’ vectors to fit the models proposed in this Chapter.
For instance, for the hurdle models, recall that the parameter vector of the HOPM is
θ˜ = (β, γ, c, ρ, pi) and θ = (β, γ, c, ρ) for the HOP. Suppose that one would like to test
that the l estimated misclassification probabilities [l = (J/2) × ((J/2) − 1) − J ] are
zero, against the alternative that they are higher than zero. Stack these l estimated
misclassification probabilities pˆij,k (for j < k) in a row vector Ψˆl. Then proceed as in
Appendix A.
6.4. SIMULATIONS
In this section, I evaluate the performance of the above models by Monte Carlo
simulation. The main interest concerns the comparisons of the hurdle versions (where
there is a correlation in the error terms of the latent equations) with the OP model,
although I also set up experiments with ρ = 0 as a way to contrast the performance of
binary specifications. I choose J = 10 in the simulation’s designs as most attitudinal
questions have a 1 to 10 scale, which also motivates the empirical application I
examine later in Section 6.5. This choice, however, has empirical disadvantages
because, given the great number of alternatives, identification of the misclassification
probabilities on the OPM model becomes very difficult, even more so if the dependent
variable has few observations for values below the median. Thus, I do not estimate
the OPM model. The main evaluation is across hurdle and non-hurdle versions of
the models of Figure 6.1, and the principal cases I consider are those when the true
d.g.p. is the HOPM, BOPM and OP models.
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6.4.1. Models 1: HOPM d.g.p.
In the group of Models 1 the true d.g.p. is given by the HOPM model. In Model
1A there is no overlap of x and z variables and in Model 1B there is partial overlap.
I set J = 10 for the dependent variable, a sample size N = 2000 and use a number of
repetitions M = 100 for all experiments. The Monte Carlo design is aimed at mim-
icking the observed and true distributions of civic behavioural questions/variables.
Model 1A covariates are: x = (x0,x1), z = (z1, z2), where x0 is a vector of
ones, x1 = Lognormal(0, 1), z1 = Binomial(p = 0.6), and z2 = Normal(10, 3). The
parameter vector for the probit selection in Eq. (6.2) is β = (β0, β1) = (1, 0.3). The
values for β are chosen so that the probability of answers above the median (j ≥ 6) is
≈ 0.90, which coincides with the sample values of civic behaviours.9 I select γ2 = 0.8
and γ2 = -0.2, as well as cutpoints values (i.e., cj in Eq. (6.4)) c6 = −1.8, c7 = −0.8,
c8 = 0.1 and c9 = 1. As mentioned above, the design attempt to match a hypothetical
y˜ civic behaviour, with ‘true’ answers concentrated around values of j ∈ (6, 7, 8).
Because the d.g.p. is given by the HOPM model, the next step is to generate10 the
misclassified ‘observed’ outcome ω˜ which is used in the log-likelihood of Eq. (6.12).
I assume the following misclassification probabilities,
Π(5) =

pi6,6 pi6,7 pi6,8 pi6,9 pi6,10
0 pi7,7 pi7,8 pi7,9 pi7,10
0 0 pi8,8 pi8,9 pi8,10
0 0 0 pi9,9 pi9,10
0 0 0 0 pi10,10
 =

0.46 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.25
0 0.30 0.15 0.25 0.30
0 0 0.30 0.30 0.40
0 0 0 0.55 0.45
0 0 0 0 1
 ,
which yields underreporting for categories j = 6, 7, 8 and over-reporting for cat-
egories j = 9, 10. Hence, Proposition 6.1 holds. The misreporting process mirrors
SD (e.g., Paulhus (1991)). In fact, the misclassification pattern is very significant
and the probability of reporting the truth is less than lying/misreporting for answers
close to the median: pij,j < 0.5 for j ∈ (6, 7, 8).
Monte Carlo results for the first model are in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. They
contain the MEs at the mean of covariates, but I also include the estimated coefficients
to show why average MEs across models differ, as well as several statistical tests
to guide model selection. Specifically, for each model I present the true MEs, the
estimated MEs averaged over the M repetitions and their root mean squared errors.
I also display the value of the overall root mean squared errors of the coefficients,
9The distribution of x1 may mimic a variable such as income, z1 a qualitative variable that repre-
sents, for instance, marital status or a regional dummy, and z2 could be years of education.
10See Chapter 3 (Section 3.4) for details on the simulation algorithm.
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TABLE 6.1
Simulations results (marginal effects) for Model 1A: HOPM d.g.p. with no
overlap (z 6= x)
Covariates TRUE HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
J=0
x1 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.038 -0.039




x1 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.021 0.007
0.003 0.006 0.009 0.006
z1 -0.133 -0.138 -0.138 -0.072 -0.067 -0.072
0.020 0.020 0.063 0.067 0.063
z2 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.017 0.016 0.018
0.004 0.004 0.016 0.017 0.016
J=7
x1 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
z1 0.006 0.008 0.006 -0.022 -0.022 -0.024
0.011 0.012 0.029 0.029 0.031
z2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006
0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.008
J=8
x1 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
z1 0.037 0.039 0.041 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015
0.012 0.013 0.049 0.051 0.052
z2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004
0.003 0.003 0.012 0.013 0.013
J=9
x1 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.010
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002
z1 0.040 0.043 0.046 0.012 0.009 0.009
0.019 0.018 0.029 0.032 0.031
z2 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008
J=10
x1 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.013
0.002 0.002 0.009 0.003
z1 0.050 0.048 0.049 0.094 0.095 0.102
0.019 0.018 0.047 0.048 0.055
z2 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.023 -0.023 -0.025
0.005 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.013




[θˆ− θ][θˆ− θ]′)] 12 , which gives an overall performance of the
model. Tests results are shown as the proportion of times that the statistic supports
each model out of 100 M repetitions using a 5% significance level.
As expected, Table 6.1 shows that Model 1A’s estimated MEs differ with respect
to the true ones across models. The amount of bias in the MEs is a function of two
components. First, pˆij,k and, second, the bias in the γˆ coefficients due to misreporting
(Eq. (6.15)). As it can be seen at the bottom of Table 6.2, whereas the estimated
coefficients for the models that account for misclassification (i.e., HOPM and BOPM)
tend to the true values, but this is not the case for the other models. There is signifi-
cant downward bias in γˆ coefficients and cutpoints that lead to a poor performance in
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TABLE 6.2
Simulation results (tests and estimates) for Model 1A: HOPM d.g.p. with
no overlap (z 6= x)
Tests HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
t-test (ρ) 0.51 0.49
χ¯2 test hurdle 1.00 0.00







AIC hurdle 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC binary 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC all 0.21 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00
BIC hurdle 0.53 0.47 0.00
BIC binary 0.57 0.43 0.00
BIC all 0.00 0.57 0.06 0.37 0.00
CAIC hurdle 0.35 0.65 0.00
CAIC binary 0.39 0.61 0.00
CAIC all 0.00 0.39 0.07 0.54 0.00
Parameters TRUE HOPM Rmse BOPM Rmse HOP Rmse BOP Rmse OP Rmse
β0 1 0.999 0.063 1.000 0.063 1.019 0.066 1.000 0.063
β1 0.3 0.300 0.048 0.299 0.048 0.283 0.050 0.299 0.048
c6 -1.8 -1.816 0.223 -1.971 0.287 -1.309 0.500 -1.478 0.336 -1.478 0.336
c7 -0.8 -0.869 0.308 -0.968 0.367 -0.955 0.178 -1.100 0.314 -1.100 0.314
c8 0.1 0.101 0.344 0.032 0.452 -0.611 0.717 -0.736 0.842 -0.736 0.842
c9 1 0.824 0.356 0.779 0.454 0.039 0.966 -0.057 1.062 -0.057 1.062
γ1 0.8 0.856 0.166 0.899 0.189 0.277 0.525 0.285 0.518 0.285 0.518
γ2 -0.2 -0.210 0.034 -0.220 0.040 -0.066 0.134 -0.069 0.131 -0.069 0.131
ρ 0.5 0.487 0.170 0.590 0.199
pi6,7 0.03 0.030 0.028 0.032 0.029
pi6,8 0.06 0.062 0.030 0.063 0.030
pi6,9 0.2 0.209 0.042 0.209 0.043
pi6,10 0.25 0.249 0.045 0.250 0.044
pi7,8 0.15 0.145 0.108 0.145 0.105
pi7,9 0.25 0.207 0.138 0.211 0.137
pi7,10 0.3 0.288 0.130 0.288 0.137
pi8,9 0.3 0.307 0.162 0.296 0.173
pi8,10 0.4 0.380 0.148 0.384 0.152
pi9,10 0.45 0.379 0.145 0.332 0.217
RMSE-all 0.216 0.370 1.413 1.514 1.514
terms of the RMSEall and, accordingly, to differences in the estimated MEs. Instead,
predictions for βˆ coefficients for all models are similar because this parameter is not
affected by misclassification at the bottom of the scale. As a result, the MEs for x1
(for all j) do not vary.
But they do indeed vary for covariates z in two groups. On the one hand, although
the BOPM assumes that ρ = 0, it performs very well and its MEs are practically the
same as the HOPM model and very close to the true ones. For the HOP, BOP and
OP models on the other hand, in some cases MEs are of the opposite sign to the true
MEs and are in general underestimated; moreover, they are imprecisely estimated as
it is shown by their higher root mean squared errors (RMES). In summary, based
upon predicted MEs, this latter group of models does not perform very well.
In terms of model selection, the OP is never chosen. The misclassification hy-
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TABLE 6.3
Simulation results (marginal effects) for Model 1B: HOPM d.g.p. with
partial overlap (x1 = z1)
Covariates TRUE HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
J=0
x1 = z1 -0.060 -0.058 -0.058 -0.051 -0.058
0.015 0.015 0.018 0.015
z2
J=6
x1 = z1 -0.107 -0.106 -0.106 -0.049 -0.047 -0.064
0.020 0.020 0.059 0.061 0.095
z2 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.017 0.016 0.018
0.004 0.004 0.014 0.015 0.125
J=7
x1 = z1 0.008 0.009 0.010 -0.016 -0.014 -0.023
0.010 0.011 0.025 0.022 0.024
z2 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.007
0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.001
J=8
x1 = z1 0.040 0.040 0.039 -0.008 -0.005 -0.015
0.012 0.010 0.048 0.045 0.007
z2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.004 0.004
0.004 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.036
J=9
x1 = z1 0.053 0.054 0.051 0.018 0.022 0.007
0.013 0.013 0.035 0.031 0.017
z2 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.055
J=10
x1 = z1 0.066 0.061 0.062 0.105 0.102 0.094
0.016 0.017 0.043 0.040 0.108
z2 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.023 -0.023 -0.027
0.004 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.092
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pothesis is fully supported with both the HOPM and BOPM correctly selected over
the HOP and BOP for all M repetitions. (See χ¯2 test hurdle and binary in Ta-
ble 6.2). The likelihood ratio tests also select these two models over the OP in all
cases. Neither is the OP preferred to the other four models according to the Vuong
test. Yet, there seems to be an identification problem with the correlation coefficient,
since according to the t-test on ρ the HOPM is only chosen in 51% of cases over the
BOPM.11 Information criteria further confirms this problem, with the binary versions
of the models more likely to be chosen by the AIC, BIC and CAIC when comparing
the five models. Overall, the BOPM performs slightly better than the HOPM.
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 contain the results for Model 1B under partial overlap
of covariates. The MEs for the models that do not include misreporting are far way
from their true values with high RMSE and, for some j, have different signs than the
true MEs. Once more, the OP is never selected by any test and the HOPM performs
similarly to the previous experiment, although it is chosen by information criteria
fewer times now. It should be noted that in this design there is only one exclusion
restriction, z2, and the percentage of observations below the median is still small (d¯
= 0.88). Together, these two reasons, may explain why ρ is not easily identified. This
agrees with studies comparing the sample selection and two-part models, which find
that the power of the t-test for selectivity is limited by collinearity and by the degree
of censoring (Leung and Yu (1996) and Norton et al. (2008)).
To investigate this issue further, I re-run the models under full overlap of covari-
ates (Model 1C) and increase the proportion of answers in the bottom half of the
scale by lowering β1 (Model 1D). Table 6.5 shows the tests result for these models.
As before, the OP is never chosen. When the set of explanatory variables is the
same, ρ is very poorly estimated because there is not enough nonlinearity to identify
it. Results for the hurdle version of the misclassification test are affected too, only
choosing the true HOPM model 32% of the times, but not for the binary misclassified
version of this test. On the contrary, the quality of true HOPM model is enhanced
by decreasing the probability of d = 1(≈ 0.55). Now both the t-test and χ¯2 test
fully support the HOPM. Information criteria further validate this. In summary, the
model which accounts for misreporting but ignores correlation, provides the better
results based on the range of tests and predicted MEs and, for the HOPM, the degree
of censoring and exclusion restrictions are crucial to its performance.
11I examine this issue by modifying the simulation design and inspect how this affects the t-test’s
outcome.
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TABLE 6.4
Simulation results (tests and estimates) for Model 1B: HOPM d.g.p. with
partial overlap (x1 = z1)
Tests HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
t-test (ρ) 0.53 0.47
χ¯2 test hurdle 1.00 0.00







AIC hurdle 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC binary 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC all 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BIC hurdle 0.33 0.67 0.00
BIC binary 0.41 0.59 0.00
BIC all 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.59 0.00
CAIC hurdle 0.19 0.81 0.00
CAIC binary 0.24 0.76 0.00
CAIC all 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.76 0.00
Parameters TRUE HOPM Rmse BOPM Rmse HOP Rmse BOP Rmse OP Rmse
β0 1 1.003 0.055 1.003 0.055 1.022 0.061 1.003 0.055
β1 0.3 0.292 0.076 0.291 0.076 0.253 0.092 0.291 0.076
c6 -1.8 -1.899 0.255 -2.142 0.422 -1.267 0.541 -1.573 0.252 -1.573 0.252
c7 -0.8 -0.879 0.330 -1.032 0.429 -0.918 0.147 -1.182 0.398 -1.182 0.398
c8 0.1 0.066 0.353 -0.075 0.456 -0.580 0.685 -0.809 0.915 -0.809 0.915
c9 1 0.780 0.378 0.672 0.508 0.057 0.947 -0.124 1.129 -0.124 1.129
γ1 0.8 0.820 0.168 0.820 0.184 0.310 0.493 0.262 0.541 0.262 0.541
γ2 -0.2 -0.215 0.036 -0.228 0.045 -0.070 0.131 -0.074 0.126 -0.074 0.126
ρ 0.5 0.496 0.170 0.688 0.200
pi6,7 0.03 0.035 0.030 0.037 0.031
pi6,8 0.06 0.061 0.034 0.061 0.033
pi6,9 0.2 0.207 0.046 0.207 0.046
pi6,10 0.25 0.249 0.050 0.249 0.050
pi7,8 0.15 0.155 0.090 0.159 0.089
pi7,9 0.25 0.221 0.120 0.226 0.119
pi7,10 0.3 0.302 0.124 0.308 0.119
pi8,9 0.3 0.341 0.143 0.331 0.156
pi8,10 0.4 0.379 0.141 0.384 0.149
pi9,10 0.45 0.409 0.143 0.379 0.176
RMSE-all 0.266 0.563 1.395 1.611 1.611
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TABLE 6.5
Simulation results (tests) for Model 1C and Model 1D: HOPM d.g.p.
a) Model 1C: full overlap in covariates
Tests HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
t-test (ρ) 0.35 0.65
χ¯2 test hurdle 0.32 0.68







AIC hurdle 0.56 0.44 0.00
AIC binary 0.89 0.11 0.00
AIC all 0.03 0.62 0.34 0.01 0.00
BIC hurdle 0.00 1.00 0.00
BIC binary 0.01 0.99 0.00
BIC all 0.00 0.01 0.92 0.07 0.00
CAIC hurdle 0.00 1.00 0.00
CAIC binary 0.01 0.99 0.00
CAIC all 0.00 0.01 0.89 0.10 0.00
b) Model 1D: no overlap in covariates with lower Pr(d = 1|x)
Tests HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
t-test (ρ) 0.88 0.12
χ¯2 test hurdle 1.00 0.00







AIC hurdle 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC binary 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC all 0.72 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
BIC hurdle 0.11 0.89 0.00
BIC binary 0.04 0.96 0.00
BIC all 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.81 0.00
CAIC hurdle 0.02 0.98 0.00
CAIC binary 0.00 1.00 0.00
CAIC all 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.88 0.00
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TABLE 6.6
Simulation results (marginal effects) for Model 2: BOPM d.g.p. with
partial overlap (x1 = z1)
Covariates TRUE HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
J=0
x1 = z1 -0.060 -0.060 -0.058 -0.058 -0.058
0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015
z2
J=6
x1 = z1 -0.113 -0.111 -0.113 -0.054 -0.050 -0.069
0.015 0.019 0.060 0.064 0.101
z2 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.014 0.016 0.018
0.003 0.004 0.017 0.015 0.131
J=7
x1 = z1 0.014 0.014 0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.021
0.010 0.011 0.028 0.027 0.020
z2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006
0.002 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.009
J=8
x1 = z1 0.042 0.042 0.042 -0.004 -0.004 -0.013
0.009 0.012 0.046 0.046 0.005
z2 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.002 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.039
J=9
x1 = z1 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.024 0.023 0.009
0.012 0.013 0.029 0.030 0.018
z2 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.055
J=10
x1 = z1 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.107 0.102 0.094
0.013 0.016 0.045 0.041 0.107
z2 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.019 -0.022 -0.025
0.003 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.089
6.4.2. Model 2: BOPM d.g.p.
Due to the lack of identification of ρ in the previous experiments, one would
expect Model 2 (with zero correlation for the error terms) to perform extremely well.
Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 indicate that this is the case when the true d.g.p is given by
the BOPM model.
Note first that the BOPM RMSEall is smaller and closer to the HOPM. Now,
the t-test for ρ mostly support the BOPM over the HOPM (in 71% of cases). The
mean estimate of ρ over the M replications are relatively small for the hurdle models,
between 0.11-0.18, approaching to the zero true value but with a high RMSE. Second,
the estimated MEs follow the pattern of the former models in Section 6.4.1: for the
BOPM and HOPM they tend to be the true ones, but diverge significantly for the
other three models. This difference is due to the HOP, BOP and OP models ignoring
the misclassification probabilities and the downward bias in γˆ1 and γˆ2 coefficients.
With regard to tests, except from the one for ρ, all results are very similar to Model
1B which also assumes partial overlapping. Binary models are preferred by model
selection criteria. For example, the AIC chooses the BOPM in all cases amongst the
five models and there is nearly an equal split with the BOP by the BIC. Although
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TABLE 6.7
Simulation results (tests and estimates) for Model 2: BOPM d.g.p. with
partial overlap (x1 = z1)
Tests HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
t-test (ρ) 0.29 0.71
χ¯2 test hurdle 1.00 0.00







AIC hurdle 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC binary 1.00 0.00 0.00
AIC all 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BIC hurdle 0.34 0.66 0.00
BIC binary 0.35 0.65 0.00
BIC all 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.65 0.00
CAIC hurdle 0.19 0.81 0.00
CAIC binary 0.22 0.78 0.00
CAIC all 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.00
Parameters TRUE HOPM Rmse BOPM Rmse HOP Rmse BOP Rmse OP Rmse
β0 1 0.997 0.044 1.003 0.055 1.002 0.054 1.003 0.055
β1 0.3 0.299 0.064 0.291 0.076 0.292 0.076 0.291 0.076
c6 -1.8 -1.855 0.189 -1.873 0.274 -1.295 0.512 -1.455 0.361 -1.455 0.361
c7 -0.8 -0.850 0.282 -0.871 0.383 -0.936 0.156 -1.092 0.312 -1.092 0.312
c8 0.1 0.112 0.293 0.064 0.428 -0.586 0.690 -0.739 0.846 -0.739 0.846
c9 1 0.864 0.332 0.821 0.492 0.083 0.919 -0.065 1.071 -0.065 1.071
γ1 0.8 0.806 0.125 0.828 0.165 0.295 0.507 0.264 0.538 0.264 0.538
γ2 -0.2 -0.210 0.030 -0.213 0.037 -0.061 0.139 -0.070 0.131 -0.070 0.131
ρ 0 0.117 0.201 0.180 0.212
pi6,7 0.03 0.029 0.024 0.031 0.029
pi6,8 0.06 0.060 0.028 0.062 0.032
pi6,9 0.2 0.202 0.035 0.203 0.040
pi6,10 0.25 0.246 0.042 0.250 0.047
pi7,8 0.15 0.147 0.082 0.141 0.104
pi7,9 0.25 0.229 0.112 0.225 0.135
pi7,10 0.3 0.297 0.121 0.291 0.150
pi8,9 0.3 0.312 0.144 0.304 0.172
pi8,10 0.4 0.389 0.126 0.369 0.173
pi9,10 0.45 0.418 0.124 0.348 0.209
RMSE-all 0.200 0.239 1.375 1.532 1.532
the correct comparison, the χ¯2 test, selects the BOPM for all repetitions. Vuong
and LR tests also support these models against the misspecified OP, which is never
selected. I believe that all this evidence is enough to support that the true d.g.p. in
this experiment is the BOPM model.
6.4.3. Models 3: OP d.g.p.
I now consider situations when the true d.g.p. is given by the standard OP model
(Tables 6.8 and 6.9). In Model 3A, I assume the same misclassification matrix as
before and, in Model 3B, no misclassification (Π(5) ≡ I(5)). For the usual OP there
is no split process by low and high observations due to (x′β) → +∞. Thus, the
dependent variable now takes values j ∈ (1, ..., 10) and the MEs for the HOPM are
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TABLE 6.8
Simulation results for Model 3A: OP d.g.p. with misclassification
Marginal effects J=6 J=7 J=8
TRUE OP BOPM TRUE OP BOPM TRUE OP BOPM
z1 -0.060 -0.048 -0.139 0.013 -0.027 0.006 0.049 -0.009 0.037
0.014 0.084 0.040 0.017 0.058 0.022
z2 0.015 0.012 0.035 -0.003 0.007 -0.001 -0.012 0.002 -0.009
0.004 0.021 0.010 0.004 0.014 0.005
J=9 J=10
TRUE OP BOPM TRUE OP BOPM
z1 0.077 0.043 0.048 0.096 0.174 0.050
0.035 0.039 0.080 0.054
z2 -0.019 -0.010 -0.012 -0.024 -0.042 -0.013
0.009 0.010 0.019 0.013
Tests OP BOPM





Parameters TRUE OP Rmse BOPM Rmse
c1 -4 -3.310 0.699 -4.049 0.156
c2 -3.6 -2.937 0.671 -3.654 0.149
c3 -3.2 -2.550 0.657 -3.244 0.140
c4 -2.9 -2.264 0.642 -2.942 0.132
c5 -2.6 -1.974 0.632 -2.637 0.125
c6 -1.8 -1.589 0.228 -1.783 0.173
c7 -0.8 -1.276 0.484 -0.776 0.321
c8 0.1 -0.950 1.054 0.057 0.397
c9 1 -0.328 1.330 0.835 0.438
γ1 0.8 0.545 0.260 0.815 0.072
γ2 -0.2 -0.133 0.068 -0.204 0.012
pi6,7 0.03 0.045 0.059
pi6,8 0.06 0.074 0.064
pi6,9 0.2 0.184 0.103
pi6,10 0.25 0.243 0.102
pi7,8 0.15 0.135 0.101
pi7,9 0.25 0.258 0.146
pi7,10 0.3 0.294 0.135
pi8,9 0.3 0.272 0.184
pi8,10 0.4 0.388 0.152
pi9,10 0.45 0.364 0.203
RMSE-all 2.311 0.223
Under OP d.g.p. the misreported dependent variable ω takes values j ∈ (1, ..., 10). Only MEs for the top
half are shown. For j ∈ (1, ..., 5) MEs are similar and only differ by the downward bias of γˆOP.
But for j ∈ (6, ..., 10), the MEs of the BOPM are also function of pˆij,k.
Moreover, when the true d.g.p. is the OP model, only MEs of the BOPM are defined.
This can be seen by setting (x′β)→ +∞ (or β∗ = 0) in Appendix B.
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TABLE 6.9
Simulation results for Model 3B: OP d.g.p. without misclassification
Marginal effects J=6 J=7 J=8
TRUE OP BOPM TRUE OP BOPM TRUE OP BOPM
z1 -0.130 -0.131 -0.293 0.057 0.058 0.052 0.161 0.160 0.156
0.011 0.165 0.008 0.023 0.012 0.016
z2 0.033 0.033 0.073 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.040 -0.040 -0.039
0.002 0.041 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.004
J=9 J=10
TRUE OP BOPM TRUE OP BOPM
z1 0.074 0.074 0.071 0.014 0.014 0.014
0.006 0.007 0.003 0.003
z2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Tests OP BOPM





Parameters TRUE OP Rmse BOPM Rmse
c1 -4 -4.028 0.119 -4.073 0.122
c2 -3.6 -3.624 0.107 -3.667 0.109
c3 -3.2 -3.221 0.098 -3.264 0.096
c4 -2.9 -2.927 0.103 -2.970 0.102
c5 -2.6 -2.621 0.098 -2.663 0.096
c6 -1.8 -1.819 0.093 -1.787 0.095
c7 -0.8 -0.814 0.081 -0.758 0.099
c8 0.1 0.079 0.080 0.170 0.123
c9 1 0.980 0.099 1.117 0.171
γ1 0.8 0.801 0.046 0.827 0.055
γ2 -0.2 -0.202 0.008 -0.207 0.009
pi6,7 0 0.072 0.083
pi6,8 0 0.010 0.054
pi6,9 0 0.002 0.198
pi6,10 0 0.000 0.250
pi7,8 0 0.053 0.110
pi7,9 0 0.001 0.249
pi7,10 0 0.001 0.299
pi8,9 0 0.060 0.246
pi8,10 0 0.004 0.396
pi9,10 0 0.054 0.400
RMSE-all 0.066 0.826
When the true d.g.p. is an OP without misclassification, the dependent variable is y = 1, ..., 10, and Π5 = I(5).
The MEs for j ∈ (1, ..., 5) are exactly the same for the OP and BOPM.
Though for answers in the top half, they differ by pˆij,k of the BOPM MEs .
Again, only MEs of the BOPM are defined. See explanation in Table ??.
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equivalent to the BOPM as well as the HOP (and BOP) to the MEs of the OP.12
Table 6.8 reports the simulations for Model 3A.13 Not surprisingly, the OP model
in this scenario, performs very poorly with very significant biases in the estimated cj
and γ parameters: whereas the RMSEall for the BOPM is 0.22, for the OP is 2.31.
In fact, the true d.g.p. is closer to the BOPM and, consequently, true MEs (except
for j = 6) are much better approximated by this model. All tests lead to the same
conclusion.14 The misclassification test, LR test and information criteria statistics
choose the BOPM for all M repetitions.
On the other hand, when I assume lack of misreporting in Model 3B (see Ta-
ble 6.9), results clearly change towards supporting the OP model. The χ¯2 test accepts
the null of non-misreporting for all instances, and the LR tests, AIC, BIC and CAIC
support the OP model for all cases too. Although here the true model is strictly
the OP because all pij,k are set to zero, the BOPM actually performs extremely well
considering its estimated MEs which are close to the OP and true ones. This is
a very favourable result. It means that when the reported outcome is in fact not
misreported or misclassified, fitting a BOPM would still produce predictions close
to the true model. This shows the capability of the BOPM to detect the lack of
misclassification as all pˆij,k tend to zero.
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 show how the MEs for covariates z1 and z2 vary by the
amount of misclassification. I multiply the off-diagonal elements of the Π(5) matrix
by a constant k = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1 to generate different degrees of misreporting. Then,
when k = 0 the misclassification matrix is identity matrix I(5) (Model 3B) and for
k = 1 the one displayed previously (Model 3A). Both figures shows that BOPM
model yields, regardless of the level of misclassification, MEs that are closer to the
true MEs as compared to the MEs under the OP model. All MEs coincide when
k = 0 but, when k increases, the MEs for the OP monotonically depart from the true
ones. The BOPM is also accepted by the misclassification test as the true model in
all instances for most values of k (i.e, k ≥ 0.3). Once more, these figures support the
BOPM even though misclassification may not be present.
I can conclude for the Monte Carlo results in this Chapter the following. First,
when the true d.g.p. is given by the HOPM and the BOPM, both models perform well
and the remaining HOP, BOP and OP models MEs are far away from their true values
and imprecisely estimated. Second, based on the t-test on ρ, the performance of the
12This can be seen by replacing (x′β) by +∞ in the full expressions for MEs in Appendix B.
13MEs for the bottom half answers are not shown because misclassification is only assumed for
observed answers in the top half of the distribution. Hence, MEs for j ∈ (1, ..., 5) are similar for the
two models, and mainly explained by a downward bias of OP γˆ coefficients as they are not function
of misclassification probabilities.
14I do not include the Vuong test as the two models are strictly nested by setting pij,k = 0.
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HOPM model compared to the BOPM model is mainly enhanced the less skew the
distribution of dependent variable is. Instead, as I assume a very skew outcome, the
BOPM model performs the best across the different experiments. Third, a positive
result is that the BOPM yields accurate estimates and MEs even when the true d.g.p.
is the usual OP model and, unless this is true model, the OP is never chosen by any
test or information criteria. Furthermore, when choosing amongst the models, the
χ¯2 test always picks the correct model, as well as the LR and Vuong tests. Yet, for
the information criteria statistics, only the AIC select the correct true model, with
the BIC and CAIC more likely to choose the smaller models (i.e., HOP and BOP)
as they penalise the more parameterised models. All information criteria, however,
do not fail to choose the correct model when d.g.p. is given by the OP. The crucial
and encouraging result is the BOPM’s good performance, regardless of the d.g.p.
assumed.
6.5. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO CIVIC BEHAVIOURS
I now turn to an empirical application of the econometric models. It is based on
one of the civic behaviours’ variables I introduced earlier in the data Section 2.3 of
Chapter 2. This dependent variable is convenient to apply to the previous models
since: (i) it contains a significant amount of skewness, and (ii) because it is a mea-
surement of a sensitive topic (question), it is very likely to be misreported due to
SD.
In particular, the civic behaviour chosen is a question regarding the willingness
to leave the name when scraping a car (for Italy). Recall that individuals were asked
to report the extent to which not leaving your name for the owner of a car you
accidentally scraped was acceptable, with responses given in an ordered scale from
1 ‘never justified’ to 10 ‘always justified’. The order to the answers of this question
is reversed so that a higher value indicates a higher sense of civic duty. Table 6.10
presents the proportions of each answers j = (1, ..., 10). Clearly, the distribution of
the dependent variable is highly skewed (skewness = -2.24), with a small fraction of
answers below the median of ≈ 7%. Covariates included in the analysis are displayed
in Table 2.1 of Chapter 2.
6.5.1. Results
In this section I present the array of tests and MEs for the group of models
previously discussed. (See Figure 6.1). I select the covariates so as to explain whether
individuals’ answers are in the bottom or top half of the distribution of the dependent
variable ‘not leaving name’ the following socioeconomic proxies: years of education
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TABLE 6.10
Civic behaviour (‘not leaving name’) frequencies
Not leaving name: Pr(ω = j), for j = 1, ..., 10









never justifiable = 10 61.95
Number of observations 3,059
and household income. That is, the vector of explanatory variables for the probit
selection rule of Eq. (6.2) is x = (x0,x1,x2), where x0 is a vector of ones, x1 =
education, and x2 = income. For answers above the median (j ≥ 6), the covariates
z are a subset of the whole range of variables of Table 2.1. Thus, the scenario is one
of partial overlap with extra variables only in z.
I purposely choose this set up for two reasons. First, individuals from privileged
backgrounds are more likely to be more civically responsible, with their ‘observed’
responses located in the top half. Indeed, there is consensus in the empirical literature
that education is positively associated with civic outcomes (e.g., Dee (2004)). Second,
to facilitate identification of ρ through nonlinearities by a scenario of partial overlap
between covariates x and z.
Tests and information criteria for the five alternative econometric models15 are
contained in Table 6.11. The misclassification test confirms that, both the HOPM
and BOPM models which allow for misclassification errors, outperform the the HOP
and BOP models. The χ¯2 statistics are 0.2129 and 0.1418, with probability values
less than 5%, so one would reject the null hypothesis that the misclassification prob-
abilities are equal to zero in either case. As expected, the civic behaviour ‘not leaving
name’ suffers from SDB and is therefore misreported. This is particularly relevant
for Italy which has often been characterised as a low trust society with a higher tol-
erance of self-interest acts, such as the one measured by the dependent variable in
the current application (Halpern (2005)). When comparing the hurdle and binary
versions of the models, binary representations are superior according to the t-test in
15Recall that for the hurdle and binary models a 6 point scale is used, with j taking val-
ues (1,2,...,5)=0, (6=6),..., (10=10), whereas for the OP the dependent variable takes values
j ∈ (1, ..., 10).
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TABLE 6.11
Models’ tests and information criteria for ‘not leaving name’
HOPM BOPM HOP BOP OP
`(θˆ) -3688.96 -3689.29 -3755.68 -3702.17 -3989.19
ρˆ -0.0309 -0.0395
(std error) (0.8622) (0.2643)
χ¯2 0.2129** 0.1418**
(p-value) (0.0225) (0.0390)
LR test versus OP 600.46** 599.78**
AIC 7435.91 7434.59 7549.35 7440.34 8018.37
BIC 7610.66 7603.31 7663.84 7548.80 8138.89
CAIC 7639.66 7631.31 7682.84 7566.80 8158.89
Vuong test versus OP -13.48 -13.45 -8.12 -11.94
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
The preferred model, with the lowest information criteria, is indicated in bold.
The OP dependent variable takes values j ∈ (1, ..., 10). For the hurdle and binary models
a 6 point scale is used, with (1,2,...,5)=0, (6=6),..., (10=10).
ρˆ, and for the two hurdle models the correlation is statistically insignificant. Uncor-
related versions of the models are additionally supported by the information criteria
statistics. The AIC suggests superiority of the BOPM, whereas the BIC and CAIC
statistics which penalise more parameterised models, favour the BOP. Moreover, the
OP performs poorly with the LR statistics rejecting the OP model, as well as the
Vuong test. In summary, the BOPM is the most preferred model and the OP is never
selected by any test and information criteria. The better performance of the BOPM
across the five models is in line with the simulations results.
Nevertheless, one needs to evaluate the potential endogeneity of education to
obtain a credible link between schooling and civic behaviour. Hence, I employ an
educational reform as an instrument for schooling that provides a source of exogenous
variation in individuals’ level of schooling that is otherwise unrelated to the dependent
variable.16 Because the BOPM offers the best performance, I carry out a Hausman
test to check for endogeneity for this model as well as for the OP. For this latter
model, education only appears once as covariate in z, thus I use a Hausman test
only for this parameter.17 The χ2(1) statistic is 0.013 (p-value = 0.910), so that the
null of exogeneity of education is accepted. I also arrive at the same conclusion in
the BOPM framework. Here, education is included in the two groups of x and z
covariates and one needs to apply a different version of the test. Specifically, the
Hausman test statistic is H =
(
θˆ − θ˜)′(Vˆ [θ˜] − Vˆ [θˆ])−1(θˆ − θ˜) ∼ χ2(q), where θˆ is
the BOPM estimator, and θ˜ the IV-BOPM estimator.18 The χ2(24) statistic is 18.80
16A detailed explanation of the IV strategy can be found in Section 4.2.









Vˆ [θ˜]− Vˆ [θˆ]) is of less than full rank (q= 24 < 28), then the generalised inverse is used and
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with a p-value of 0.24. The standard MEs, without accounting for endogeneity, are
then appropriate.
The estimated misclassification matrix for the preferred model, the BOPM, is
Πˆ(5) =

pˆi6,6 pˆi6,7 pˆi6,8 pˆi6,9 pˆi6,10
0 pˆi7,7 pˆi7,8 pˆi7,9 pˆi7,10
0 0 pˆi8,8 pˆi8,9 pˆi8,10
0 0 0 pˆi9,9 pˆi9,10
0 0 0 0 pˆi10,10
 =

0.4312 0.1960 0.1887 0.0000 0.1841
0.0000 0.6556 0.0821 0.0000 0.2623
0.0000 0.0000 0.4875 0.0126 0.4999
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5250 0.4750
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
 .
Note that the amount of misclassification is significant. The probabilities of an-
swering the truth (the diagonal elements of Πˆ(5)) are less than 52% (expect from
pˆi7,7). Overall, it is equally likely that individuals would either tell the truth or lie
when answering the question on the civic behaviour ‘not leaving name’. In partic-
ular, most misreporting is due to the elements pˆij,10. This means that people whose
reported answers show a lower degree of civic awareness are more concerned in pre-
senting themselves in the most socially acceptable terms (reporting j = 10) and,
consequently, they tend to lie on how they would react to this hypothetical situation.
This is consistent with findings from social psychology that support over-reporting
of civic behaviours.
What is the impact of misclassification matrix in terms of ‘true’ answers? One
can recover the vector of ‘true’ answers by an equation system (see, e.g., Molinari
(2008)) that relates reported and true outcomes by the estimated misclassification
matrix. Specifically, I only need to transpose the matrix and take its inverse to
obtain a solution for the vector of true responses: Pˆ y˜ =
(
Πˆ′(5)
)−1 × P ω˜, where P ω˜ is
given by the sample, that is, the vector of observed frequencies which is misclassified.
Results of Pˆ y˜j for j ∈ (6, ..., 10) are contained in Figure 6.4. Clearly, there is a very
important under-reporting for j = 6 with true answers twice as large as observed
values
(




, as well as over-reporting for the highest value
j = 10
(




. The remaining categories (j = 8, 9) are under-
reported, with P ω˜7 ≈ Pˆ y˜7 . Predicted true probabilities follow Proposition 6.1(i) and
there are significant differences between observed and true responses. This shows
that some of the skewness of the distribution of the dependent variable is explained
by misclassification, with most answers being under-reported, apart from j = 10.
I now discuss the estimated MEs for the different models. Table 6.12 presents
the MEs for the binary and the OP models. The main comparison is between the
chosen model, the BOPM, against the OP, which would be commonly used in this
the chi-square test has degrees of freedom equal to the rank of
(
Vˆ [θ˜]− Vˆ [θˆ]).
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Figure 6.4.— Observed and true probabilities for ‘not leaving name’.
type of application. Predictions for the explanatory variable family income underlines
important differences between the two models. Results based on the BOPM model
show a logical positive impact of income for all answers, with the effect rising along
j. An increase of household income of a thousand results in a 0.0063 rise in the
‘true’ probability of answering j = 6, whereas the increase in the probability for
j = 10 is significantly higher, of 9.67%. For the OP, however, this impact is not
only constant but also negative for j = 6, 7, 8; even for category j = 10 is very small
(= 0.0012). Using the OP model, without accounting for misreporting, one would
incorrectly conclude that income only increases the probability on the highest value
of the scale.19
A similar example of significant MEs with opposite signs is given by the covariate
age. Empirical evidence suggests that older individuals are likely to exhibit a higher
concern for civic values compared to younger individuals (Algan and Cahuc (2006)).
This is mostly predicted by the BOPM MEs but, for the OP, an increase of age
reduces the effect on nearly all probabilities. Additionally, note that the MEs for
the BOPM for overlapping covariates (education and income) are composed of two
19This might be caused by the smaller variation between ‘observed’ frequencies for j = 6, ..., 9.
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elements: MEs on answers being above the median and MEs on the probability of
the ‘true’ outcome conditional on this. For example, the ME of income of 0.0245 (for
j = 9) is the result of the MEs of Pr(d = 1) = 0.1462 and Pr(ω˜ = 9|d = 1) = 0.1679.
Moreover, even if some MEs are in line with each other in term of signs, the
OP model produces substantially biased results. For instance, the average bias of
the significant MEs for the variable education, is around 800%. In some cases the
upper bias in the MEs of the OP model leads to qualitatively different conclusions.
Covariates such as number of children in the household and being married do not
have a statistically significant impact (for all j) in the BOPM (p-values ≈ 0.40), but
they are significant according to the OP model (p-values ≈ 0.02).
In summary, there are crucial discrepancies in the MEs according to the signs
and statistical significance of these two models. This reflects the relevance of the
two-part and misclassification assumptions in the estimated MEs. In contrast, MEs
predictions for binary models are more alike in relation to their signs, but there are
still important differences which are due to misclassification. Most BOPM’s MEs are
larger than the ones from the BOP.
I still present the results for the hurdle models although ρˆ is not significant. As
can be seen in Table 6.13, the MEs of the HOPM are very similar to the BOPM
and the HOP and BOP estimates are quite close as well, which additionally provide
evidence on the independence of the two-part decisions. In other words, the MEs of
the HOPM and HOP confirm earlier binary predictions. There are further disparities
in the MEs significance levels between the HOPM and OP, with only two covariates
agreeing completely (for all j) with regards to statistical significance.
6.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, I propose a hurdle (and binary) OPM to deal with the skewness
and misclassification of the distribution of a self-reported outcome. As the outcome
variable has a substantial proportion of values at one end of its distribution, I account
for this via a hurdle (or two-part) assumption which divides the distribution into two
regimes, by the median of the dependent variable, using a split probit. I also allow for
the possible correlation of the two latent equations in the HOPM model. In addition,
as the framework is of a dependent variable which measures a sensitive topic, it is
likely to be misclassified due to SDB, with individuals under-reporting undesirable
behaviours and over-reporting desirable ones. I handle this by using an OPM to deal
with misreporting of observed answers in the top half of the scale.
The Monte Carlo simulations provide a good performance. If the d.g.p. includes
misclassification, both the HOPM and BOPM perform well with estimates and MEs
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TABLE 6.12
Binary models and OP marginal effects for ‘not leaving name’
Variables BOPM BOP BOPM BOP OP
Pr(ω˜=0) Pr(y˜=0) Pr(ω˜=6) Pr(y˜=6) Pr(y=6)
Education -0.0008** -0.0012** -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0018**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Income -0.1462** -0.1119** 0.0066** 0.0048** -0.0002**
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Age 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Age2/100 -0.0013* -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Male 0.0015 0.0008 0.0005
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0027)
Father’s education -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Mother’s education -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Number of children -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0034**
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Married 0.0008 0.0033 0.0065**
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0033)
Center -0.0308** -0.0279** -0.0201**
(0.0145) (0.0058) (0.0040)
North -0.0290** -0.0237** -0.0236**
(0.0134) (0.0049) (0.0037)
Variables BOPM BOP OP BOPM BOP OP
Pr(ω˜=7) Pr(y˜=7) Pr(y=7) Pr(ω˜=8) Pr(y˜=8) Pr(y=8)
Education -0.0002* -0.0001* -0.0015** -0.0002** -0.0001* -0.0021**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Income 0.0059** 0.0050** -0.0002** 0.0124** 0.0095** -0.0002**
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0001)
Age 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Age2/100 -0.0015** -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0018** -0.0003 -0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Male 0.0018 0.0006 0.0004 0.0021 0.0009 0.0006
(0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0058) (0.0048) (0.0033)
Father’s education -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Mother’s education -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Number of children -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0028** -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0041**
(0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0020)
Married 0.0009 0.0025 0.0054** 0.0011 0.0035 0.0079**
(0.0060) (0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0070) (0.0053) (0.0040)
Center -0.0367** -0.0208** -0.0167** -0.0437** -0.0297** -0.0244**
(0.0097) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0100) (0.0063) (0.0048)
North -0.0346** -0.0177** -0.0195** -0.0412** -0.0253** -0.0287**
(0.0094) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0089) (0.0053) (0.0043)
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Variables BOPM BOP OP BOPM BOP OP
Pr(ω˜=9) Pr(y˜=9) Pr(y=9) Pr(ω˜=10) Pr(y˜=10) Pr(y=10)
Education 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0024** 0.0012** 0.0017** 0.0110**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0026)
Income 0.0249** 0.0184** -0.0003** 0.0963** 0.0742** 0.0012**
(0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0004)
Age 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0024 0.0028 0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Age2/100 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0049** 0.0012 0.0030
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0033)
Male 0.0004 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0057 -0.0032 -0.0032
(0.0015) (0.0054) (0.0037) (0.0158) (0.0180) (0.0169)
Father’s education -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Mother’s education -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0000 0.0022 0.0028 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Number of children -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0046** 0.0058 0.0060 0.0212**
(0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0100)
Married 0.0002 0.0040 0.0088** -0.0031 -0.0134 -0.0406**
(0.0016) (0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0193) (0.0198) (0.0204)
Center -0.0087 -0.0338** -0.0273** 0.1199** 0.1122** 0.1260**
(0.0228) (0.0070) (0.0053) (0.0212) (0.0225) (0.0231)
North -0.0082 -0.0287** -0.0320** 0.1129** 0.0953** 0.1479**
(0.0214) (0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0197)
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
For the OP, only MEs for j ∈ (6, ..., 10) are shown because they are comparable to the ones
from the BOPM and BOP models.
close to the true values, and the χ¯2 misclassification test always picks the correct
model as well as the LR and Vuong tests. As regsards to information criteria statis-
tics, only the AIC selects the correct true model, with the BIC and CAIC more likely
to choose the smaller models (i.e., HOP and BOP) as they penalise the more parame-
terised models. When comparing the performance of the HOPM to the BOPM based
on the t-test on ρ, the power of this test is enhanced, the less skewed the distribution
of the dependent variable is, but since the framework is of a very skew outcome, the
BOPM model provides the best performance. Under the scenario of misclassification,
the remaining models, the HOP, BOP and OP, have MEs which are far away from
their true values and imprecisely estimated. A positive result is that, even in the case
of a d.g.p. given by the OP, the BOPM will still yield accurate estimates and MEs.
I then apply the models to a discrete civic behaviour (for Italy) outcome measuring
the willingness to leave the name when scraping a car (‘not leaving name’) which is
prone to suffer from SDB and, consequently, is likely to be misreported. In fact, I
found a significant amount of misclassification, being equally likely that individuals
would either tell the truth or lie. This demonstrates the superiority of the models
which incorporate misreporting. An equation system that relates reported and true
answers by the estimated misclassification matrix, shows that categories depicting low
degree of civic behaviour are clearly under-reported and, in particular, the highest
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TABLE 6.13
Hurdle models marginal effects for ‘not leaving name’
Variables HOPM HOP HOPM HOP HOPM HOP
Pr(ω˜=0) Pr(y˜=0) Pr(ω˜=6) Pr(y˜=6) Pr(ω˜=7) Pr(y˜=7)
Education -0.0008** -0.0021** -0.0002** -0.0001* -0.0002** -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Income -0.1451** -0.0386** 0.0061 0.0014 0.0055 0.0015
(0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0141) (0.0016) (0.0137) (0.0013)
Age 0.0008* -0.0010** 0.0007** -0.0007**
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Age2/100 -0.0015** -0.0001 -0.0014** -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Male 0.0009** 0.0006 0.0009** 0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0047) (0.0001) (0.0035)
Father’s education -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Mother’s education -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Number of children -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0011
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0018)
Married 0.0024 0.0037 0.0023 0.0027
(0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0037)
Center -0.0298** -0.0283** -0.0291** -0.0210**
(0.0122) (0.0059) (0.0073) (0.0045)
North -0.0272** -0.0241** -0.0266** -0.0179**
(0.0115) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0038)
Variables HOPM HOP HOPM HOP HOPM HOP
Pr(ω˜=8) Pr(y˜=8) Pr(ω˜=9) Pr(y˜=9) Pr(ω˜=10) Pr(y˜=10)
Education -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0013** 0.0023**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Income 0.0116 0.0030* 0.0241** 0.0061** 0.0978** 0.0265**
(0.0193) (0.0020) (0.0121) (0.0028) (0.0564) (0.0088)
Age 0.0010** -0.0010** 0.0006 -0.0012** -0.0031** 0.0039**
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Age2/100 -0.0020** -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0060** 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Male 0.0013** 0.0007 0.0007** 0.0008 -0.0038** -0.0026
(0.0001) (0.0050) (0.0001) (0.0057) (0.0001) (0.0188)
Father’s education -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0032)
Mother’s education -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0020 0.0029
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0034)
Number of children -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0019 0.0072 0.0062
(0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Married 0.0032 0.0039 0.0018 0.0044 -0.0098 -0.0147
(0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0060) (0.0179) (0.0200)
Center -0.0403** -0.0302** -0.0226 -0.0344** 0.1218** 0.1138**
(0.0086) (0.0063) (0.0193) (0.0070) (0.0218) (0.0226)
North -0.0367** -0.0257** -0.0206 -0.0293** 0.1110** 0.0969**
(0.0079) (0.0053) (0.0171) (0.0059) (0.0189) (0.0190)
** significant at 5 % and * significant at 10 %.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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degree of civic behaviour is largely over-reported. In turn, this leads to considerable
discrepancies in the estimated MEs between the chosen BOPM model and the OP,
often yielding different qualitative conclusions.
The models introduced in Chapter 6 can be used to analyse diverse outcomes
in the social sciences where one believes that individuals’ answering is a two stage
process, which is also subject to misclassification. Besides being applicable to several
sensitive questions (e.g., civic behaviours, illegal activities, drug consumption, etc.)
whose answers are either provided or can be recoded into 1 to J scale, the models
are also useful to studies using satisfaction or happiness data.
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B. APPENDIX: HOPM MARGINAL EFFECTS
In this appendix, I present the full MEs for the reported (misclassified) dependent variable ω˜.
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MEs for the BOPM are attained by setting ρ = 0 in the above expressions. Alternatively, by
fixing pijj = 1, one would obtain the MEs of the BOP as Π(J/2) in Eq. (6.10) would be an identity
matrix and hence true and reported answers would coincide. Standard errors of the marginal effects
are calculated by the Delta method.
Chapter 7
Overall conclusions
Social capital is an umbrella concept which embodies elements ranging from networks
and trust to civism (van Oorschot et al. (2006)). The multifaceted character of so-
cial capital is what makes it an appealing notion, because it has a positive impact
on key aspects of a society. Higher levels of social capital are normally associated
with higher economic growth and an increasing human development. Social capi-
tal influences economic performance through trust as its pivotal element (Zak and
Knack (2001), and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004)). Trust incentives markets to function
efficiently by reducing inter-firm transaction costs, by increasing exchange of knowl-
edge between firms and by enhancing the division of labour by lowering costs of
coordination (Maskell (2000)). Trust, at the macro level, is also strongly associated
with lower government corruption and higher bureaucratic quality and compliance
with paying taxes (Halpern (2005)).
Moreover, there is a growing body of evidence on how social capital also plays
an important role in shaping people’s health via different channels (e.g., Poortinga
(2006a), Sundquist and Yang (2007)). For example, at the individual level, social
capital provides social and material support in adverse times (Ferlander (2007)) and,
at the macro level, more trust in a society leads to a higher efficiency of health
institutions (Szreter and Woolcock (2004), Helliwell (2006)). This dual impact of
social capital on economic performance and well being, is the reason why I have relied
on the multidimensional construct of social capital throughout my dissertation.
Education, the other key element of the thesis, is one of the most important
determinants of social capital found in the literature (e.g., Helliwell and Putnam
(2007), van Oorschot and Finsveen (2009)). Of the different levels of analysis of
social capital, Halpern (2005) argues that education affects social capital primarily
at the micro (individual) level. Regardless of their income level, more educated
individuals are more likely to participate in social networks, be engaged in politics and
volunteering activities, and have a higher trust in other people (Delhey and Newton
(2003), Bekkers (2007)). The same evidence is contained in the meta analysis study of
Huang et al. (2009) who assess the effect of schooling in a large number of evaluations
and find that education is a strong and robust correlate of individual social capital.
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Similarly to this strand of the literature, the thesis’ chosen working hypothesis was
with causality going from human to social capital. Nonetheless, because social capital
can be both cause and effect and indicators of social capital are measured with error,
I have accounted for the empirical problems such as simultaneity and misreporting.
At the macro-level, however, social capital is directly affected by history and cul-
ture, social structures, labour-market trends and the size and nature of the welfare
state. For example, a more extended welfare state supposes to create a national
norm of social solidarity and fellow feeling which is conducive to higher trust levels
amongst individuals (van Oorschot and Finsveen (2010)). Besides schooling, religion
is often cited as another important determinant at the micro-level. Some studies
find that a country with a dominant protestant culture tends to show a higher level
of trustworthiness (Delhey and Newton (2005), van Oorschot et al. (2006)). Trust
is often considered endogenous to certain elements of the social structure (Torsvik
(2004)). In fact, some countries are immersed in social traps due to an overall in-
stitutional environment problem (Rothstein (2005)). Because political institutions’
efficiency, religious composition and welfare policies differ across countries, then, the
contextual factors of the two countries would likely influence relationships within the
human to social capital framework. In this dissertation I have investigated this rela-
tionship for two different countries, as causality from education to measures of social
capital might be local to social structures and, in consequence, it would be rather
erroneous to make generalisations exclusively based upon one country.
Specifically, in this dissertation I have examined, for both Italy and the UK, the
impact of education on a range of civic outcomes that embody some of the main
dimensions of social capital. The dissertation’s main interest was to attain a “credi-
ble” relationship between education and civic outcomes. Unobserved factors driving
education choices (endogeneity) and the tendency of individuals to under-report so-
cially undesirable behaviours (misclassification) are both elements which contribute
to obscuring the true relationship between education and civic outcomes. Controlling
for measurement error in the two components of this association is vital. One could
not argue of the benefits of education in terms of economic growth and health via
its impact on key facets of social capital, if the observed relationship is plagued with
inaccuracies. Therefore, I methodologically accounted for these empirical concerns
and also investigated whether they varied by countries’ contextual factors. Finally, I
proposed an extension to discrete choice models to deal with highly skewed responses
of a misclassified outcome.
The dissertation’s main empirical contribution was given by using an array of civic
outcomes and, crucially, because I accounted for misclassification. Previous research
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in the economic literature studying the causal link of education and civic outcomes
(e.g., Dee (2004)) does not explicitly control for misclassification and focuses on only
one aspect of social capital, civic engagement. Including civic behaviours into the
analysis allowed me to provide evidence on how, after accounting for misreporting,
education is related to indicators of social trust. Moreover, because of the two coun-
tries’ analysis, I was able to investigate issues such as the extent to which educational
effects on social capital differ under varying social structures.
I concentrated on these two countries as a way of finding out whether the extent
of the problem of endogeneity and misreporting in the human to social capital frame-
work is country specific. On the one hand, the interest in Italy was twofold. Firstly,
the economic literature on civic returns tends to be centered in works for the US
and UK (e.g., Milligan et al. (2004)). Secondly, it contains unique features, partic-
ulary compelling regional differences in social capital which lead some authors (e.g.,
Fukuyama (1995)) to classify it as a low trust society, and southern Italian regions
cited as examples of situations of social trap. Indeed, the Italian case has been very
popular within the social capital literature since publication of the seminal study by
Putnam et al. (1993). On the other hand, the UK was included in the thesis as a
way to validate the results for Italy, but also so as to inspect the extent in which
simultaneity and misreporting are in fact influenced by macro characteristics. Note
that Italy and the UK are distinct as far as religious composition and welfare policies
are concerned. Knowing whether unobservables behind education choices and social
desirability (SD) are local to social structures, is vital, particularly since there is
mixed evidence on how social capital is distributed across Europe (e.g., Delhey and
Newton (2005), van Oorschot et al. (2006), van Oorschot and Finsveen (2010)).
Figure 7.1 illustrates the dissertation’s main results in a diagram, showing key
differences of the two countries.1 The figure and its notation follow the one presented
in the introductory Chapter 1 which contained the thesis’ outline, that is, Figure 1.1.
To begin with, I reintroduce the notation. Let x be the observed value of the educa-
tion covariate and x∗ its true value which accounts for endogeneity, obtained by the
IV approach. This is the first empirical issue in the causality of education with civic
outcomes. The observed dependent variable y represents the array of civic outcomes,
which are composed of y1 (civic opinions) and y2 (civic behaviours). Due to SD, civic
outcomes y are likely to be misreported since, typically, individuals would tend to
underreport socially undesirable behaviours and over-report socially desirable ones.
Hence, the true dependent variables of civic opinions and civic behaviours are instead
given, respectively, by ω1 and ω2, with estimated misclassification matrices that link
1More detailed results and conclusions were already included at the end of Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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Figure 7.1.— Dissertation’s main results.
them with the observed answers Πˆ1 and Πˆ2. This is the second empirical issue in
the causality of education with civic outcomes. These two (true) civic outcomes em-
body the main dimension of social capital which, in turn, has an effect on health, life
satisfaction and economic growth.
The parametric models defined by the different variables of Figure 7.1 are as fol-
lows. The first model is the OP, which does not account for either endogeneity or
misclassification, consisting of the linkage of the observed version of the indepen-
dent (x) and dependent variables (y); its schooling’s coefficient is denoted as βed,OP.
Because unobservables have an effect on schooling decisions, they are depicted by a
variation in the observed valued of schooling (∆x). Thus, the true value of education,
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which is obtained by the fitted value IV approach, is defined as x∗ = x + ∆x. The
second parametric model accounting for endogeneity is the IV-OP, linking the true
value of education (x∗) and the observed value of civic outcomes (y). The schooling’s
coefficient is βed,IV-OP. Controlling only for misreporting defines the third model, the
OPM, which links the observed value of education (x) with the true values of civic
opinions (ω1) and civic behaviours (ω2), and its coefficient for education is denoted
by βed,OPM. Finally, the full model, which accounts for both empirical concerns in the
human to social capital framework is the IV-OPM, where the true value of education
x∗ is linked to true values of civic outcomes (ω) by the coefficient βed,IV-OPM.
As displayed in Figure 7.1, education, for both Italy and the UK, is statistically
significant for most civic outcomes’ specifications within the OP; that is, βˆed,OP > 0.
Thus, I am able to reproduce the result found in most empirical studies that schooling
is one of the strongest determinants of social capital in different countries (e.g., Delhey
and Newton (2003), Li et al. (2005), Helliwell and Putnam (2007)). I found an
equivalent result when controlling for unobservables: βˆed,IV-OP > 0, with the common
upward bias in the coefficient due to endogeneity. Yet the effect of unobservables
diverges for the two countries. Whereas education is exogenous in the civic outcomes’
specifications for Italy (∆x ≡ 0), it is endogenous for the UK (∆x 6= 0). This means
that the hypothesis of the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al. (1995)) holds in the
UK: unobserved factors which lead individuals to develop a taste for education, are
likely to be positively correlated with civic outcomes. In other words, the transmission
of interest in issues of the political sphere and attitudinal behaviours occur in the
UK, as suggested by the civic voluntarism model, at the family level, due to resources
and psychological factors, but not however, in Italy. For example, privileged families
are more likely to boast a politically rich home environment dominated by frequent
political discussions, with politically active parents acting as role models (Verba et al.
(2005)). In fact, this result is very important for how causality varies for the two
countries.
As far as misreporting is concerned, I found that, as hypothesised, it is a cru-
cial empirical issue (Πˆ) throughout the thesis, since indicators are self-reported and
also recover sensitive information. Indeed, most civic outcomes are misclassified for
both countries, and misreporting is more severe for civic behaviours due to a larger
influence of SD (Πˆ1  Πˆ2), leading to substantial changes in the estimated effects.
Civic opinions, which essentially are measures of political engagement, tend to be
over-reported. Specifically, individuals who apparently show the highest political
engagement are more likely to misreport due to factors such as stigma and feelings
of guilt, or because they are more concerned with their class interests (e.g., Bern-
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stein et al. (2001)). Because civic behaviours measure sensitive topics and people’s
morality, the misclassification problem is more severe. Certainly, estimations by ed-
ucational levels show a significant misreporting of civic behaviours regardless of the
schooling level considered, but, for civic opinions, misreporting only holds for the
group of more educated individuals. The higher misreporting for the former indica-
tors might be explained by empirical research in social psychology which normally
finds a stronger effect of descriptive social norms (see, e.g., Cialdini et al. (2006)).
Figure 7.1’s fundamental difference originates from estimations on civic behaviours.
Civic opinions’ results, on the contrary, are the same for Italy and the UK, with the
estimated schooling’s coefficient being positive and statistically significant for the two
countries. For Italy, the null of exogeneity of schooling is accepted and the correct
model is the OPM, thus causality of education on civic opinions is depicted by the
arrow going from x to ω1 (βˆed,OPM  0). For the UK, unobservables drive education
decisions so that the estimated coefficient is βˆed,IV-OPM ( 0), which estimates the
relationship going from x∗ to the civic opinion ω1. When accounting for misclassifi-
cation for civic behaviours in the OPM, however, the deeper influence of SD renders
the link with education as statistically nonsignificant (for both countries), which is
displayed in the Figure by βˆed,OPM ≡ 0. In particular, this lack of causality for the
Italian case (as the OPM is the chosen model) highlights the fact that, if one does not
account for the tendency of individuals to provide socially desirable responses, this
would lead to a spurious relationship between education and civic behaviours. For
the UK, the chosen model is the IV-OPM (∆x 6= 0), and the upper bias introduced
by endogeneity is such, that the impact of education on civic behaviours becomes
statistically significant. This is the main difference with the Italian case: schooling
has significant positive effects on all civic outcomes in the UK. In short, the fact that
unobservables jointly affect education and civic outcomes seems to be local to social
structures, whereas misreporting is not country specific and it is more related to the
nature of the indicators measured. In the remainder of this section, each Chapter’s
results are discussed in more detail.
In Chapter 4, I investigated the Italian case. The range of civic measures used
are: ‘interest in politics’, the ‘problem of tax evasion’, and the following behaviours:
‘not paying for your ticket on public transport’, ‘keeping money obtained by accident
when it could be returned’ and ‘not leaving your name for the owner of a car you
accidentally scraped’. Given the distinct nature of these measures, I classified the
first two as civic opinions and the last three as civic behaviours. This classification
relies on the two main dimensions of social capital proposed by Uphoff (2000), that is,
structural social capital (civic engagement) and cognitive social capital (social trust).
Chapter 7. Overall conclusions 142
The former type is associated with various forms of social organisation while the latter
indicates mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology,
more specifically, by norms, values and beliefs. These two categories of social capital
are interdependent (Woolcock and Narayan (2000), Sundquist and Yang (2007)).
I found that self-reported measures in Italy are prone to suffer from social de-
sirability bias (SDB). Specifically, misreporting yielded a large bias in the impact of
schooling but, also, and importantly, an overestimation of its precision. Crucially,
even if there is a positive bias in the estimated coefficients, the increase of their
standard error can obscure key empirical causality links. This is certainly the case
of the association of education with civic behaviours, where qualitative overall con-
clusions were indeed affected by incorporating misclassification. That is, education
has a positive and statistically significant effect on civic opinions but misreporting
modified the relationship between schooling and civic behaviours, becoming statisti-
cally non-significant. This lack of causality suggests two possibilities. It may indicate
that SDB operates differently within the two dimensions of social capital and it is a
more important issue regarding measures of civic behaviours, than indicators on civic
engagement. This agrees with studies showing that the facets of social capital tend
to be positively correlated, but correlations are usually quite low (Rothstein (2001),
Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003), van Oorschot et al. (2006)). Alternatively, it may
reflect that the cultural component of social trust plays a deeper role than schooling.
As argued before, lack of trust in Italy would lead to bad steady states and social
traps, making misreporting perhaps more significant in this country. Furthermore,
perhaps surprisingly, I accepted the hypothesis that education is exogenous in the IV-
OPM models, rejecting the civic voluntarism’s hypothesis of unobservables operating
at the family level, being particularly cultivated at the beginning of the life-course.
More specifically, out of the five civic outcomes analysed in Chapter 4, I only
found lack of evidence of misclassification for the civic opinion ‘the problem of tax
evasion’. Also, the misclassification problem is more severe for civic behaviours and
empirically explained by the assumption of monotonicity of correct report, which
justified my choice as regards to the classification of civic outcomes into two groups.
Civic behaviours are misreported regardless of which education level I considered,
that is, either the higher or lower educated group of individuals would tend to lie
with regards to how they behave, as they are apparently reluctant to admit to an
interviewer that they lack civic awareness, or have engaged in an illegal activity. The
misclassification bias for civic behaviours obeys to an under-reporting of the lower
civically behaved group whereas, for ‘interest in politics’, the group that apparently
show a higher degree of political engagement are more prone to over-report it. These
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misreporting patterns obtained are in line with existing theories from political science
and social psychology (e.g., Bernstein et al. (2001), Karp and Brockington (2005),
Cialdini (2007)).
The analysis for the UK was carried out in Chapter 5, for which I employed more
indicators than Italy, yet the core group of civic outcomes are equivalent across the
two countries. Civic opinions are: ‘interest in politics’, ‘pay attention to politics’,
‘discuss politics’ and being ‘active in a voluntary organisation’. The three civic
behaviours used are: ‘failing to report accidental damage done to a parked vehicle’,
‘keeping money that you have found’, and ‘avoiding a fare on public transport’. I
additionally included outcomes related to politics, voting and social trust. Namely,
whether respondents believe that ‘political activity takes too much time and effort’,
‘family and friends think that voting is a waste of time’, ‘feel very guilty if not
vote’, ‘neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote’, as well as outcomes concerning
interpersonal trust and trust in institutions, that is, whether ‘most people can be
trusted’ and whether they ‘trust the local government’. This allowed me to add
other dimensions of social capital (such as social participation and interpersonal
trust) that are not captured by the previous indicators. These UK’s indicators fit
into the framework by van Oorschot et al. (2006), which contains three dimensions
for social capital: i) networks, ii) trust, and iii) civism. Individuals’ attitudinal and
behavioural characteristics belong to the third dimension (civism), although I also
included outcomes representing trust and network dimensions.
Chapter 5’s estimations show that most civic outcomes are misclassified and,
therefore, misclassification is an important empirical issue for the UK too. Most
social capital indicators are self-reported and measure sensitive topics, so SD influ-
ences reported answers in spite of countries’ macro characteristics as religion and
welfare policies. SD operates regardless of the endogeneity of social structures, at
least when one compares the social structures of European southern countries with
Anglo-Saxon countries. On the one hand, the pattern of misreporting for civic opin-
ions is also equivalent to the one in Italy. Specifically, individuals who apparently
show the highest political engagement are more likely to over-report due to factors
such as stigma and feelings of guilt. The fourth civic opinion, ‘active in a voluntary
organisation’, is not misreported according to the misclassification test, because un-
like measures of political engagement, the impact of SD is not as strong. The group
of civic behaviours, on the other hand, suffer from misreporting to a larger degree
(as in Italy) than indicators on civic engagement. The extent of misclassification is
such that, for certain values, individuals are more likely to lie than to tell the truth.
Also, the assumption of monotonicity of correct report holds, which means that the
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problem is decreasing, the more civically behaved individuals are, according to their
reported answers.
With regards to the additional indicators, the negative link of schooling with the
first two outcomes ‘political activity takes too much time and effort’ and ‘voting is
a waste of time’, challenges the alternative mechanisms proposed by some studies
in the economics field (e.g., Gibson (2001), Dee (2004)). That is, by raising the
opportunity cost of an individual’s time, increased schooling could reduce the amount
of time and attention allocated to civic activities. On the contrary, when applied to
political activities in the UK, the opportunity cost of time is lower for more educated
individuals, who also do not consider the voting process futile. In fact, estimations
suggest that the more educated an individual is, the less likely he would be to judge
the time aspect of political activity as a reason for his lack of participation, and also
the less likely he would be to consider voting a waste of time. The other indicators
‘feel very guilty if not vote’ and ‘neglect my duty as a citizen if not vote’ allowed
me to investigate the extent to which, feelings of guilt and duty in the participation
of the political process, vary by educational levels. Indeed, these feelings varied by
schooling levels because, even after controlling for misclassification, the coefficient
of education is statistically significant and positive for both outcomes. This offers
extra support to the hypothesis of SD driving misclassification of civic outcomes.
Moreover, self-reported data on generalised trust and trust in institutions are subject
to SD and are misreported as well.
Contrary to the Italian case, endogeneity of education in the UK is accepted
for most indicators. The direction of the bias introduced by endogeneity follows
the same direction as the one introduced by endogeneity, with upward biases in
both cases. Results appear to suggest that the extent of this correlation is such,
that the impact of education on civic behaviours becomes statistically significant
when accounting for endogeneity. This is the main difference with the Italian case:
schooling has significant positive effects on all civic outcomes in the UK. Chapter 5’s
main finding is that educational achievement emerges as a strong predictor for the
different dimensions of social capital. Estimations of education levels for the UK are
in line with the the lower and higher educated sub-samples of individuals for the
Italian case. For example, for civic opinions, misreporting only holds for the group
of more educated individuals.
The principal difference of Chapters 4 and 5 is how causality of schooling and civic
behaviours varies in Italy and the UK. As far as civic opinions are concerned, the
only difference between these two countries principally consists of the endogeneity of
education. Causality of schooling for the different measures of political engagement
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in the UK are mostly driven by unobservables, but not for ‘interest in politics’ in
Italy, where the null of exogeneity of education is accepted. The transmission of
interest in issues of the political sphere occurs in the UK, as suggested by the civic
voluntarism model, at the family level, but not in Italy. The dissertation’s results
agree with the mixed distribution of social capital within Europe.
In Chapter 6, motivated by civic behaviours’ distributions, I proposed a theoreti-
cal extension to an ordered response model, a “hurdle ordered probit with misclassifi-
cation” (HOPM). In the model, I addressed two problems regarding the distribution
of a self-reported ordered outcome: its skewness and its misclassification. Because
the dependent variable measures a sensitive topic (i.e., a civic behaviour), it is more
probable to be misclassified. The argument is the same as in the previous Chapters:
the bias (social desirability bias) occurs since respondents will tend to answer, though
unconsciously, according to what is considered to be socially acceptable in order to
gain approval of others, and will result in under-reporting undesirable behaviours and
over-reporting desirable ones (Paulhus (1991), Tourangeau and Yan (2007)). I used
an OPM to account for this. For the high degree of skewness (that is, the substantial
proportion of values at one end of its distribution), I relied on a hurdle (or two-part)
model. Combining a binary choice model and an OP model is a standard practice
in the empirical literature. This modeling approach is well established within the
field of health economics in the analysis of smoking, health expenditures, etc. (Jones
(2000), Madden (2008), Kasteridis et al. (2010)). Hence, the proposed HOPM con-
sists of two parts: (i) a split probit model which divides the distribution into two
regimes by the median of the dependent variable, and (ii) an ordered probit with
misclassification to deal with misreporting of observed answers in the top half of the
scale. The model can be applied to questions on sensitive issues whose answers are
given into an ordered 1 to J scale.
I carried out extensive simulations under different true models or data generation
process (d.g.p.) to evaluate the models in terms of biases, precision of estimates, and
marginal effects (MEs). Various tests and information criteria were also reported to
compare the array of models’ performance. The Monte Carlo simulations provided a
good performance for the model, even when d.g.p. is given by the OP, the model still
yielded accurate estimates and MEs. The χ¯2 misclassification test always picks the
correct model as well as the LR and Vuong tests. I then applied the model to a discrete
civic behaviour (for Italy) measuring the willingness to leave the name when scraping
a car (‘not leaving name’), which is prone to suffer from SDB and consequently, is
likely to be misreported. I found a significant amount of misclassification, being
equally likely that individuals would either tell the truth or lie. In particular, if the
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splitting process and measurement error are ignored, inference would be erroneous.
This is the first model which accounts for these two issues and potentially could be
applied to self-reported data in other fields, such as happiness and job satisfaction
outcomes.
I now mention some central issues which emerged from the thesis. To begin with,
social capital is a valuable concept to study the mechanisms by which education af-
fects civic outcomes. Its multidimensional character, including elements as diverse
as civism, trust and networks, is what makes it an appealing concept for analysing
causality of education on civic outcomes. I have relied on the social capital liter-
ature to classify civic outcomes, to put forward hypotheses regarding misreporting
by groups of indicators, and to interpret the role of unobservables. Secondly, misre-
porting is a fundamental phenomenon within the human to social capital framework
which should be controlled for. Civic outcomes are self-reported and measure sen-
sitive topics, thus SD plays a major role in causality. Furthermore, if one does not
account for misclassification, qualitative overall conclusions regarding the causality
of education on civic outcomes could be affected, particularly for civic behaviours.
Finally, because the two countries studied in the thesis do not differ substantially
with regards to misreporting, this might indicate that SD influences measures of so-
cial capital beyond country effects or contextual factors (e.g., religion and welfare
policies). This is in line with the similarity in the aggregate levels of social capital
amongst European countries, found in the literature.
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